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THE ''UNITED STATES'' AND THE ''MACEDONIAN" 

In one of the notable duels of the war, Decatar, with the 

'* United States," disabled and captured the 

British frigate "Macedonian" 



Statceman EWtlon 



THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812 

THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY DURING 

THE LAST WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN, TO 

WHICH IS APPENDED AN ACCOUNT OF 

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS 
VOLUME I 



BY 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT 




PUBLISHED WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE 
PRESIDENT THROUGH SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT 
WITH THE CENTURY CO., MESSRS. CHARLES 
SCRIBNER'S SONS, AND G. P. PUTNAM'S SON» 



NEW YORK 

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS COMPANY 

MCM I V 






Copyright 1882 
By G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



This edition is published under arrangement with 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, of New Yorit and London. 



£ditc-- 
2;Mr'0f 



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PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO 

American State Papers. 

Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, 1783 to 
1836. 2 vols, octavo. London, 1837. 

Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo. 
London, 1866. 

"Captains' Letters" in Archives at Washington. 

Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs, edited by his daugh- 
ter. 2 vols, octavo. London, 1873. 

Coggeshall, George. History of American Privateers. 
New York, 1876. 

Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New 
York, 1856. 

Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman. London, 
i860. 

Douglas, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. Lon- 
don, i860. 

Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States 
Navy, 1853. 

Farragut, Adm. D. G., Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut. 
Octavo. New York, 1878. 

Graviere, Adm., J. de la. Guerres Maritimes. 2 vols, oc- 
tavo. Paris, 1881. 

James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols, 
octavo, London, 1837. 

James, William. Naval Occurrences with the Americans. 
Octavo, London, 1817. 

Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812. Oc- 
tavo, New York, 1869. 

Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613 to 1863. 2 
vols, octavo. London, 1877. 

"London Naval Chronicle." 



Principal Authorities Referred To 

Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols, octavo. Lon- 
don, 1825. 

"Masters-Commandant's Letters" in the Archives at Wash- 
ington. 

Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880. 
Naval Archives at Washington. 

Niles "Weekly Register." 

Pielat, B. La Vie et les Actions Memorables du St. Michel 
de Ruyter. Amsterdam, 1677. 

Riviere, Lieut. H. La Marine Frangaise sous le Regime 
de Louis XV. Paris, iSsg. 

Tatnall, Commod., Life, by C. C. Jones. Jr. Savannah, 
1878. 

Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion. Phila. 
1811. 

Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris, 1868. 

Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics, 1859. 

Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British Navy. 3 
vols, octavo. London, 1866. 



PREFACE 

THE history of the naval events of the War of 
1 8 12 has been repeatedly presented both to the 
American and the English reader. Historical writ- 
ers have treated it either in connection with a gen- 
eral account of the contest on land and sea, or as 
forming a part of the complete record of the navies 
of the two nations. A few monographs, which con- 
fine themselves strictly to the naval occurrences, have 
also appeared. But none of these works can be re- 
garded as giving a satisfactorily full or impartial 
account of the war — some of them being of the 
"popular" and loosely-constructed order, while oth- 
ers treat it from a purely partisan standpoint. No 
single book can be quoted which would be accepted 
by the modern reader as doing justice to both sides, 
or, indeed, as telling the whole story. Any one spe- 
cially interested in the subject must read all, and 
then it will seem almost a hopeless task to reconcile 
the many and widely contradictory statements he 
will meet with. 

There appear to be three works which, taken in 

(i) Vol. IX.— I 



2 Preface 

combination, give the best satisfaction on the sub- 
ject. First, in James's "Naval History of Great 
Britain" (which suppHes both the material and the 
opinions of almost every subsequent English or 
Canadian historian) can be found the British view 
of the case. It is an invaluable work, written with 
fulness and care; on the other hand, it is also a 
piece of special pleading by a bitter and not over- 
scrupulous partisan. This, in the second place, can 
be partially supplemented by Fenimore Cooper's 
"Naval History of the United States." The latter 
gives the American view of the cruises and battles ; 
but it is much less of an authority than James's, both 
because it is written without great regard for exact- 
ness, and because all figures for the American side 
need to be supplied from Lieutenant (now Admiral) 
George E. Emmons's statistical "History of the 
United States Navy," which is the third of the 
works in question. 

But even after comparing these three authors, 
many contradictions remain unexplained, and the 
truth can only be reached in such cases by a careful 
examination of the navy "Records," the London 
"Naval Chronicle," "Niles's Register," and other 
similar documentary publications. Almost the only 
good criticisms on the actions are those incidentally 
given in standard works on other subjects, such as 



Preface 3 

Lord Howard Douglas's "Naval Gunnery," and 
Admiral Jurien de la Graviere's "Guerres Mari- 
times." Much of the material in our Navy Depart- 
ment has never been touched at all. In short, no 
full, accurate, and unprejudiced history of the war 
has ever been written. 

The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it has 
received. At present people are beginning to real- 
ize that it is folly for the great English-speaking Re- 
public to rely for defence upon a navy composed 
partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new ves- 
sels rather more worthless than the old. It is worth 
while to study with some care that period of our his- 
tory during which our navy stood at the highest pitch 
of its fame; and to learn anything from the past it 
is necessary to know, as near as may be, the exact 
truth. Accordingly, the work should be written im- 
partially, if only from the narrowest motives. With- 
out abating a jot from one's devotion to his country 
and flag, I think a history can be made just enough 
to warrant its being received as an authority equally 
among Americans and Englishmen. I have endeav- 
ored to supply such a work. It is impossible that 
errors, both of fact and opinion, should not have 
crept into it ; and although I have sought to make it 
in character as non-partisan as possible, these errors 
will probably be in favor of the American side. 



4 Preface 

As my only object is to give an accurate narrative 
of events, I shall esteem it a particular favor if any 
one will furnish me with the means of rectifying 
such mistakes; and if I have done injustice to any 
commander, or officer of any grade, whether Ameri- 
can or British, I shall consider myself under great 
obligations to those who will set me right. 

I have been unable to get access to the original 
reports of the British commanders, the logs of the 
British ships, or their muster-rolls, and so have been 
obliged to take them at second hand from the "Ga- 
zette," or "Naval Chronicle," or some standard his- 
tory. The American official letters, log-books, orig- 
inal contracts, muster-rolls, etc., however, being pre- 
served in the Archives at Washington, I have been 
able, thanks to the courtesy of the Hon, Wm. H. 
Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, to look them over. 
The set of letters from the officers is very complete, 
in three series, — "Captains' Letters," "Masters' 
Commandant Letters," and "Officers' Letters," there 
being several volumes for each year. The books of 
contracts contain valuable information as to the 
size and build of some of the vessels. The log- 
books are rather exasperating, often being very in- 
complete. Thus when I turned from Decatur's 
extremely vague official letter describing the cap- 
ture of the Macedonian to the log-book of the frigate 



Preface 5 

United States, not a fact about the fight could be 
gleaned. The last entry in the log on the day of 
the fight is ''Strange sail discovered to be a frigate 
under English colors," and the next entry (on the 
following day) relates to the removal of the prison- 
ers. The log of the Enterprise is very full indeed, 
for most of the time, but is a perfect blank for the 
period during which she was commanded by Lieu- 
tenant Burrows, and in which she fought the Boxer. 
I have not been able to find the Peacock's log at all, 
though there is a very full set of letters from her 
commander. . Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed a 
great deal of valuable material. Whenever it was 
possible I have referred to printed matter in prefer- 
ence to manuscript, and my authorities can thus, in 
most cases, be easily consulted. 

In conclusion I desire to express my sincerest 
thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of 
the United States Navy, and Commander Adolf 
Mensing, formerly of the German Navy, without 
whose advice and sympathy this work would prob- 
ably never have been written or even begun. 

New York City, 1882. 



PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION 

{ORIGINALLY intended to write a companion 
volume to this, which should deal with the oper- 
ations on land. But a short examination showed 
that these operations were hardly worth serious 
study. They teach nothing new; it is the old, old 
lesson, that a miserly economy in preparation may 
in the end involve a lavish outlay of men and money, 
which, after all, comes too late to more than partially 
offset the evils produced by the original short-sighted 
parsimony. This might be a lesson worth dwelling 
on did it have any practical bearing on the issues 
of the present day; but it has none, as far as the 
army is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jeffer- 
son, and his follower, Madison, to neglect to give 
us a force either of regulars or of well-trained vol- 
unteers during the twelve years they had in which 
to prepare for the struggle that any one might see 
was inevitable; but there is now far less need of an 
army than there was then. Circumstances have al- 
tered widely since 1812. Instead of the decaying 
might of Spain on our Southern frontier, we have 
the still weaker power of Mexico. Instead of the 
great Indian nations of the interior, able to keep 
civilization at bay, to hold in check strong armies, 

(7) 



8 Preface to Third Edition 

to ravage large stretches of territory, and needing 
formidable military expeditions to overcome them, 
there are now only left broken and scattered bands 
which are sources of annoyance merely. To the 
North we are still hemmed in by the Canadian pos- 
sessions of Great Britain ; but since 1812 our strength 
has increased so prodigiously, both absolutely and 
relatively, while England's military power has re- 
mained almost stationary, that we need now be un- 
der no apprehensions from her land-forces ; for, even 
if checked in the beginning, we could not help con- 
quering in the end by sheer weight of numbers, if 
by nothing else. So that there is now no cause for 
our keeping up a large army; while, on the contrary, 
the necessity for an efficient navy is so evident that 
only our almost incredible short-sightedness pre- 
vents our at once preparing one. 

Not only do the events of the war on land teach 
very little to the statesman who studies history in 
order to avoid in the present the mistakes of the 
past, but besides this, the battles and campaigns are 
of very little interest to the student of military mat- 
ters. The British regulars, trained in many wars, 
thrashed the raw troops opposed to them whenever 
they had anything like a fair chance; but this is not 
to be wondered at, for the same thing has always 
happened the world over under similar conditions. 
Our defeats were exactly such as any man might 
have foreseen, and there is nothing to be learned 
from the follies committed by incompetent com- 
manders and untrained troops when in the presence 



Preface to Third Edition 9 

of skilled officers having under them disciplined sol- 
diers. The humiliating surrenders, abortive at- 
tacks, and panic routs of our armies can all be paral- 
leled in the campaigns waged by Napoleon's mar- 
shals against the Spaniards and Portuguese in the 
years immediately preceding the outbreak of our 
own war. The Peninsular troops were as little able 
to withstand the French veterans as were our militia 
to hold their own against the British regulars. But 
it must always be remembered, to our credit, that 
while seven years of fighting failed to make the 
Spaniards able to face the French,^ two years of 
warfare gave us soldiers who could stand against 
the best men of Britain. On the Northern frontier 
we never developed a great general, — Brown's claim 
to the title rests only on his not having committed 
the phenomenal follies of his predecessors, — but by 
1 8 14 our soldiers had become seasoned, and we had 
acquired some good brigade commanders, notably 
Scott, so that in that year we played on even terms 
with the British. But the battles, though marked 
by as bloody and obstinate fighting as ever took 
place, were waged between small bodies of men, and 
were not distinguished by any feats of generalship, 
so that they are not of any special interest to the 
historian. In fact, the only really noteworthy feat 

' At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between the 
allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so 
rapid and universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington 
the bitter observation, that "though he had seen a good many 
remarkable things in the course of his life, yet this was the 
first time he had ever seen ten thousand men running a race." 



lo Preface to Third Edition 

of arms of the war took place at New Orleans, and 
the only military genius that the struggle developed 
was Andrew Jackson. His deeds are worthy of all 
praise, and the battle he won was in many ways so 
peculiar as to make it well worth a much closer study 
than it has yet received. It was by far the most 
prominent event of the war; it was a victory which 
reflected high honor on the general and soldiers who 
won it, and it was in its way as remarkable as any 
of the great battles that took place about the same 
time in Europe. Such being the case, I have de- 
voted a chapter to its consideration at the conclusion 
of the chapters devoted to the naval operations. 

As before said, the other campaigns on land do 
not deserve very minute attention; but, for the sake 
of rendering the account of the battle of New Or- 
leans more intelligible, I will give a hasty sketch 
of the principal engagements that took place else- 
where. 

The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by the 
campaign of General Hull on the Michigan frontier. 
With two or three thousand raw troops he invaded 
Canada. About the same time Fort Mackinaw was 
surrendered by its garrison of 60 Americans to a 
British and Indian force of 600. Hull's campaign 
was unfortunate from the beginning. Near Browns- 
town the American Colonel Van Home, with some 
200 men, was ambushed and routed by Tecumseh 
and his Indians. In revenge Colonel Miller, with 
600 Americans, at Maguaga attacked 150 British 



Preface to Third Edition ii 

and Canadians under Captain Muir, and 250 In- 
dians under Tecumseh, and whipped them, — Te- 
cumseh's Indians standing their ground longest. 
The Americans lost 75, their foes 180 men. At 
Chicago the small force of 66 Americans was sur- 
prised and massacred by the Indians. Meanwhile, 
General Brock, the British commander, advanced 
against Hull with a rapidity and decision that 
seemed to paralyze his senile and irresolute oppo- 
nent. The latter retreated to Detroit, where, with- 
out striking a blow, he surrendered 1,400 men to 
Brock's nearly equal force, which consisted nearly 
one-half of Indians under Tecumseh. On the Ni- 
agara frontier, an estimable and honest old gentle- 
man and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of mili- 
tary matters. Gen. Van Rensselaer, tried to cross 
over and attack the British at Queenstown; 1,100 
Americans got across and were almost all killed 
or captured by an equal number of British, Cana- 
dians, and Indians, while on the opposite side a 
larger number of their countrymen looked on, 
and with abject cowardice refused to cross to 
their assistance. The command of the army was 
then handed over to a ridiculous personage named 
Smythe, who issued proclamations so bombastic that 
they really must have come from an unsound mind, 
and then made a ludicrously abortive effort at inva- 
sion, which failed almost of its own accord. A Brit- 
ish and Canadian force of less than 400 men was 
foiled in an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight 
skirmish, by about 1,000 Americans under Brown; 



12 Preface to Third Edition 

and with this trifling success the military operations 
of the year came to an end. 

Early in 1813, Ogdensburg was again attacked, 
this time by between 500 and 600 British, who took 
it after a brisk resistance from some 300 militia ; the 
British lost 60 and the Americans 20, in killed and 
wounded. General Harrison, meanwhile, had be- 
gun the campaign in the Northwest. At French- 
town, on the river Raisin, Winchester's command 
of about 900 Western troops was surprised by a 
force of 1,100 men, half of them Indians, under the 
British Colonel Proctor. The right division, taken 
by surprise, gave up at once ; the left division, mainly 
Kentucky riflemen, and strongly posted in houses 
and stockaded inclosures, made a stout resistance, 
and only surrendered after a bloody fight, in which 
180 British and about half as many Indians were 
killed or wounded. Over 300 Americans were slain, 
some in the battle, but most in the bloody massacre 
that followed. After this. General Harrison went 
into camp at Fort Meigs, where, with about 1,100 
men, he was besieged by 1,000 British and Cana- 
dians under Proctor and 1,200 Indians under Te- 
cumseh. A force of 1,200 Kentucky militia ad- 
vanced to his relief and tried to cut its way into the 
fort while the garrison made a sortie. The sortie 
was fairly successful, but the Kentuckians were scat- 
tered like chaff by the British regulars in the open, 
and when broken were cut to pieces by the Indians in 
the woods. Nearly two-thirds of the relieving troops 
were killed or captured ; about 400 got into the fort. 



Preface to Third Edition 13 

Soon afterward Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort 
Stephenson, garrisoned by Major Croghan and 160 
men, was attacked by a force of 391 British regu- 
lars, who tried to carry it by assault, and were re- 
pulsed with the loss of a fourth of their number. 
Some four thousand Indians joined Proctor, but 
most of them left him after Perry's victory on Lake 
Erie. Then Harrison, having received large rein- 
forcements, invaded Canada. At the River Thames 
his army of 3,500 men encountered and routed be- 
tween 600 and 700 British under Proctor, and 
about 1,000 Indians under Tecumseh. The battle 
was decided at once by a charge of the Kentucky 
mounted riflemen, who broke through the regulars, 
took them in rear, and captured them, and then dis- 
mounting attacked the flank of the Indians, who 
were also assailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped 
by the skin of his teeth and Tecumseh died fighting, 
like the hero that he was. This battle ended the 
campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter it must 
be remembered that the war was, on the part of the 
Americans, mainly one against Indians; the latter 
always forming over half of the British forces. 
Many of the remainder were French Canadians, and 
the others were regulars. The American armies, 
on the contrary, were composed of the armed set- 
tlers of Kentucky and Ohio, native Americans, of 
English speech and blood, who were battling for 
lands that were to form the heritage of their chil- 
dren. In the West the war was only the closing 
act of the struggle that for many years had been 



14 Preface to Third Edition 

waged by the hardy and restless pioneers of our 
race, as with rifle and axe they carved out the 
mighty empire that we their children inherit ; it was 
but the final effort with which they wrested from 
the Indian lords of the soil the wide and fair do- 
main that now forms the heart of our great Re- 
public. It was the breaking down of the last bar- 
rier that stayed the flood of our civilization; it 
settled, once and forever, that henceforth the law, 
the tongue, and the blood of the land should be 
neither Indian, nor yet French, but English, The 
few French of the West were fighting against a race 
that was to leave as little trace of them as of the 
doomed Indian peoples with whom they made com- 
mon cause. The presence of the British mercenaries 
did not alter the character of the contest ; it merely 
served to show the bitter and narrow hatred with 
fwhich the Mother-Island regarded her greater 
daughter, predestined as the latter was to be queen 
of the lands that lay beyond the Atlantic. 

Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans 
made successful descents on York and Fort George, 
scattering or capturing their comparatively small 
garrisons, while a counter descent by the British 
on Sackett's Harbor failed, the attacking force be- 
ing too small. After the capture of Fort George, 
the Americans invaded Canada; but their advance 
guard, 1,400 strong, under Generals Chandler and 
Winder, was surprised in the night by 800 British, 
who, advancing with the bayonet, broke up the camp, 
capturing both the generals and half the artillery. 



Preface to Third Edition 15 

Though the assailants, who lost 220 of their small 
number, suffered much more than the Americans, 
yet the latter were completely demoralized, and at 
once retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward, 
Col, Boerstler with about 600 men surrendered with 
shamefully brief resistance to a somewhat smaller 
force of British and Indians. Then about 300 Brit- 
ish crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock, which 
they took, but were afterward driven off by a large 
body of militia with the loss of 40 men. Later in 
the season the American General McClure wantonly 
burned the village of Newark, and then retreated 
in panic flight across the Niagara. In retaliation 
the British in turn crossed the river; 600 regulars 
surprised and captured in the night Fort Niagara, 
with its garrison of 400 men; two thousand troop- 
ers attacked Black Rock, and, after losing over a 
hundred men in a smart engagement with somewhat 
over 1,500 militia whom they easily dispersed, cap- 
tured and burned both it and Buffalo, Before these 
last events took place another invasion of Canada 
had been attempted, this time under General Wil- 
kinson, "an unprincipled imbecile," as Scott very 
properly styled him. It was mismanaged in every 
possible way, and was a total failure; it was attend- 
ed with but one battle, that of Chrystler's Farm, in 
which 1,000 British, with the loss of less than 200 
men, beat back double their number of Americans, 
who lost nearly 500 men and also one piece of artil- 
lery. The American army near Lake Champlain 
had done nothing, its commander, General Wade 



i6 Preface to Third Edition 

Hampton, being, if possible, even more incompetent 
than Wilkinson, He remained stationary while a 
small force of British plundered Plattsburg and 
Burlington; then, with 5,000 men he crossed into 
Canada, but returned almost immediately, after a 
small skirmish at Chauteaugay between his advance 
guard and some 500 Canadians, in which the former 
lost 41 and the latter 22 men. This affair, in which 
hardly a tenth of the American force was engaged, 
has been, absurdly enough, designated a "battle" by 
most British and Canadian historians. In reality 
it was the incompetency of their general and not the 
valor of their foes that caused the retreat of the 
Americans. The same comment, by the way, ap- 
plies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, in the 
following year, which may have been lost by Sir 
George Prevost, but was certainly not won by the 
Americans. And, again, a similar criticism should 
be passed on General Wilkinson's attack on La 
Colle Mill, near the head of the same lake. Neither 
one of the three affairs was a stand-up fight ; in each 
a greatly superior force, led by an utterly incapable 
general, retreated after a slight skirmish with an 
enemy whose rout would have been a matter of cer- 
tainty had the engagement been permitted to grow 
serious. 

In the early spring of 18 14 a small force of 160 
American regulars, under Captain Holmes, fighting 
from behind felled logs, routed 200 British with a 
loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 8. On 
Lake Ontario the British made a descent on Oswego 



Preface to Third Edition 17 

and took it by fair assault; and afterward lost 180 
men who tried to cut out some American transports, 
and were killed or captured to a man. All through 
the spring and early summer the army on the Niag- 
ara frontier was carefully drilled by Brown, and 
more especially by Scott, and the results of this 
drilling were seen in the immensely improved effec- 
tiveness of the soldiers in the campaign that opened 
in July. Fort Erie was captured with little resist- 
ance, and on the 4th of July, at the river Chippeway, 
Brown, with two brigades of regulars, each about 
1,200 strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade 
of 800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a 
total of about 3,200 men, won a stand-up fight 
against the British General Riall, who had nearly 
2,500 men, 1,800 of them regulars. Porter's bri- 
gade opened by driving in the Canadian militia and 
the Indians; but was itself checked by the British 
light-troops. Ripley's brigade took very little part 
in the battle, three of the regiments not being en- 
gaged at all, and the fourth so slightly as to lose but 
five men. The entire brunt of the action was borne 
by Scott's brigade, which was fiercely attacked by 
the bulk of the British regulars under Riall. The 
latter advanced with great bravery, but were ter- 
ribly cut up by the fire of Scott's regulars ; and when 
they had come nearly up to him, Scott charged with 
the bayonet and drove them clean off the field. The 
American loss was 322, including 2;^ Indians ; the 
British loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians. 
The number of Americans actually engaged did not 



1 8 Preface to Third Edition 

exceed that of the British; and Scott's brigade, in 
fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge, defeated an 
equal force of British regulars. 

On July 25th occurred the Battle of Niagara, or 
Lundy's Lane, fought between General Brown with 
3,100^ Americans and General Drummond with 
3,500^ British. It was brought on by accident in 
the evening, and was waged with obstinate courage 
and savage slaughter till midnight. On both sides 
the forces straggled into action by detachments. 
The Americans formed the attacking party. As 
before, Scott's brigade bore the brunt of the fight, 
and over half of his men were killed or wounded; 
he himself was disabled and borne from the field. 
The struggle was of the most desperate character, 
the combatants showing a stubborn courage that 
could not be surpassed.'* Charge after charge was 
made with the bayonet, and the artillery was taken 
and retaken once and again. The loss was nearly 

^ As near as can be found out; most American authorities 
make it much less; Lossing, for example, says, only 2,400. 

* General Drummond in his official letter makes it but 
2,800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3,000 rank and 
file; adding 13 per cent for the officers, sergeants, and drum- 
mers, brings it up to 3,400; and we still have to count in the 
artillery drivers, etc. 

■* General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner 
were their attacks directed against our guns that our artil- 
lerymen were bayoneted while in the act of loading, and the 
muzzle of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few 
yards of ours." Even James says: "Upon the whole, how- 
ever, the American troops fought bravely ; and the conduct 
of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially, 
would have done honor to any service." 



Preface to Third Edition 19 

equal: on the side of the Americans, 854 men (in- 
cluding Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and 
two guns; on that of the British, 878 men (includ- 
ing General Riall captured) and one gun. Each 
side claimed it as a victory over superior numbers. 
The truth is beyond question that the British had 
the advantage in numbers, and a still greater advan- 
tage in position ; while it is equally beyond question 
that it was a defeat and not a victory for the Ameri- 
cans. They left the field and retired in perfect or- 
der to Fort Erie, while the British held the field and 
the next day pursued their foes. 

Having received some reinforcements General 
Drummond, now with about 3,600 men, pushed for- 
ward to besiege Fort Erie, in which was the Ameri- 
can army, some 2,400 strong, under General Gaines. 
Col. Tucker with 500 British regulars was sent 
across the Niagara to destroy the batteries at Black 
Rock, but was defeated by 300 American regulars 
under Major Morgan, fighting from behind a strong 
breastwork of felled trees, with a creek in front. 
On the night of the 15th of August, the British in 
three columns advanced to storm the American 
works, but after making a most determined assault 
were beaten off. The assailants lost 900 men, the 
assailed about 80. After this nothing was done till 
September 17th, when General Brown, who had 
resumed command of the American forces, deter- 
mined upon and executed a sortie. Each side had 
received reinforcements; the Americans numbered 
over 3,000, the British nearly 4,000. The fighting 



20 Preface to Third Edition 

was severe, the Americans losing 500 men ; but their 
opponents lost 600 men, and most of their batteries 
were destroyed. Each side, as usual, claimed the 
victory; but, exactly as Lundy's Lane must be ac- 
counted an American defeat, as our forces retreated 
from the ground, so this must be considered an 
American victory, for after it the British broke up 
camp and drew off to Chippeway. Nothing more 
was done, and on November 5th the American 
army recrossed the Niagara. Though marked by 
some brilliant feats of arms this four months' in- 
vasion of Canada, like those that had preceded it, 
thus came to nothing. But at the same time a Brit- 
ish invasion of the United States was repulsed far 
more disgracefully. Sir George Prevost, with an 
army of 13,000 veteran troops, marched south along 
the shores of Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, which 
was held by General Macomb with 2,000 regulars, 
and perhaps double that number of nearly worthless 
militia; — a force that the British could have scat- 
tered to the winds, though, as they were strongly 
posted, not without severe loss. But the British 
fleet was captured by Commodore MacDonough in 
the fight on the lake; and then Sir George, after 
some heavy skirmishing between the outposts of the 
armies, in which the Americans had the advantage, 
fled precipitately back to Canada. 

All through the war the sea-coasts of the United 
States had been harried by small predatory excur- 
sions ; a part of what is now the State of Maine was 
conquered with little resistance, and kept until the 



Preface to Third Edition 21 

close of hostilities ; and some of the towns on the 
shores of Chesapeake Bay had been plundered or 
burnt. In August, 18 14, a more serious invasion 
was planned, and some 5,000 troops — regulars, sail- 
ors, and marines — were landed, under the command 
of General Ross. So utterly helpless was the Demo- 
cratic Administration at Washington, that during 
the two years of warfare hardly any steps had been 
taken to protect the Capitol, or the counti*y round 
about; what little was done was done entirely too 
late, and bungled badly in addition. History has 
not yet done justice to the ludicrous and painful 
folly and stupidity of which the government found- 
ed by Jefferson, and carried on by Madison, was 
guilty, both in its preparations for, and in its way of 
carrying on, this war ; nor is it yet realized that the 
men just mentioned, and their associates, are pri- 
marily responsible for the loss we suffered in it, and 
the bitter humiliation some of its incidents caused 
us. The small British army marched at will through 
Virginia and Maryland, burned Washington, and 
finally retreated from before Baltimore and re-em- 
barked to take part in the expedition against New 
Orleans. Twice, at Bladensburg and North Point, 
it came in contact with superior numbers of militia 
in fairly good position. In each case the result was 
the same. After some preliminary skirmishing, 
manoeuvring, and volley firing, the British charged 
with the bayonet. The rawest regiments among the 
American militia then broke at once; the others 
kept pretty steady, pouring in quite a destructive 



22 Preface to Third Edition 

fire, until the regulars had come up close to them, 
when they also fled. The British regulars were too 
heavily loaded to pursue, and, owing to their mode 
of attack, and the rapidity with which their oppo- 
nents ran away, the loss of the latter was in each case 
very slight. At North Point, however, the militia, 
being more experienced, behaved better than at 
Bladensburg. In neither case were the British put 
to any trouble to win their victory. 

The above is a brief sketch of the campaigns of 
the war. It is not cheerful reading for an American, 
nor yet of interest to a military student ; and its les- 
sons have been taught so often by similar occur- 
rences in other lands under like circumstances, and 
moreover, teach such self-evident truths, that they 
scarcely need to be brought to the notice of a his- 
torian. But the crowning event of the war was the 
Battle of New Orleans: remarkable in its military 
aspect, and a source of pride to every American. It 
is well worth a more careful study, and to it I have 
devoted the last chapter of this book. 

New York City, 1883. 



CONTENTS 



FA R T ONE 
CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Causes of the War of 1812 — Conflicting views of America 
and Britain as regards neutral rights — Those of the 
former power right — Impossibility of avoiding hostili- 
ties — Declaration of war — General features of the con- 
test — Racial identity of the contestants — The treaty of 
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged — But 
practically settles the dispute in our favor in respect to 
maritime rights — The British navy and its reputation 
prior to 1812 — Comparison with other European navies 
— British and American authorities consulted in the 
present work 27 

CHAPTER II 

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when Ameri- 
ca declared war against her — Race identity of the com- 
batants — The American navy at the beginning of the 
war — Officers well trained — Causes tending to make our 
seamen especially efficient — Close similarity between 
the British and American sailors — Our ships manned 
chiefly by native Americans, many of whom had for- 
merly been impressed into the British navy — Quotas of 
seamen contributed by the different States — Navy yards 
— Lists of officers and men — List of vessels — Tonnage — 

(23) 



24 Contents 

Different ways of estimating it in Britain and America 
— Ratings — American ships properly rated — Arma- 
ments of the frigates and corvettes — Three styles of 
guns used — Difference between long guns and carron- 
ades — Short weight of American shot — Comparison of 
British frigates rating 38, and American frigates rating 
44 guns — Compared with a 74 50 



CHAPTER III 

1812 

ON THE OCEAN 

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of 
the Belvidera — Cruise of the Essex — Captain Hull's 
cruise, and escape from the squadron of Commodore 
Broke — Cotistittttion captures Gtcerriere — Wasp cap- 
tures Frolic — Second unsuccessful cruise of Commo- 
dore Rodgers — United States captures Macedonian — 
Constitution captures Java — Essex starts on a cruise 
— Summary 105 

CHAPTER IV 
1812 

ON THE LAKES 

Preliminary — The combatants starting nearly on an 
equality — Difficulties of creating a naval force — Diffi- 
culty of comparing the force of the rival squadrons — 
Meagreness of the published accounts — Unreliability of 
James — Ontario — Extraordinary nature of the Ameri- 
can squadron — Canadian squadron forming only a kind 



Contents 25 

of water militia — Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by 
Commodore Earle — Commodore Chauncy bombards 
York — Erie — Lieutenant Elliott captures the Detroit 
and Caledonia — Unsuccessful expedition of Lieutenant 
Angus 178 

CHAPTER V 
1813 

ON THE OCEAN 

Blockade of the American coast — The Essex in the South 
Pacific — The Hornet captures the Peacock — American 
privateers cut-out by British boats — Unsuccessful cruise 
of Commodore Rodgers — The Chesapeake is captured 
by the Shannon — Futile gunboat actions — Defence of 
Craney Island — Cutting-out expeditions — The Argus 
is captured by the Pelican — The Enterprise captures 
the Boxer — Summary 201 



CHAPTER VI 

1813 

ON THE LAKES 

Ontario — Comparison of the rival squadrons — Chauncy 
takes York and Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at Sack- 
ett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake — Chauncy 
sails — Yeo's partial victory off Niagara — Indecisive ac- 
tion off the Genesee — Chauncy's partial victory off Bur- 
lington, which gives him the command of the lake — 
Erie — Perry's success in creating a fleet— His victory 
— Champlain — Loss of the Growler and Eagle — Sum- 
mary 267 

Vol. IX.— 2 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Causes of the War of 1812— Conflicting views of America 
and Britain as regards neutral rights— Those of the 
former power right— Impossibility of avoiding hostili- 
ties—Declaration of war— General features of the con- 
test—Racial identity of the contestants— The treaty of 
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged— But 
practically settles the dispute in our favor in respect to 
maritime rights— The British navy and its reputation 
prior to 1812— Comparison with other European navies 
— British and American authorities consulted in the 
present work 

THE view professed by Great Britain in 1812 
respecting the rights of belHgerents and neu- 
trals was diametrically opposite to that held by the 
United States. "Between England and the United 
States of America," writes a British author, "a 
spirit of animosity, caused chiefly by the impress- 
ment of British seamen, or of seamen asserted to 
be such, from on board of American merchant ves- 
sels, had unhappily subsisted for a long time" prior 
to the war. "Itjs, we believe," he continues, "an 
acknowledged maxim of public lawj as well that no 
nation jDUt_the_£)neJhe belongs to_i:an.xelease a sub- 
ject from his natural allegiance, as that, provided, 
the jurisdiction of another independent state be not 
infringed, every nation has a right to enforce the 
services of her subjects wherever they may be found. 

(27) 



28 Naval War of 1812 

Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over 
her merchant vessels upon the high seas as to ex- 
clude a belHgerent nation from the right of search- 
ing them for contraband of war or for the property 
or persons of her enemies. And if, in the exercise 
of that right, the belligerent should discover on 
board of the neutral vessel a subject who has with- 
drawn himself from his lawful allegiance, the neu- 
tral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver 
him up; more especially if that subject is proved to 
be a deserter from the sea or land service of the 
former." ^ 

Great Britain's doctrine was "once a subject al- 
ways a subject." On the other hand, the United 
States maintained that any foreigner, after five 
years' residence within her territory, and after hav- 
ing complied with certain forms, became one of her 
citizens as completely as if he was native born. 
Great Britain contended that her warships possessed 
the right of searching all neutral vessels for the 
property and persons of her foes. The United 
States, resisting this claim, asserted that "free bot- 
toms made free goods," and that consequently her 
ships when on the high seas should not be molested 
on any pretext whatever. Finally, Great Britain's 
system of impressment,^ by which men could be 
forcibly seized and made to serve in her navy, no 



1 '" 



'The Naval History of Great Britain," by William James, 
Vol. IV, p. 324. (New edition by Captain Chamier, R. N.. 
London, 1837.) 

* The best idea of which can be gained by reading Marry- 
at's novels. 



Introductory 29 

matter at what cost to themselves, was repugnant to 
every American idea. 

Such wide differences in the views of the two 
nations produced endless difficulties. To escape the 
press-gang, or for other reasons, many British sea- 
men took service under the American flag; and if 
they were demanded back, it is not likely that they 
or their American shipmates had much hesitation in 
swearing either that they were not British at all, 
or else that they had been naturalized as Americans. 
Equally probable is it that the American blockade- 
runners were guilty of a great deal of fraud and 
more or less thinly veiled perjury. But the wrongs 
done by the Americans were insignificant compared 
with those they received. Any innocent merchant 
vessel was liable to seizure at any moment; and 
when overhauled by a British cruiser short of men 
was sure to be stripped of most of her crew. The 
British officers were themselves the judges as to 
whether a seaman should be pronounced a native 
of America or of Britain, and there was no appeal 
from their judgment. If a captain lacked his full 
complement there was little doubt as to the view 
he would take of any man's nationality. The wrongs 
inflicted on our seafaring countrymen by their im- 
pressment into foreign ships formed the main cause 
of the war. 

There were still other grievances which are thus 
presented by the British Admiral Cochrane.^ "Our 

^ "Autobiography of a Seaman," by Thomas, tenth Earl of 
Dundonald, Admiral of the Red, Rear-Admiral of the Fleet, 
London, i860, vol. I, p. 24. 



30 Naval War of 1812 

treatment of its (America's) citizens was scarcely 
in accordance with the national privileges to which 
the young Republic had become entitled. There 
were no doubt many individuals among the Ameri- 
can people who, caring little for the Federal Gov- 
ernment, considered it more profitable to break than 
to keep the laws of nations by aiding and supporting 
our enemy (France), and it was against such that 
the efforts of the squadron had chiefly been directed ; 
but the way the object was carried out was scarcely 
less an infraction of those national laws which we 
were professedly enforcing. The practice of taking 
English (and American) seamen out of American 
ships without regard to the safety of navigating 
them when thus deprived of their hands has been 
already mentioned. To this may be added the de- 
tention of vessels against which nothing contrary to 
international neutrality could be established, where- 
by their cargoes became damaged, the compelling 
them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other 
than those to which they were destined ; and gener- 
ally treating them as though they were engaged in 
contraband trade. . . . American ships were not 
permitted to quit English ports without giving se- 
curity for the discharge of their cargoes in some 
other British or neutral port." On the same subject 
James* writes : "When, by the maritime supremacy 
of England, France could no longer trade for her- 
self, America proffered her services, as a neutral, to 
trade for her; and American merchants and their 

* L. c, IV, 325. 



Introductory ^i 

agents, in the gains that flowed in, soon found a 
compensation for all the perjury and fraud necessary 
to cheat the former out of her belligerent rights. 
The high commercial importance of the United 
States, thus obtained, coupled with a similarity of 
language and, to a superficial observer, a resem- 
blance in person between the natives of America 
and Great Britain, has caused the former to be the 
chief, if not the only, sufferers by the exercise of the 
right of search. Chiefly indebted for their growth 
and prosperity to emigration from Europe, the 
United States hold out every allurement to foreign- 
ers, particularly to British seamen, whom, by a 
process peculiarly their own, they can naturalize as 
quickly as a dollar can exchange masters and a blank 
form, ready signed and sworn to, can be filled up.^ 
It is the knowledge of this fact that makes British 
naval officers when searching for deserters from 
their service so harsh in their scrutiny, and so scep- 
tical of American oaths and asseverations." 

The last sentence of the foregoing from James is 
a euphemistic way of saying that whenever a Brit- 
ish commander short of men came across an Ameri- 
can vessel he impressed all of her crew that he 
wanted, whether they were citizens of the United 
States or not. It must be remembered, however, 
that the only reason why Great Britain did us more 
injury than any other power was because she was 
better able to do so. None of her acts were more 
offensive than Napoleon's Milan decree, by which 
* This is an exaggeration. 



32 Naval War of 1812 

it was declared that any neutral vessel which per- 
mitted itself to be searched by a British cruiser 
should be considered as British, and as the lawful 
prize of any French vessel. French frigates and 
privateers were very apt to snap up any American 
vessel they came across, and were only withheld at 
all by the memory of the sharp dressing they had 
received in the West Indies during the quasi-war of 
1 799- 1 800. What we undoubtedly ought to have 
done was to have adopted the measure actually pro- 
posed in Congress, and declared war on both France 
and England. As it was, we chose as a foe the one 
that had done, and could still do, us the greatest 
injury. 

The principles for which the United States con- 
tended in 1812 are now universally accepted, and 
those so tenaciously maintained by Great Britain 
find no advocates in the civilized world. That Eng- 
land herself was afterward completely reconciled 
to our views was amply shown by her intense indig- 
nation when Commodore Wilkes, in the exercise of 
the right of search for the persons of the foes of 
his country, stopped the neutral British ship Trent; 
while the applause with which the act was greeted 
in America proves pretty clearly another fact, that 
we had warred for the right, not because it zvas the 
right, but because it agreed with our self-interest to 
do so. We were contending for "Free Trade and 
Sailors' Rights" ; meaning by the former expression, 
freedom to trade wherever we chose without hin- 
drance save from the power with whom we were 



Introductory ^3 

trading ; and by the latter, that a man who happened 
to be on the sea should have the same protection 
accorded to a man who remained on land. Nomi- 
nally, neither of these questions was settled by, or 
even alluded to, in the treaty of peace; but the im- 
mense increase in reputation that the navy acquired 
during the war practically decided both points in our 
favor. Our sailors had gained too great a name for 
one to molest them with impunity again. 

Holding views on these maritime subjects so radi- 
cally different from each other, the two nations could 
not but be continually dealing with causes of quar- 
rel. Not only did British cruisers molest our mer- 
chantmen, but at length one of them, the 50-gun 
ship Leopard, attacked an American frigate, the 
Chesapeake, when the latter was so lumbered up that 
she could not return a shot, killed or disabled some 
twenty of her men, and took away four others, one 
Briton and three Americans, who were claimed as 
deserters. For this act an apology was offered, but . 
it failed to restore harmony between the two nations. 
Soon afterward another action was fought. The 
American frigate President, Commodore Rodgers, 
attacked the British sloop Little Belt, Captain Bing- 
ham, and exchanged one or two broadsides with her, 
— the frigate escaping scot-free while the sloop was 
nearly knocked to pieces. Mutual recriminations 
followed, each side insisting that the other was the 
assailant. 

When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council 
forbidding our trading with France, we retaliated 



34 Naval War of 1812 

by passing an embargo act, which prevented us from 
trading at all. There could be but one result to 
such a succession of incidents, and that was war. 
Accordingly, in June, 1812, war was declared; and 
as a contest for the rights of seamen, it was largely 
waged on the ocean. We also had not a little fight- 
ing to do on land, in which, as a rule, we came out 
second-best. Few or no preparations for the war 
had been made, and the result was such as might 
have been anticipated. After dragging on through 
three dreary and uneventful years it came to an end 
in 181 5, by a peace which left matters in almost pre- 
cisely the state in which the war had found them. 
On land and water the contest took the form of a 
succession of petty actions, in which the g\ory ac- 
quired by the victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace in- 
curred by the vanquished. Neither side succeeded 
in doing what it intended. Americans declared that 
Canada must and should be conquered, but the con- 
quering came quite as near being the other way. 
British writers insisted that the American navy 
should be swept from the seas: and during the 
sweeping process it increased fourfold. 

When the United States declared war. Great Brit- 
ain was straining every ner\'^e and muscle in a death 
struggle with the most formidable military despot- 
ism of modem times, and was obliged to entrust the 
defence of her Canadian colonies to a mere handful 
of regulars, aided by the local fencibles. But Con- 
gress had provided even fewer trained soldiers, and 
relied on the militia. The latter chiefly exercised 



Introductory S5 

their fighting abilities upon one another in dueling, 
and, as a rule, were afflicted with conscientious scru- 
ples whenever it was necessary to cross the frontier 
and attack the enemy. Accordingly, the campaign 
opened with the bloodless surrender of an American 
general to a much inferior British force, and the war 
continued much as it had begun; we suffered dis- 
grace after disgrace, while the losses we inflicted, 
in turn, on Great Britain were so slight as hardly 
to attract her attention. At last, having crushed her 
greater foe, she turned to crush the lesser, and, in 
her turn, suffered ignominious defeat. By this time 
events had gradually developed a small number of 
soldiers on our northern frontier, who, commanded 
by Scott and Brown, were able to contend on equal 
terms with the veteran troops to whom they were 
opposed, though these formed part of what was then 
undoubtedly the most formidable fighting infantry 
any European nation possessed. The battles at this 
period of the struggle were remarkable for the skill 
and stubborn courage with which they were waged, 
as well as for the heavy loss involved ; but the num- 
ber of combatants was so small that in Europe they 
would have been regarded as mere outpost skir- 
mishes, and they wholly failed to attract any atten- 
tion abroad in that period of colossal armies. 

When Great Britain seriously turned her attention 
to her transatlantic foe, and assembled in Canada 
an army of 14,000 men at the head of Lake Cham- 
plain, Congressional forethought enabled it to be 
opposed by soldiers who, it is true, were as well dis- 



36 Naval War of 1812 

ciplined, as hardy, and as well commanded as any in 
the world, but who were only a few hundred strong, 
backed by more or less incompetent militia. Only 
Macdonough's skill and Sir George Prevost's inca- 
pacity saved us from a serious disaster ; the sea-fight 
reflected high honor on our seamen, but the retreat 
of the British land-forces was due to the commander 
and not to their antagonists. Meanwhile a large 
British fleet in the Chesapeake had not achieved 
much glory by the destruction of local oyster-boats 
and the burning of a few farmers' houses, so an 
army was landed to strike a decisive blow. At Bla- 
densburg® the five thousand British regulars, utterly 
worn out by heat and fatigue, by their mere ap- 
pearance, frightened into a panic double their num- 
ber of American militia well posted. But the only 
success attained was burning the public buildings of 
Washington, and that result was of dubious value. 
Baltimore was attacked next, and the attack repulsed, 
after the forts and ships had shelled one another 
with the slight results that usually attend that spec- 
tacular and harmless species of warfare. 

The close of the contest was marked by the ex- 
traordinary battle of New Orleans. It was a per- 
fectly useless shedding of blood, since peace had 
already been declared. There is hardly another con- 
test of modern times where the defeated side suf- 
fered such frightful carnage, while the victors came 
off almost scathless. It is quite in accordance with 

* See the "Capture of Washington," by Edward D. Ingra- 
ham (Philadelphia, 1849). 



Introductory 37 

the rest of the war that the militia, hitherto worse 
than useless, should on this occasion win against 
great odds in point of numbers; and, moreover, that 
their splendid victory should have been of little con- 
sequence in its effects upon the result. On the whole, 
the contest by land, where we certainly ought to 
have been successful, reflected greater credit on our 
antagonists than upon us, in spite of the services of 
Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small force of 
regulars and volunteers did excellently; as for the 
militia, New Orleans proved that they could fight 
superbly; and the other battles that they generally 
would not fight at all. 

At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were 
widely different. Here we possessed a small but 
highly effective force, the ships well built, manned 
by thoroughly trained men, and commanded by able 
and experienced officers. The deeds of our navy 
form a part of history over which any American can 
be pardoned for lingering. 

Such was the origin, issue, and general character 
of the war. It may now be well to proceed to a 
comparison of the authorities on the subject. Allu- 
sion has already been made to them in the preface, 
but a fuller reference seems to be necessary in this 
connection. 

At the close of the contest, the large majority of 
historians who wrote of it were so bitterly ran- 
corous that their statements must be received with 
caution. For the main facts I have relied wherever 



38 Naval War of 1812 

it was practicable upon the official letters of the 
commanding officers, taking each as authority for 
his own force and loss/ For all the British victories 
we have British official letters, which tally almost 
exactly, as regards matters of fact and not of opin- 
ion, with the corresponding American accounts. For 
the first year the British also published official ac- 
counts of their defeats, which, in the cases of the 
Guerriere, Macedonian, and Frolic, I have followed 
as closely as the accounts of the American victors. 
The last British official letter published announcing 
a defeat was that in the case of the Java, and it is 
the only letter that I have not strictly accepted. The 
fact that no more were published thereafter is of 
itself unfortunate; and from the various contradic- 
tions it contains it would appear to have been tam- 
pered with. The surgeon's report accompanying it 
is certainly false. Subsequent to 1812 no letter of 
a defeated British commander was published,^ and I 
have to depend upon the various British historians, 
especially James, of whom more anon. 

The American and British historians from whom 
we are thus at times forced to draw our material 

■" As where Broke states his own force at 330, his antago- 
nist's at 440, and the American court of inquiry makes the 
numbers 396 and 379, I have taken them as being 330 and 379 
respectively. This is the only just method; I take it for 
granted that each commander meant to tell the truth, and 
of course knew his own force, while he might very naturally 
and in perfect good faith exaggerate his antagonist's. 

* Except about the battles on the Lakes, where I have ac- 
cordingly given the same credit to the accounts both of the 
British and of the Americans. 



Introductory 39 

regard the war from very different standpoints, and 
their accounts generally differ. Each writer natur- 
ally so colored the affair as to have it appear favor- 
able to his own side. Sometimes this was done inten- 
tionally and sometimes not. Not infrequently errors 
are made against the historian's own side ; as when 
the British author, Brenton, says that the British 
brig Peacock mounted 32's instead of 24's, while 
Lossing in his "Field Book of the War of 1812" 
makes the same mistake about the armament of the 
American brig Argus. Errors of this description 
are, of course, as carefully to be guarded against as 
any others. Mere hearsay reports, such as "it has 
been said," "a prisoner on board the opposing fleet 
has observed," "an American (or British) news- 
paper of such and such a date has remarked," are of 
course to be rejected. There is a curious parallelism 
in the errors on both sides. For example, the Amer- 
ican, Mr. Low, writing in 1813, tells how the Con- 
stiUition, 44, captured the Guerriere of 49 guns, 
while the British Lieutenant Low, writing in 1880, 
tells how the Pelican, 18, captured the Argus of 20 
guns. Each records the truth but not the whole 
truth, for although rating 44 and 18 the victors car- 
ried respectively 54 and 21 guns, of heavier metal 
than those of their antagonists. Such errors are 
generally intentional. Similarly, most American 
writers mention the actions in which the privateers 
were victorious, but do not mention those in which 
they were defeated ; while the British, in turn, record 
every successful "cutting-out" expedition, but ig- 



40 Naval War of 1812 

nore entirely those which terminated unfavorably. 
Other errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus, 
James in speaking of the repulse of the Endymion's 
boats by the Nenfchatel gives the latter a crew of 
120 men; she had more than this number originally, 
but only 40 were in her at the time of the attack. 
So also when the captain of the Pelican writes that 
the officers of the Argus report her loss at 40, when 
they really reported it at 24 ; or when Captain Dacres 
thought the Constitution had lost about 20 men in- 
stead of T4. The American gunboat captains in 
recounting their engagements with the British frig- 
ates invariably greatly overestimated the loss of the 
latter. So that on both sides there were some inten- 
tional misstatements or garblings, and a much more 
numerous class of simple blunders, arising largely 
from an incapacity for seeing more than one side 
of the question. 

Among the early British writers upon this war, 
the ablest was James. He devoted one work, his 
"Naval Occurrences," entirely to it ; and it occupies 
the largest part of the sixth volume of his more ex- 
tensive "History of the British Navy." ^ Two other 
British writers. Lieutenant Marshall^" and Captain 
Brenton,^^ wrote histories of the same events, about 
the same time; but neither of these naval officers 
produced half as valuable a work as did the civilian 

« A new edition, London, 1826. 

10 "Royal Naval Biography," by John Marshall (London. 

1823-1835). 
" "Naval History of Great Britain," by Edward Pelham 

Brenton (new edition, London, 1837). 



Introductory 41 

James. Marshall wrote a dozen volnmes, each filled 
with several scores of dreary panegyrics, or memoirs 
of as many different officers. There is no attempt at 
order, hardly anything about the ships, guns, or 
composition of the crews ; and not even the pretence 
of giving both sides, the object being to make every 
Englishman appear in his best light. The work is 
analogous to the numerous lives of Decatur, Bain- 
bridge, Porter, etc., that appeared in the United 
States about the same time, and is quite as un- 
trustworthy. Brenton made a far better and very 
interesting book, written on a good and well-con- 
nected plan, and apparently with a sincere desire to 
tell the truth. He accepts the British official ac- 
counts as needing nothing whatever to supplement 
them, precisely as Cooper accepts the American offi- 
cials'. A more serious fault is his inability to be ac- 
curate. That this inaccuracy is not intentional is 
proved by the fact that it tells as often against his 
own side as against his opponents. He says, for 
example, that the guns of Perry's and Barclay's 
squadrons "were about equal in number and weight," 
that the Peacock (British) was armed with 32's in- 
stead of 24's, and underestimates the force of the 
second Wasp. But the blunders are quite as bad 
when distributed as when confined to one side; in 
addition, Brenton's disregard of all details makes 
him of but little use. 

James, as already said, is by far the most valuable 
authority on the war, as regards purely British af- 
fairs. He enters minutely into det-^ils, and has evi- 



42 Naval War of 1812 

dently laboriously hunted up his authorities. He has 
examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty reports, va- 
rious treaties, all the "Gazette" reports, gives very 
well-chosen extracts, has arranged his work in chron- 
ological order, discriminates between the officers that 
deserve praise and those that deserve blame, and in 
fact writes a work which ought to be consulted by 
every student of naval affairs. But he is unfortu- 
nately afflicted with a hatred toward the Americans 
that amounts to a monomania. He wishes to make 
out as strong a case as possible against them. The 
animus of his work may be gathered from the not 
over complimentary account of the education of the 
youthful seafaring American, which can be found in 
Vol. VI, p. 113, of his "History." On page 153 he 
asserts that he is an "impartial Historian" ; and about 
three lines before mentions that "it may suit the 
Americans to invent any falsehood, no matter how 
barefaced, to foist a valiant character on them- 
selves." On page 419 he says that Captain Porter 
is to be believed, "so far as is borne out by proof 
(the only safe way where an American is con- 
cerned)," — which somewhat sweeping denunciation 
of the veracity of all of Captain Porter's compatriots 
would seem to indicate that James was not, perhaps, 
in that dispassionate frame of mind best suited for 
writing history. That he should be biased against 
individual captains can be understood, but when he 
makes rabid onslaughts upon the American people 
as a whole, he renders it difficult for an American, 
at any rate, to put implicit credence in him. His 



Introductory 43 

statements are all the harder to confute when they 
are erroneous, because they are intentionally so. 
It is not, as with Brenton and Marshall, because he 
really thinks a British captain can not be beaten, ex- 
cept by some kind of distorted special Providence, 
for no man says worse things than he does about 
certain officers and crews. A writer of James' un- 
doubted ability must have known perfectly well that 
his statements were untrue in many instances, as 
where he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter's loss, 
or misstates the comparative force of the fleets on 
Lake Champlain. 

When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge 
wished to run away from the Java, and would have 
done so if he had not been withheld by the advice 
of his first lieutenant, who was a renegade English- 
man,^2 it is not of much consequence whether his 
making the statement was due to excessive credulity 
or petty meanness, for, in either case, whether the 
defect was in his mind or his morals, it is enough 
to greatly impair the value of his other "facts." 
Again, when James (p. 165) states that Decatur 
ran away from the Macedonian until, by some mar- 
velous optical delusion, he mistook her for a 32, he 
merely detracts a good deal from the worth of his 
own account. When the Americans adopt boarding 
helmets, he considers it as proving conclusively that 
they are suffering from an acute attack of cowardice. 
On p. 122 he says that "had the President, when she 

" Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in Virginia, and 
never in England in his life. 



44 Naval War of 1812 

fell in with the Belvidera, been cruising alone . . . 
Commodore Rodgers would have magnified the Brit- 
ish frigate into a line-of-battle ship, and have done 
his utmost to avoid her," which gives an excellent 
idea of the weight to be attached to the various 
other anecdotes he relates of the much abused Com- 
modore Rodgers. 

But it must always be remembered that untrust- 
worthy as James is in anything referring purely to 
the Americans, he is no worse than his compeers of 
both nationalities. The misstatements of Niles in 
his "Weekly Register" about the British are quite 
as flagrant, and his information about his own side 
even more valuable.^^ Every little American author 
crowed over Perry's "Nelsonic victory over a greatly 
superior force." The Constitution was declared to 
have been at a disadvantage when she fought the 
Guerriere, and so on ad infimtum. But these writers 
have all faded into oblivion, and their writings are 
not even referred to, much less believed. James, on 
the contrary, has passed through edition after edi- 
tion, is considered as unquestionable authority in 

'^ In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent examples of 
the traditional American "spread-eagle" style. In one place 
I remember his describing "The Immortal Rodgers," balked 
of his natural prey, the British, as "soaring about like the 
bold bald eagle of his native land," seeking whom he might 
devour. The accounts he gives of British line-of-battle ships 
fleeing from American 44's quite match James' anecdotes of 
the latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36's for fear they 
might mount twenty-four-pounders. The two works taken 
together give a very good idea of the war; separately, either 
is utterly unreliable, especially in matters of opinion. 



Introductory 45 

his own country and largely throughout Europe, 
and has furnished the basis for every subsequent ac- 
count by British authors. From Ahson to Lieuten- 
ant Low, almost every English work, whether of a 
popular character or not, is, in so far as it touches 
on the war, simply a "rehash" of the works written 
by James. The consequence is that the British and 
American accounts have astonishingly little resem- 
blance. One ascribes the capture of the British frig- 
ates simply to the fact that their opponents were "cut 
down line-of-battle ships"; the other gives all the 
glory to the "undaunted heroism," etc., of the Yan- 
kee sailors. 

One not very creditable trait of the early Ameri- 
can naval historians gave their rivals a great advan- 
tage. The object of the former was to make out 
that the Constitution, for example, won her victo- 
ries against an equal foe, and an exact statement of 
the forces showed the contrary; so they always 
avoided figures, and thus left the ground clear for 
James' careful misstatements. Even when they 
criticised him they never went into details, confin- 
ing themselves to some remark about "hurling" his 
figures in his face with "loathing." Even Cooper, 
interesting though his work is, has gone far less into 
figures than he should, and seems to have paid little 
if any attention to the British official statements, 
which of course should be received as of equal 
weight with the American. His comments on the 
actions are generally very fair, the book never being 
disfigured by bitterness toward the British ; but he is 



46 Naval War of 18 12 

certainly wrong, for example, in ascribing the loss 
of the Chesapeake solely to accident, that of the 
Argus solely to her inferiority in force, and so on. 
His disposition to praise all the American com- 
manders may be generous, but is nevertheless un- 
just. If Decatur's surrender of the President is at 
least impliedly praised, then Porter's defence of the 
Essex can hardly receive its just av^ard. There is 
no weight in the commendation bestowed upon Hull, 
if commendation, the same in kind though less in 
degree, is bestowed upon Rodgers. It is a great pity 
that Cooper did not write a criticism on James, for 
no one could have done it more thoroughly. But 
he never mentions him, except once in speaking of 
Barclay's fleet. In all probability this silence arose 
from sheer contempt, and the certainty that most of 
James' remarks were false; but the effect was that 
very many foreigners believe him to have shirked 
the subject. He rarely gives any data by which the 
statements of James can be disproved, and it is for 
this reason that I have been obliged to criticise the 
latter's work very fully. Many of James' remarks, 
however, defy criticism from their random nature, 
as when he states that American midshipmen were 
chiefly masters and mates of merchantmen, and does 
not give a single proof to support the assertion. It 
would be nearly as true to assert that the British 
midshipmen were for the most part ex-members of 
the prize-ring, and as much labor would be needed 
to disprove it. In other instances it is quite enough 
to let his words speak for themselves, as where he 



Introductory 47 

says (p. 155) that of the American sailors one-third 
in number and one-half in point of effectiveness were 
in reaHty British. That is, of the 450 men the Con- 
stitution had when she fought the Java 150 were 
British, and the remaining 300 could have been as 
effectively replaced by 1 50 more British. So a very 
little logic works out a result that James certainly 
did not intend to arrive at ; namely, that 300 British 
led by American officers could beat, with ease and 
comparative impunity, 400 British led by their own 
officers. He also forgets that the whole consists of 
the sum of the parts. He accounts for the victories 
of the Americans by stating (p. 280) that they were 
lucky enough to meet with frigates and brigs who 
had unskilful gunners or worthless crew^s; he also 
carefully shows that the Macedonian was incompe- 
tently handled, the Peacock commanded by a mere 
martinet, the Avon's crew unpracticed at the guns, 
the Epervier's mutinous and cowardly, the Pen- 
guin's weak and unskilful, the Java's exceedingly 
poor, and more to the same effect. Now the Amer- 
icans took in single fight three frigates and seven 
sloops, and when as many as ten vessels are met 
it is exceedingly probable that they represent the fair 
average; so that James' strictures, so far as true, 
simply show that the average British ship was very 
apt to possess, comparatively speaking, an incompe- 
tent captain or unskilful crew. These disadvantages 
were not felt when opposed to navies in which they 
existed to an even greater extent, but became very 
apparent when brought into contact with a power 



48 Naval War of 1812 

whose few officers knew how to play their own parts 
very nearly to perfection, and, something equally im- 
portant, knew how to make first-rate crews out of 
what was already good raw material. Finally, a 
large proportion of James' abuse of the Americans 
sufficiently refutes itself, and perhaps Cooper's 
method of contemptuously disregarding him was the 
best ; but no harm can follow from devoting a little 
space to commenting upon him. 

Much the best American work is Lieutenant 
George E. Emmons' statistical "History of the 
United States Navy." Unfortunately it is merely 
a mass of excellently arranged and classified statis- 
tics, and while of invaluable importance to the stu- 
dent, is not interesting to the average reader. Al- 
most all the statements I have made of the force, 
tonnage, and armament of the American vessels, 
though I have whenever practicable taken them 
from the Naval Records, etc., yet could be just as 
well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most of the 
American official letters which I have quoted can be 
found in Niles' "Register," volumes i to 10, and all 
of the British ones in the "London Naval Chronicle" 
for the same years. It is to these two authorities 
that I am most indebted, and nearly as much so to 
the "American State Papers," Vol. XIV. Next in 
order come Emmons, Cooper, and the invaluable, al- 
beit somewhat scurrilous, James; and a great many 
others whose names I have quoted in their proper 
places. In commenting upon the actions I have, 
whenever possible, drawn from some standard work. 



Introductory 49 

such as Jurien de la Graviere's "Guerres Maritimes," 
Lord Howard Douglas' "Naval Gunnery," or, bet- 
ter still, from the lives and memoirs of Admirals 
Farragut, Codrington, Broke, or Durham. The titles 
of the various works will be found given in full as 
they are referred to.^* In a few cases, where ex- 
treme accuracy was necessary, or where, as in the 
case of the President's capture, it was desirable that 
there should be no room for dispute as to the facts, 
I have given the authority for each sentence; but in 
general this would be too cumbersome, and so I have 
confined myself to referring, at or near the begin- 
ning of the account of each action, to the authorities 
from whom I have taken it. For the less important 
facts on which every one is agreed I have often 
given no references. 

" To get an idea of the American seamen of that time 
Cooper's novels, "Miles Wallingford," "Home as Found," 
and the "Pilot," are far better than any history; in the 
"Two Admirals" the description of the fleet mancEuvring is 
unrivaled. His view of Jack's life is rather rose-colored 
however. "Tom Cringle's Log" ought to be read for the in- 
formation it gives; Marryat's novels will show some of the 
darker aspects of sailor life. 



Vol. IX.— 3 



CHAPTER II 

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when Ameri- 
ca declared war against her — Race identity of the com- 
batants—The American navy at the beginning of the 
war — Officers well trained— Causes tending to make our 
seamen especially efficient — Close similarity between 
the British and American sailors— Our ships manned 
chiefly by native Americans, many of whom had for- 
merly Deen impressed into the British navy — Quotas of 
seamen contributed by the different States— Navy yards 
—Lists of officers and men — List of vessels — Tonnage — 
Different ways of estimating it in Britain and America 
— Ratings — American ships properly rated — Arma- 
ments of the frigates and corvettes— Three styles of 
guns used — Difference between long guns and carron- 
ades — Short weight of American shot — Comparison of 
British frigates rating 38, and American frigates rating 
44 guns — Compared with a 74 

DURING the early years of this century Eng- 
land's naval power stood at a height never 
reached before or since by that of any other nation. 
On every sea her navies rode, not only triumphant, 
but with none to dispute their sway. The island folk 
had long claimed the mastery of the ocean, and they 
had certainly succeeded in making their claim com- 
pletely good during the time of bloody warfare that 
followed the breaking out of the French Revolu- 
tion. Since the year 1792 each European nation, in 
turn, had learned to feel bitter dread of the weight 
of England's hand. In the Baltic, Sir Samuel Hood 
(50) 



Naval War of 1 8 12 51 

had taught the Russians that they must needs keep 
in port when the English cruisers were in the ofifing. 
The descendants of the Vikings had seen their whole 
navy destroyed at Copenhagen. No Dutch fleet ever 
put out after the day when, off Camperdown, Lord 
Duncan took possession of Van Winter's shattered 
ships. But a few years before 181 2, the greatest 
sea-fighter of all time had died in Trafalgar Bay, 
and in dying had crumbled to pieces the navies of 
France and of Spain. 

From that day England's task was but to keep 
in port such of her foes' vessels as she had not de- 
stroyed. France alone still possessed fleets that 
could be rendered formidable, and so, from the 
Scheldt to Toulon, her harbors were watched and 
her coasts harried by the blockading squadrons of 
the English. Elsewhere the latter had no fear of 
their power being seriously assailed; but their vast 
commerce and numerous colonies needed ceaseless 
protection. Accordingly in every sea their cruisers 
could be found, of all sizes, from the stately ship-of- 
the-line, with her tiers of heavy cannon and her 
many hundreds of men, down to the little cutter 
carrying but a score of souls and a couple of light 
guns. All these cruisers, but especially those of the 
lesser rates, were continually brought into contact 
with such of the hostile vessels as had run through 
the blockade, or were too small to be affected by it. 
French and Italian frigates were often fought and 
captured when they were skirting their own coasts, 
or had started off on a plundering cnu'se through the 



52 Naval War of 1812 

Atlantic, or to the Indian Ocean; and though the 
Danes had lost their larger ships they kept up a spir- 
ited warfare with brigs and gunboats. So the En- 
glish marine was in constant exercise, attended with 
almost invariable success. 

Such was Great Britain's naval power when the 
Congress of the United States declared war upon 
her. While she could number her thousand sail, 
the American navy included but half a dozen frig- 
ates, and six or eight sloops and brigs ; and it is 
small matter for surprise that the British officers 
should have regarded their new foe with contemptu- 
ous indifference. Hitherto the American seamen 
had never been heard of except in connection with 
two or three engagements with French frigates, and 
some obscure skirmishes against the Moors of Trip- 
oli; none of which could possibly attract attention 
in the years that saw Aboukir. Copenhagen, and 
Trafalgar. And yet these same petty wars were th^ 
school which raised our marines to the highest 
standard of excellence. A continuous course of vic- 
tory, won mainly by seamanship, had made the En- 
glish sailor overweeningly self-confident, and caused 
him to pay but little regard to manceuvring or even 
to gunnery. Meanwhile the American learned, by 
receiving hard knocks, how to give them, and be- 
longed to a service too young to feel an over-confi- 
dence in itself. One side had let its training relax, 
while the other had carried it to the highest possible 
point. Hence our ships proved, on the whole, vic- 
torious in the apparently unequal struggle, and the 



Naval War of 1812 S3 

men who had conquered the best seamen of Europe 
were now in turn obliged to succumb. Compared 
with the great naval battles of the preceding few 
years, our bloodiest conflicts were mere skirmishes, 
but they were skirmishes between the hitherto ac- 
knowledged kings of the ocean, and new men who 
yet proved to be more than their equals. F'or over 
a hundred years, or since the time when they had 
contended on equal terms with the great Dutch 
admirals, the British .had shown a decided supe- 
riority to their various foes, and during the latter 
quarter of the time this superiority, as already said, 
was very marked indeed ; in consequence, the victo- 
ries of the new enemy attracted an amount of atten- 
tion altogether disproportionate to their material 
effects. And it is a curious fact that our little navy, 
in which the art of handling and fighting the old 
broadside, sailing frigate in single conflict was 
brought to the highest point of perfection ever 
reached, that this same navy should have contained 
the first representative of the modern war steamer, 
and also the torpedo — the two terrible engines which 
were to drive from the ocean the very white-winged 
craft that had first won honor for the starry flag. 
The tactical skill of Hull or Decatur is now of mere- 
ly archaic interest, and has but little more bearing 
on the manoeuvring of a modern fleet than have the 
tactics of the Athenian galleys. But the war still 
conveys some most practical lessons as to the value 
of efficient ships and, above all, of efficient men in 
them. Had we only possessed the miserable giui- 



54 Naval War of 1812 

boats, our men could have done nothing; had we 
not possessed good men, the heavy frigates would 
have availed us little. Poor ships and impotent 
artillery had lost the Dutch almost their entire 
navy; fine ships and heavy cannon had not saved 
the French and Spanish from the like fate. We 
owed our success to putting sailors even better 
than the Dutch on ships even finer than those built 
by the two Latin seaboard powers. 

The first point to be remembered in order to 
write a fair account of this war is that the difference 
in fighting skill, which certainly existed between the 
two parties, was due mainly to training, and not to 
the nature of the men. It seems certain that the 
American had in the beginning somewhat the ad- 
vantage, because his surroundings, partly physical 
and partly social and political, had forced him into 
habits of greater self-reliance. Therefore, on the 
average, he offered rather the best material to start 
with ; but the difference was very slight, and totally 
disappeared under good training. The combatants 
were men of the same race, differing but little from 
one another. On the New England coast the En- 
glish blood was as pure as in any part of Britain; 
in New York and New Jersey it was mixed with 
that of the Dutch settlers — and the Dutch are by 
race nearer to the true old English of Alfred and 
Harold than are, for example, the thoroughly Angli- 
cized Welsh of Cornwall.' Otherwise, the infusion 
of new blood into the English race on this side of the 
Atlantic has been chiefly from three sources — Ger- 



Naval War of 1812 ^$ 

man, Irish, and Norse; and these three sources rep- 
resent the elemental parts of the composite English 
stock in about the same proportions in which they 
were originally combined— mainly Teutonic, largely 
Celtic, and with a Scandinavian admixture. The 
descendant of the German becomes as much an An- 
glo-American as the descendant of the Strathclyde 
Celt has already become an Anglo-Briton. Looking 
through names of the combatants it would be diffi- 
cult to find any of one navy that could not be matched 
in the other — Hull or Lawrence. Allen, Perry, or 
Stewart. And among all the English names on both 
sides will be found many Scotch, Irish, or Welsh— 
Macdonough, O'Brien, or Jones. Still stranger ones 
appear: the Huguenot Tattnall is one among the 
American defenders of the Constellation, and an- 
other Huguenot Tattnall is among the British as- 
sailants at Lake Borgne. It must always be kept 
in mind that the Americans and the British are two 
substantially similar branches of the great English 
race, which both before and after their separation 
have assimilated, and made Englishmen of many 
other peoples. 1 The lessons taught by the war can 
hardly be learned unless this identity is kept in 
mind.^ ' 

' The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated as 
"British"— English being eitlier too narrow or too broad a 
term, in one case meaning the inhabitants of but a part of 
Britain, and in the other the whole Anglo-Saxon people. 

'^ It was practically a civil war. and was waged with much 
harshness and bitterness on both sides. I have already spoken 
of the numerous grievances of the Americans; the British, 
in turn, looked upon our blockade-runners which entered 



56 Naval War of 1812 

To understand aright the efficiency of our navy, 
it is necessary to take a brief look at the character 
and antecedents of the officers and men who served 
in it. 

- When war broke out the United States Navy was 
but a few years old, yet it already had a far from 
dishonorable history. The captains and lieutenants 
of 1812 had been taught their duties in a very prac- 
tical school, and the flag under which they fought 
was endeared to them already by not a few glorious 
traditions — though these, perhaps, like others of 
their kind, had lost none of their glory in the telling. 
A few of the older men had served in the war of 
the Revolution, and all still kept fresh in mind the 
doughty deeds of the old-time privateering war 
craft. Men still talked of Biddle's daring cruises 
and Barney's stubborn fights, or told of Scotch Paul 
and the grim work they had who followed his for- 
tunes. Besides these memories of an older genera- 
tion, most of the officers had themselves taken part, 
when.younger in years and rank, in deeds not a whit 
less glorious. Almost every man had had a share in 
some gallant feat, to which he, in part at least, owed 

the French ports exactly as we regarded, at a later date, the 
British steamers that ran into Wilmington and Charleston. 
It is curious to see how illogical writers are. The careers of 
the Argus and. Alabama, for example, were strikingly similar 
in many ways, yet the same writer who speaks of one as a 
"heroic little brig," will qall the other a "black pirate." Of 
course there can be no possible comparison as to the causes 
for which the two vessels were fighting; but the cruises 
themselves were very much alike, both in character and 
history. 



Naval War of 1812 57 

his present position. The captain had perhaps been 
a midshipman under Truxton when he took the Ven- 
geance, and had been sent aboard the captured 
French frigate with the prize-master; the Heutenant 
had borne a part in the various attacks on TripoH, 
and had led his men in the desperate hand-to-hand 
fights in which the Yankee cutlass proved an over- 
match for the Turkish and Moorish cimeters. Nearly 
every senior officer had extricated himself by his 
own prowess or skill from the dangers of battle or 
storm ; he owed his rank to the fact that he had 
proved worthy of it. Thrown upon his own re- 
sources, he had learned self-reliance ; he was a first- 
rate practical seaman, and prided himself on the 
way his vessel was handled. Having reached his 
rank by hard work, and knowing what real fighting 
meant, he was careful to see that his men were 
trained in the essentials of discipline, and that they 
knew how to handle the guns in battle as well as pol- 
ish them in peace. Beyond almost any of his coun- 
trymen, he worshiped the "Gridiron Flag," and, 
having been brought up in the Navy, regarded its 
honor as his own. It was, perhaps, the Navy alone 
that thought itself a match, ship against ship, for 
Great Britain. The remainder of the nation pinned 
its faith to the army, or rather to that weakest of 
weak reeds, the militia. The officers of the Navy, 
with their strong esprit de corps, their jealousy of 
their own name and record, and the knowledge, by 
actual experience, that the British ships sailed no . 
faster and were no better handled than their own, 



58 Naval War of 1812 

had no desire to shirk a conflict with any foe, and 
having tried their bravery in actual service, they 
made it doubly formidable by cool, wary skill. Even 
the younger men, who had never been in action, had 
been so well trained by the tried veterans over them 
that the lack of experience was not sensibly felt. 

The sailors comprising the crews of our ships 
were well worthy of their leaders. There was no bet- 
ter seaman in the world than the American Jack ; he 
had been bred to his work from infancy, and had 
been off in a fishing dory almost as soon as he could 
walk. When he grew older, he shipped on a mer- 
chantman or whaler, and in those warlike times, 
when our large merchant-marine was compelled to 
rely pretty much on itself for protection, each craft 
had to be well handled ; all who were not were soon 
weeded out by a process of natural selection, of 
which the agents were French picaroons, Spanish 
buccaneers, and Malay pirates. It was a rough 
school, but it taught Jack to be both skilful and self- 
reliant ; and he was all the better fitted to become a 
man-of-war's man, because he knew more about fire- 
arms than most of his kind in foreign lands. At 
home he had used his ponderous ducking gun with 
good effect on the flocks of canvasbacks in the reedy 
flats of the Chesapeake, or among the sea-coots in 
the rough water off the New England cliffs; and 
w^hen he went on a sailing voyage the chances were 
even that there would be some use for the long guns 
before he returned, for the American merchant 
sailor could trust to no armed escort. 



Naval War of 1812 59 

The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at the 
date of which I am writing as well as long subse- 
quently to it was largely due to the curious condi- 
tion of things in Europe. For thirty years all the 
European nations had been in a state of continuous 
and very complicated warfare, during the course of 
which each nation in turn fought almost every other, 
England being usually at loggerheads with all. One 
effect of this was to force an enormous proportion 
of the carrying trade of the world into American 
bottoms. The old Massachusetts town of Salem 
was then one of the main depots of the East India 
trade; the Baltimore clippers carried goods into the 
French and German ports with small regard to the 
blockade; New Bedford and Sag Harbor fitted out 
whalers for the Arctic seas as well as for the South 
Pacific ; the rich merchants of Philadelphia and New 
York sent their ships to all parts of the world; 
and every small port had some craft in the coasting 
trade. On the New England seaboard but few of 
the boys would reach manhood without having made 
at least one voyage to the Newfoundland Banks 
after codfish; and in the whaling towns of Long 
Island it used to be an old saying that no man could 
marry till he struck his whale. The wealthy mer- 
chants of the large cities would often send their 
sons on a voyage or two before they let them enter 
their counting-houses. Thus it came about that a 
large portion of our population was engaged in sea- 
faring pursuits of a nature strongly tending to de- 
velop a resolute and hardy character in the men 



6o Naval War of 1812 

that followed them. The British merchantmen 
sailed in huge convoys, gxiarded by men-of-war, 
while, as said before, our vessels went alone, and 
relied for protection on themselves. If a fishing 
smack went to the Banks it knew that it ran a chance 
of falling in with some not overscrupulous Nova 
Scotian privateer. The barks that sailed from Sa- 
lem to the Spice Islands kept their men well trained 
both at great guns and musketry, so as to be able to 
beat off either Malay proas, or Chinese junks. The 
New York ships, loaded for the West Indies, Avere 
prepared to do battle with the picaroons that 
swarmed in the Spanish Main; while the fast craft 
from Baltimore could fight as well as they could 
run. Wherever an American seaman went, he not 
only had to contend with all the legitimate perils of 
the sea, but he had also to regard almost every 
stranger as a foe. Whether this foe called him- 
self pirate or privateer mattered but little. French, 
Spaniards, Algerines, Malays, from all alike our 
commerce suft'ered, and against all our merchants 
were forced to defend themselves. The effect of 
such a state of things, which made commerce so 
remunerative that the bolder spirits could hardly 
keep out of it, and so hazardous that only the most 
skilful and daring could succeed in it, was to raise 
up as fine a set of seamen as ever manned a navy. 
The stem school in which the American was brought 
up forced him into habits of independent thought 
and action which it was impossible that the more 
protected Briton could possess. He worked more 



Naval War of 1812 61 

intelligently and less from routine, and while per- 
fectly obedient and amenable to discipline, was yet 
able to judge for himself in an emergency. He 
was more easily managed than most of his kind — 
being shrewd, quiet, and, in fact, comparatively 
speaking, rather moral than otherwise ; if he was a 
New Englander, when he retired from a sea life he 
was not unapt to end his days as a deacon. Alto- 
gether there could not have been better material for 
a fighting crew than cool, gritty American Jack. 
Moreover, there was a good nucleus of veterans to 
begin with, who were well fitted to fill the more 
responsible positions, such as captains of guns, etc. 
These were men who had cruised in the little Enter- 
prise after French privateers, who had been in the 
C onstellation in her two victorious fights, or who, 
perhaps, had followed Decatur when with only 
eighty men he cut out the Philadelphia, manned by 
fivefold his force and surrounded by hostile bat- 
teries and war vessels, — one of the boldest expe- 
ditions of the kind on record. 

It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connection, 
that by a singular turn of fortune, Great Britain, 
whose system of impressing American sailors had 
been one of the chief causes of the war, herself be- 
came, in consequence of that very system, in some 
sort a nursery for the seamen of the young Repub- 
lican navy. The American sailor feared nothing 
more than being impressed on a British ship — dread- 
ing beyond measure the hard life and cruel discipline 
aboard of her : but once there, he usually did well 



62 Naval War of 1812 

enough, and in course of time often rose to be of 
some little consequence. For years before 18 12, 
the number of these impressed sailors was in reality 
greater than the entire number serving in the Ameri- 
can navy, from which it will readily be seen that 
they formed a good stock to draw upon. Very 
much to their credit, they never lost their devotion 
to the home of their birth, more than two thousand 
of them being imprisoned at the beginning of the 
war because they refused to serve against their 
country. When Commodore Decatur captured the 
Macedonian, that officer, as we learn from Mar- 
shall's "Naval Biography" (II. 1019), stated that 
most of the seamen of his own frigate, the United 
States, had served in British war vessels, and that 
some had been with Lord Nelson in the Victory, 
and had even been bargemen to the great Admiral, 
— a pretty sure proof that the American sailors did 
not show at a disadvantage when compared with 
others.^ 

3 With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume 
Decatur's statement to be equivalent to saying that he had 
chiefly British seamen on board ; whereas even as quoted by 
Marshall, Decatur merely said that "his seamen had served 
on board a British man-of-war," and that some "had served 
under Lord Nelson." Like the Constitution, the United 
States had rid herself of most of the British subjects on 
board, before sailing. Decatur's remark simply referred to 
the number of his American seamen who had been impressed 
on board British ships. Whenever James says that an 
American ship had a large proportion of British sailors 
aboard, the explanation is that a large number of the crew 
were Americans who had been impressed on British ships. 
It would be no more absurd to claim Trafalgar as an Ameri- 



Naval War of 1812 63 

Good seaman as the impressed American proved 
to be, yet he seldom missed an opportunity to escape 
from the British service, by desertion or otherwise. 
In the first place, the life was very hard, and, in 
the second, the American seaman was very patriotic. 
He had an honest and deep affection for his own 
flag", while, on the contrary, he felt a curiously 
strong hatred for England, as distinguished from 
Englishmen. This hatred was partly an abstract 
feeling, cherished through a vague traditional re- 
spect for Bunker Hill, and partly something very 
real and vivid, owing to the injuries he, and others 
like him, had received. Whether he lived in Mary- 
land or Massachusetts, he certahily knew men whose 
ships had been seized by British cruisers, their 
goods confiscated, and the vessels condemned. Some 
of his friends had fallen victims to the odious right 
of search, and had never been heard of afterward. 
He had suffered many an injury to friend, fortune, 
or person, and some day he hoped to repay them 
all; and when the war did come, he fought all the 
better because he knew it was his own quarrel. But, 
as I have said, this hatred was against England, 
not against Englishmen. Then, as now, sailors 
were scattered about over the world without any 
great regard for nationality; and the resulting in- 
termingling of natives and foreigners in every mer- 
cantile marine was especially great in those of 

can victory because there was a certain number of Americans 
in Nelson's fleet, than it is to assert that the Americans were 
victorious in 1812, because there were a few renegade British 
on board their ships. 



64 Naval War of 18 12 

Britain and America, whose people spoke the same 
tongue and wore the same aspect. When chance 
drifted the American into Liverpool or London, 
he was ready enough to ship in an Indiaman or 
whaler, caring little for the fact that he served under 
the British flag ; and the Briton, in turn, who found 
himself in New York or Philadelphia, willingly 
sailed in one of the clipper-built barks, whether it 
floated the Stars and Stripes or not. When Cap- 
tain Porter wrought such havoc among the British 
whalers in the South Seas, he found that no incon- 
siderable portion of their crews consisted of Ameri- 
cans, some of whom enlisted on board his own ves- 
sel ; and among the crews of the American whalers 
were many British. In fact, though the skipper 
of each ship might brag loudly of his nationality, 
yet in practical life he knew well enough that there 
was very little to choose between a Yankee and a 
Briton.* Both were bold and hardy, cool and in- 

* What choice there was, was in favor of the American, 
In point of courage there was no difference whatever. The 
Essex and the Laivrettce, as well as the Frolic and the Rein- 
deer, were defended with the same stubborn, desperate, cool 
bravery that marks the English race on both sides of the At- 
lantic. But the American was a free citizen, any one's equal, 
a voter with a personal interest in his country's welfare, and, 
above all, without having perpetually before his eyes the de- 
grading fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he was 
more tractable than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and 
possessed greater judgment. In the fight between the Wasp 
and the Frolic, the latter's crew had apparently been well 
trained at the guns, for they aimed well ; but they fired at 
the wrong time, and never corrected the error; while their 
antagonists, delivering their broadsides far more slowly, by 



Naval War of 1812 65 

telligent, quick with their hands, and showing at \ 
their best in an emergency. They looked ahke and \ 
spoke ahke; when they took the trouble to think, 
they thought alike ; and when they got drunk, which 
was not an unfrequent occurrence, they quarreled 
alike. 

Mingled with them were a few seamen of other 
nationalities. The Irishman, if he came from the 
old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford, Dublin, and 
Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much 
like the two chief combatants; the Celto-Turanian 
kern of the west did not often appear on shipboard. 
The French, Danes, and Dutch were hemmed in at 
home; they had enough to do on their own sea- 
board, and could not send men into foreign fleets. 
A few Norse, however, did come in, and excellent 
sailors and fighters they made. With the Portu- 
guese and Italians, of whom some were to be found 
serving under the Union Jack and others under the 
Stars and Stripes, it was different; although there 
were many excellent exceptions they did not, as a 
rule, make the best kind of seamen. They were 
treacherous, fond of the knife, less ready with their 
hands, and likely to lose either their wits or their 
courage when in a tight place. 

intelligently waiting until the proper moment, worked fright- 
ful havoc. But though there was a certain slight difference 
between the seamen of the two nations, it must never be for- 
gotten that it was very much less than that between the vari- 
ous individuals of the same nation; and when the British had 
been trained for a few years by such commanders as Broke 
and Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it needed 
our best men to equal them. 



66 Naval War of 1812 

In the American navy, unlike the British, there 
I was no impressment ; the sailor was a volunteer, and 
he shipped in whatever craft his fancy selected. 
Throughout the war there were no "picked crews" 
on the American side,^ excepting on the last two 
cruises of the Constitution. In fact (as seen by the 
letter of Captains Stewart and Bainbridge to Secre- 
tary Hamilton), there was often much difficulty in 
getting enough men.*' Many sailors preferred to 
serve in the innumerable privateers, and the two 

5 James' statements to the contrary being in every case ut- 
terly without foundation. He Is also wrong in his assertion 
that the American ships had no boys; they had nearly as 
many in proportion as the British. The Constitution had 
31, the Adams 15, etc. So, when he states that our midship- 
men were generally masters and mates of merchantmen ; they 
were generally from eleven to seventeen years old at the be- 
ginning of the war, and, besides, had rarely or never been in 
the merchant marine. 

^ Reading through the volumes of official letters about this 
war, which are preserved in the office of the Secretary of the 
Navy, one of the most noticeable things is the continual com- 
plaints about the difficulty of getting men. The Adams at 
one time had a crew of but nineteen men — "fourteen of whom 
are marines," adds the aggrieved commander. A log-book of 
one of the gun-boats records the fact that after much difficulty 
two men were enlisted — from the jail, with a parenthetical 
memorandum to the effect that they were both very drunk. 
British ships were much more easily manned, as they could 
always have recourse to impressment. 

The Constitution on starting out on her last cruises had an 
extraordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz., 218, with 
but 92 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, making, 
with the officers, a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain 
Bainbridge, Oct. 16, 1814; it is letter No. 51, in the fortieth 
volume of "Captains' Letters," in the clerk's office of the 
Secretary of the Navy.) 



Naval War of 1812 67 

above-mentioned officers, in urging the necessity of 
building line-of-battle ships, state that it was hard 
work to recruit men for vessels of an inferior grade, 
so long as the enemy had ships of the line. 

One of the standard statements made by the 
British historians about this war is that our ships 
were mainly or largely manned by British sailors. 
This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons 
which it teaches ; and, besides that, it is not true. 

In this, as in everything else, all the modem 
writers have merely followed James or Brenton, 
and I shall accordingly confine myself to examin- 
ing their assertions. The former begins (Vol. IV, 
p. 470) by diffidently stating that there is a "simi- 
larity" of language between the inhabitants of the 
two countries — an interesting philological discovery 
that but few will attempt to controvert. In Vol. 
VI, p. 154, he mentions that a number of blanks 
occur in the American Navy List in the column 
"Where Born" ; and in proof of the fact that these 
blanks are there because the men were not Ameri- 
cans, he says that their names "are all English and 
Irish."'^ They certainly are ; and so are all the other 

' For example, James writes: "Out of the 32 captains one 
only, Thomas Tingey, has England marked as his birth- 
place. . . . Three blanks occur, and we consider it rather 
creditable to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and 
John Ord Creighton that they were ashamed to tell where 
they were born." I have not been able to find out the lat- 
ter's birth-place, but Captain Shaw was born in New York, 
and I have seen Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as 
"born and bred in America." Generally, whenever I have 
been able to fill up the vacancies in the column "Where 
Born," I have found that it was in America. From these 



68 Naval War of 1812 

names in the list. It could not well be otherwise, 
as the United States navy was not officered by 
Indians. In looking over this same Navy List (of 
181 6) it will be seen that but a little over five per 
cent of the officers were born abroad — a smaller 
proportion by far than would exist in the popula- 
tion of the country at large — and most of these had 
come to America when under ten years of age. On 
p. 155 James adds that the British sailors com- 
posed "one third in number and one half in point 
of effectiveness" of the American crews. Brenton 
in his "Naval History" writes : "It was said, and I 
have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were 
200 British seamen aboard the Constitution."^ 
These statements are mere assertions unsupported by 
proof and of such a loose character as to be diffi- 
cult to refute. As our navy was small, it may be 
best to take each ship in turn. The only ones of 
which the British could write authoritatively were, 
of course, those whfch they captured. The first one 
taken was the Wasp. James says many British 
were discovered among her crew, instancing es- 
pecially one sailor named Jack Lang; now Jack 
Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, New 
Jersey, but had been impressed and forced to serve 
in the British Navy. The same was doubtless true 
of the rest of the "many British" seamen of her 
crew ; at any rate, as the only instance James men- 
facts it would appear that James was somewhat hasty in con- 
cluding that the omission of the birth-place proved the owner 
of the name to be a native of Great Britain. 
* New edition, London, 1837, Vol. II, p. 456. 



Naval War of 1 8 12 69 

tions (Jack Lang) was an American, he can hardly 
be trusted for those whom he does not name. 

Of the 95 men composing the crew of the Nau- 
tilus when she was captured, "6 were detained and 
sent to England to await examination as being sus- 
pected of being British subjects."^ Of the other 
small brigs, the Viper, Vixen, Rattlesnake , and 
Syren, James does not mention the composition of 
the crews, and I do not know that any were claimed 
as British. Of the crew of the Argus "about 10 or 
12 were believed to be British subjects; the American 
officers swore the crew contained none" (James, 
"Naval Occurrences," p. 278). From o to 10 per 
cent can be allowed. When the Frolic was cap- 
tured "her crew consisted of native Americans" {do. 
p. 340). James speaks ("History," p. 418) of "a 
portion of the British subjects on board the Essex," 
but without giving a word of proof or stating his 
grounds of belief. One man was claimed as a 
deserter by the British, but he turned out to be a 
New Yorker. There were certainly a certain number 
of British aboard, but the number probably did not 
exceed thirty. Of the President's crew he says 

' Quoted from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 
12, 1812 (in Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," Vol. XXV, 
No. 43), inclosing a "List of American prisoners of war dis- 
charged out of custody of Lieutenant William Miller, agent 
at the port of Halifax," in exchange for some of the British 
captured by Porter. This list, by the way, shows the crew 
of the Nautilus (counting the six men detained as British) 
to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated by James. 
Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 12 men of the 
Guerribre' s crew as an offset to the 6 men belonging to the 
Nautilus. 



70 Naval War of 1812 

("Naval Occurrences." p. 448) : "In the opinion of 
several British officers there were among them many 
British seamen" ; but Commodore Decatur, Lieuten- 
ant Gallagher, and the other officers swore that 
there were none. Of the crew of the Chesapeake, 
he says, "about 2^" were British subjects, or about 
10 per cent. One or two of these were afterward 
shot, and some 25, together with a Portuguese 
boatswain's mate, entered into the British service. 
So that of the vessels captured by the British, the 
Chesapeake had the largest number of British (about 
10 per cent of her crew) on board, the others rang- 
ing from that number down to none at all, as in the 
case of the Wasp. 

As these eleven ships would probably represent a 
fair average, this proportion, of from o to 10 per 
cent, should be taken as the proper one. James, 
however, is of the opinion that those ships manned 
by Americans were more apt to be captured than 
those manned by the braver British; which calls 
for an examination of the crews of the remaining 
vessels. Of the American sloop Peacock, James 
says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 348) that "several 
of her men were recognized as British seamen" ; 
even if this were true, "several" could not probably 
mean more than sixteen, or 10 per cent. Of the 
second Wasp he says, "Captain Blakely was a na- 
tive of Dublin, and, along with some English and 
Scotch, did not, it may be certain, neglect to have 
in his crew a great many Irish." Now Captain 
Blakely left Ireland when he was but 16 months 



Naval War of 1812 71 

old, and the rest of James's statement is avowedly 
mere conjecture. It was asserted positively in the 
American newspapers that the Wasp, which sailed 
from Portsmouth, was manned exclusively by New 
Englanders, except a small draft of men from a 
Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a for- 
eigner in her crew. Of the Hornet James states 
that "some of her men were natives of the United 
Kingdom" ; but he gives no authority, and the men 
he refers to were in all probability those spoken of 
in the journal of one of the Hornet's officers, which 
says that "many of our men [Americans] had been 
impressed in the British service." As regards the 
gunboats, James asserts that they were commanded 
by "Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ire- 
land." This officer, however, was born at Baltimore 
on July 6, 1759. As to the Constitution, Brenton, 
as already mentioned, supposes the number of Brit- 
ish sailors in her crew to have been 200; James 
makes it less, or about 150. Respecting this, the 
only definite statements I can find in British works 
are the following: In the "Naval Chronicle," Vol. 
XXIX, p. 452, an officer of the Java states that most 
of the Constitution's men were British, many being 
from the Gnerriere; which should be read in con- 
nection with James's statement (Vol. VI, p. 156) 
that but eight of the Guerriere's crew deserted, and 
but two shipped on board the Constitution. More- 
over, as a matter of fact, these eight men were all 
impressed Americans. In the "Naval Chronicle" it 
is also said that the Chesapeake's surgeon was an 



72 Naval War of 1812 

Irishman, formerly of the British Navy; he was 
born in Baltimore, and was never in the British 
navy in his life. The third lieutenant "was sup- 
posed to be an Irishman" (Brenton, II, 456). The 
first lieutenant "was a native of Great Britain, we 
have been informed" (James, VI, 194) ; he was 
Mr. George Parker, born and bred in Virginia. The 
remaining three citations, if true, prove nothing. 
"One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the Guer- 
riere (James, VI, p. 153). "One had been in the 
Achille" and "one in the Eiirydice" (Brenton, II, 
456). These three men were most probably Ameri- 
can seamen who had been impressed on British ships. 
From Cooper (in "Putnam's Magazine," Vol, I, p. 
593) as well as from several places in the Consti- 
tution's log,^" we learned that those of the crew who 
were British deserters were discharged from the 
Constitution before she left port, as they were afraid 
to serve in a war against Great Britain. That this fear 
was justifiable may be seen by reading James, Vol. 
IV, p. 483. Of the four men taken by the Leopard 
from the Chesapeake, as deserters, one was hung 
and three scourged. In reality the crew of the Con- 
stitution probably did not contain a dozen British 
sailors; in her last cruises she was manned almost 

"» See her log-book (Vol. II, Feb. i, 1812, to Dec. 13, 1813) ; 
especially on July 12th, when twelve men were discharged. 
In some of Hull's letters he alludes to the desire of the Brit- 
ish part of the crew to serve on the gun-boats or in the ports; 
and then writes that "in accordance with the instructions 
sent him by the Secretary of the Navy" he had allowed the 
British-born portion to leave the ship. The log-books are in 
the Bureau of Navigation. 



Naval War of 1812 73 

exclusively by New Englanders. The only remain- 
ing vessel is the United States, respecting whose 
crew some remarkable statements have been made. 
Marshall (Vol. II, p. 1019) writes that Commodore 
Decatur "declared there was not a seaman in his 
ship who had not served from 5 to 12 years in a 
British man-of-war," from which he concludes that 
they were British themselves. It may be questioned 
whether Decatur ever made such an assertion ; or if 
he did, it is safe to asume again that his men were 
long-impressed Americans.*^ 

" At the beginning of the war there were on record in the 
American State Department 6,257 cases of impressed Ameri- 
can seamen. These could represent but a small part of the 
whole, which must have amounted to 20,000 men, or more 
than sufficient to man our entire navy five times over. Ac- 
cording to the British Admiralty Report to the House of 
Commons, February i, 1815, 2,548 impressed American sea- 
men, who refused to serve against their country, were im- 
prisoned in 1812. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in 
the House, February 18, 1813, 3,300 men claiming to be Ameri- 
can subjects were serving in the British navy in January, 
1811, and he certainly did not give anything like the whole 
number. In the American service the term of enlistment ex- 
tended for two years, and the frigate United States, referred 
to, had not had her crew for any very great length of time as 
yet. If such a crew were selected at random from American 
sailors, among them there would be, owing to the small num- 
ber serving in our own navy and the enormous number im- 
pressed into the British navy, probably but one of the former 
to two of the latter. As already mentioned the American al- 
ways left a British man-of-war as soon as he could, by deser- 
tion or discharge; but he had no unwillingness to serve in 
the home navy, where the pay was larger and the discipline 
far more humane, not to speak of motives of patriotism. 
Even if the ex-British man-of-war's-man kept out of service 
for some time, he would be very apt to enlist when a war 

Vol. IX.— 4 



74 Naval War of 1812 

Of the Carolina's crew of 70 men, five were 
British. This fact was not found out till three 
deserted, when an investigation was made and 
the two other British discharged. Captain Henly, 
in reporting these facts, made no concealment of 
his surprise that there should be any British at 
all in his crew.^^ 

From these facts and citations we may accord- 
ingly conclude that the proportion of British seamen 
serving on American ships after the war broke out, 
varied between none, as on the Wasp and Consti- 
tution, to ten per cent, as on the Chesapeake and 
Essex. On the average, nine-tenths of each of our 
crews were American seamen, and about one-twen- 
tieth British, the remainder being a mixture of va- 
rious nationalities. 

On the other hand, it is to be said that the British 
frigate Guerriere had ten Americans among her 
crew, who were permitted to go below during action, 
and the Macedonian eight, who were not allowed 
that privilege, three of them being killed. Three 
of the British sloop Peacock's men were Americans, 
who were forced to fight against the Hornet-^ one 
of them was killed. Two of the Epervier's men 
were Americans, who were also forced to fight. 
When the crew of the Nautilus was exchanged, a 
number of other American prisoners were sent with 
them; among these were a number of American 

broke out, while his country undertook largely to avenge 
his own wrongs. 

'* See his letter in "Letters of Masters-Commandant," 
1814, I. No. 116. 



Naval War of 1812 



75 



seamen who had been Sterving in the Shannon, 
Acasta, Africa, and various other vessels. So there 
was also a certain proportion of Americans among 
the British crews, although forming a smaller per- 
centage of them than the British did on board the 
American ships. In neither case was the number 
sufficient to at all affect the result. 

The crews of our ships being thus mainly native 
Americans, it may be interesting to try to find out 
the proportions that were furnished by the different 
sections of the country. There is not much difficulty 
about the officers. The captains, masters comman- 
dant, lieutenants, marine officers, whose birthplaces 
are given in the Navy List of 18 16, — 240 in all, — 
came from the various States as follows : 



[ N. H., 
New England < j^^j "^ 

[ Conn., 

[ N. Y.. 
Middle States^ fj^^ 

[ Del., 

District of Columbia j D. C, 

f Md., 



Southern States^ 



Va., 
N. C, 

s. c, 

Ga., 

La., 
iKy., 



42 



78 



> no 



Total of given birthplaces 



240 



76 Naval War of 1812 

Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and 
proportionately, the greatest number of officers, 
Virginia, then the most populous of all the States, 
coming next ; four-fifths of the remainder came from 
the Northern States. 

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the 
sailors. Something can be inferred from the num- 
ber of privateers and letters of marque fitted out. 
Here Baltimore again headed the list; following 
closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the New 
England coast towns, with, alone among the South- 
ern ports, Charleston, S. C. A more accurate idea 
of the quotas of sailors furnished by the different 
sections can be arrived at by comparing the total 
amount of tonnage the country possessed at the out- 
break of the war. Speaking roughly, 44 per cent 
of it belonged to New England, 32 per cent to the 
Middle States, and 1 1 per cent to Maryland. This 
makes it probable (but of course not certain) that 
three-fourths of the common sailors hailed from the 
Northern States, half the remainder from Maryland, 
and the rest chiefly from Virginia and South 
Carolina. 

Having thus discussed somewhat at length the 
character of our officers and crews, it will now be 
necessary to present some statistical tables to give 
a more accurate idea of the composition of the navy, 
the tonnage, complements, and armaments of the 
ships, etc. 

At the beginning of the war the Government pos- 



. Naval War of 1812 77 

sessed six navy yards (all but the last established 
in 1801) as follows :i3 

Tj, /-,•.. Minimum number of 

'^i^ce. Onginal cost. men employed. 

1. Portsmouth, N. H., $ 5,500 i© 

2. Charleston, Mass., 39,214 20 

3. New York, 40,000 102 

4. Philadelphia, 37,000 13 

5. Washington, 4,000 36 

6. Gosport, 12,000 16 

In 181 2 the following was the number of officers 
in the navy :^^ 

12 captains, 

10 Blasters commandant. 
73 lieutenants, 
53 masters, 
310 midshipmen, 
42 marine officers, 

500 

At the opening of the year, the number of seamen, 
ordinary seamen, and boys in service was 4,010, 
and enough more were recruited to increase it to 
5,230, of whom only 2,346 were destined for the 
cruising war vessels, the remainder being detailed 
for forts, gun-boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc.^^ 
The marine corps was already ample, consisting of 
1,523 men.^^ 

No regular navy lists were published till 1816, 
and I have been able to get very little information 
respecting the increase in officers and men during 

'' Report of Naval Secretary Jones, Nov. 30. 1814. 
" "List of Vessels," etc., by Geo. H. Preble, U.S.N. 
(1874). 
'* Report of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812. 
•« Ibid 



78 Naval War of 1812 

181 3 and 1 8 14; but we have full returns for 181 5, 
which may be summarized as follows 



■i. 



.17 



30 captains, 25 masters commandant, 

141 lieutenants, 24 commanders, 

510 midshipmen, 230 sailing-master-- 

50 surgeons, 12 chaplains, 

50 pursers, 10 coast pilots, 

45 captain's clerks, 80 surgeon's mates, 

530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sm1« 

makers, 
268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc., 
1,106 quarter gunners, etc-, 
5,000 able seamen, 
6,849 ordinary seamen and boys. 

Making a total of 14,960, with 2.715 marines.'* 

Comparing this list with the figures given before, 
it can be seen that during the course of the war 
our navy grew enormously, increasing to between 
three and four times its original size. 

At the beginning of the year 1812 the navy of 
the United States on the ocean consisted of the fol- 
lowing vessels, which either were, or could have 
been, made available during the war:^^ 

/r fl!\ Name. Where Built. 

44 [/ni/eJ Stales, Philadelphia, 

44 Consiittttioft, Boston, 

44 President, New York, 

38 Constellation, Baltimore, 

38 Confess, Portsmouth, 

38 Chesapeake, Norfolk, 

32 Essex, Salem, 

28 Adams, New York, 

18 Hornet, Baltimore, 

18 IVasfi, Washington, 

i6 Argus, Boston, 

16 Syren, Philadelphia, 

14 Nautilus, Baltimore, 

14 yijren, Baltimore, 

12 Enterprise, Baltimore, 

J 2 I'iper, Purchased, 

" Seybert's" Statistical Annals, "p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818). 
1^ Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816. 
'* Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Con- 



When 


Ton. 


Cost. 


Built, 


nage. 


"797 


1576 


$299,336 


"797 


1576 


302,718 


1800 


1576 


220,910 


«797 


1265 


3'4,2"» 


1799 


1268 


•97>240 


»799 


1244 


220,677 


1799 


860 


'39.36»' 


«799 


560 


76,622 


1805 


480 


5^.603 


1806 


450 


40,000 


1803 


298 


37^38 


1803 


250 


32.S2« 


1803 


185 


18,763 


1803 


J 85 


20,872 


•799 


.65 


16,240 


tSio 


148 





Naval War of 1812 79 

There also appeared on the Hsts the New York, 
36, Boston, 28, and John Adams, 28. The two 
former were condemned hulks; the latter was en- 
tirely rebuilt after the war. The Hornet was orig- 
inally a brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having been 
transformed into a ship, she was pierced for 20 
guns, and in size was of an intermediate grade 
between the Wasp and the heavy sloops, built some- 
what later, of 509 tons. Her armament consisted 
of 32-pound carronades, with the exception of the 
two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The 
whole broadside was in nominal weight just 300 
pounds; in actual weight about 277 pounds. 
Her complement of men was 140, but during the 
war she generally left port with 150.^*^ The Wasp 
had been a ship from the beginning, mounted the 
number of guns she rated (of the same calibres as 
the Hornet's) and carried some ten men less. She 
was about the same length as the British i8-gim 
brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured nearly 
30 tons less. The Argus and Syren were similar 
and very fine brigs, the former being the longer. 
Each carried two more guns than she rated; and 

gress, Dec. 24, 1798; Letters of Secretary Paul Hamilton, 
Feb. 21, 1812; "American State Papers," Vol. XIX, p. 149. 
See also "The History of the Navy of the United States," by 
Lieut. G. E. Emmons, U. S. N. (published in Washington, 
MDCCCLUL under the authority of the Navy Department. 
"^^ In the HorneV s log of Oct. 25, 1812, while in port, it is 
mentioned that she had 158 men; four men who were sick 
were left behind before she started. (See, in the Navy 
Archives, -the Log-book, Hornet, Wasp, and Argus, July 
20, 1809, to Oct. 6, 1813). 



8o Naval War of 1812 

the Argus, in addition, had a couple thrust through 
the bridle-ports. The guns were 24-pound carron- 
ades, with two long 12's for bow-chasers. The 
proper complement of men was 100, but each sailed 
usually with about 125. The four smaller craft 
were originally schooners, armed with the same 
number of light long guns as they rated, and carry- 
ing some 70 men apiece; but they had been very 
effectually ruined by being changed into brigs, with 
crews increased to a hundred men. Each was armed 
with 18-pound carronades, carrying two more than 
she rated. The Enterprise, in fact, mounted 16 
guns, having two long nines thrust through the 
bridle-ports. These little brigs were slow, not very 
seaworthy, and overcrow'ded with men and guns; 
they all fell into the enemy's hands without doing 
any good whatever, with the single exception of 
the Enterprise, which escaped capture by sheer good 
luck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted 
against one of the corresponding and equally bad 
class of British gun-brigs. The Adams after sev- 
eral changes of form finally became a flush-decked 
corvette. The Essex had originally mounted 
twenty-six long 12's on her main-deck, and sixteen 
24-pound carronades on her spar-deck; but official 
fwisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty- 
four 32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on 
the main-deck, and sixteen 32-pound carronades 
with four long 12's on the spar-deck. When Cap- 
tain Porter had command of her he was deeply 
sensible of the disadvantages of an armament which' 



Naval War of 1812 81 

put him at the mercy of any ordinary antagonist 
who could choose his distance; accordingly he pe- 
titioned several times, but always without success, 
to have his long 12's returned to him. 

The American 38's were about the size of the 
British frigates of the same rate, and armed almost 
exactly in the same way, each having 28 long iS's 
on the main-deck and 20 32-pound carronades on 
the spar-deck. The proper complement was 300 
men, but each carried from 40 to 80 more.^^ 

Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates 
then afloat (although the British possessed some 
as heavy, such as the Egyptienne, 44). They were 
beautifully modeled, with very thick scantling, ex- 
tremely stout masts, and heavy cannon. Each car- 
ried on her main-deck thirty long 24's, and on her 
spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and twenty or 
twenty-two carronades — 42-pounders on the Presi- 

" The Chesapeake, by some curious mistake, was frequently 
rated as a 44, and this drew in its train a number of attend- 
ant errors. When she was captured, James says that in one 
of her lockers was found a letter, dated in February, 1811, 
from Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans, 
at Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for 
manning the Chesapeake, and enumerating her crew at a 
total of 443. Naturally this gave British historians the idea 
that such was the ordinary complement of our 38-gun frig- 
ates. But the ordering so large a crew was merely a mis- 
take, as may be seen by a letter from Captain Bainbridge to 
the Secretary of the Navy, which is given in full in the "Cap- 
tains' Letters," Vol. XXV, No. 19 (Navy Archives). In it he 
mentions the extraordinary number of men ordered for the 
Chesapeake, as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gun 
frigates, whereas the Chesapeake is of the class of the Con- 
gress and Constellation. 



82 Naval War of 1812 

dent and United States, 32-pounclers on the Consti- 
tution. Each sailed with a crew of about 450 men 
— 50 in excess of the regular complement.22 

It may be as well to mention here the only other 
class of vessels that we employed during- the war. 
This was composed of the ship-sloops built in 1813, 
which got to sea in 18 14. They were very fine 
vessels, measuring 509 tons apiece,^^ with very thick 
scantling and stout masts and spars. Each carried 
twenty 32-pound carronades and two long 12's, with 
a crew nominally of 160 men, but with usually a 
few supernumeraries.^^ 

^* The President when in action with the Endymion had 
450 men aboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-roll of the 
Constitution, a few days before her action with the Guerrikre, 
contains 464 names (including 51 marines); 8 men were ab- 
sent in a prize, so she had aboard in the action 456. Her 
muster-roll just before the action with the Cyane and Levant 
shows 461 names. 

'2 The dimensions were 117 feet 11 inches upon the gun- 
deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring from one 
foot before the forward perpendicular and along the base 
line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting \ of the 
moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 6 inches; mak- 
ing 509JJ tons. (See in Navy Archives, "Contracts," Vol. 
II, p. 137.) 

"^ The Peacock had 166 men, as we learn from her com- 
mander, Warrington's, letter of June ist (Letter No. 140 in 
"Masters-Commandant's Letters," 1814, Vol. I). The Frolic 
took aboard "10 or 12 men beyond her regular complement." 
(See letter of Joseph Bainbridge, No. 51, in same Vol.) Ac- 
cordingly, when she was captured by the Orpheus, the com- 
mander of the latter, Captain Hugh Pigot, reported the 
number of men aboard to be 171. The Wasp left port with 
173 men, with which she fought her first action; she had a 
much smaller number aboard in her second. 



Naval War of 1812 83 

The British vessels encountered were similar, but 
generally inferior, to our own. The only 24-pounder 
frigate we encountered was the Endyniioti, of about 
a fifth less force than the President. Their 38-gun 
frigates were almost exactly like ours, but with 
fewer men in crew as a rule. They were three times 
matched against our 44-gun frigates, to which they 
were inferior about as three is to four. Their 36- 
gun frigates were larger than the Essex, with a 
more numerous crew, but the same number of guns ; 
carrying on the lower deck, however, long i8's in- 
stead of 32-pound carronades, — a much more effec- 
tive armament. The 32-gun frigates were smaller, 
with long 12's on the main-deck. The largest sloops 
were also frigate-built, carrying twenty-two 32- 
pound carronades on the main-deck, and twelve 
lighter guns on the quarter-deck and forecastle, with 
a crew of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloops 
carried 21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men. 
But our vessels most often came in contact with 
the British i8-gun brig-sloop; this was a tubby 
craft, heavier than any of our brigs, being about 
the size of the Hornet. The crew consisted of 
from no to 135 men; ordinarily each was armed 
with sixteen 32-pound carronades, two long 6's, and 
a shifting 12-pound carronade; often with a light 
long gun as a stern-chaser, making 20 in all. The 
Reindeer and Peacock had only 24-pound carron- 
ades; the Epervier had but eighteen guns, all car- 
ronades.^^ 

" The Epervier was taken into our service under the same 
name and rate. Both Preble and Emmons describe her as of 



84 Naval War of 1812 

Among the stock accusations against our navy 
of 1 8 12 were, and are, statements that our vessels 
were rated at less than their real force, and in par- 
ticular that our large frigates were "disguised line- 
of-battle ships." As regards the ratings, most vessels 
of that time carried more guns than they rated ; the 
disparity was less in the French than in either the 
British or American navies. Our 38-gun frigates 
carried 48 guns, the exact number the British 38's 
possessed. The worst case of underrating in our 
navy was the Essex, which rated 32, and carried 
46 gtms, so that her real was 44 per cent in excess 
of her nominal force; but this was not as bad as 
the British sloop Cyane, which was rated at 20 or 
22, and carried 34 guns, so that she had either 55 
or 70 per cent greater real than nominal force. At 
the beginning of the war we owned two i8-gun 
ship-sloops, one mounting 18 and the other 20 guns; 
the i8-gun brig-sloops they captured mounted each 
19 guns, so the average was the same. Later we 
built sloops that rated 18 and mounted 22 guns, 
but when one was captured it was also put down 
in the British navy list as an i8-gun ship-sloop. 
During all the combats of the war there were but 
four vessels that carried as few guns as they rated. 
Two were British, the Epervier and Levant, and 
two American, the Wasp and Adams. One navy 

477 tons. Warrington, her captor, however, says: "The 
surveyor of the port has just measured the Epervier, and 
reports her 467 tons." (In the Navy Archives, "Masters- 
Commandant's Letters," 1814, I, No. 125.) 
For a full discussion of tonnage, see Appendix A. 



Naval War of 1812 85 

was certainly as deceptive as another, so far as un- 
derrating went. 

The force of the statement that our large frigates 
were disguised line-of-battle ships, of course de- 
pends entirely upon what the words "frigate" and 
"line-of-battle ship" mean. When, on the loth of 
August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great convoy by 
beating off Sir George Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail, 
the largest of the Dutch admiral's "33 sail of the 
line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, and his own 
flagship but 28 guns and 134 men.^® The Dutch 
book from which this statement is taken speaks in- 
differently of frigates of 18, 40, and 58 guns. 
Toward the end of the eighteenth century the terms 
had crystallized. Frigate then meant a so-called 
single-decked ship ; it in reality possessed two decks, 
the main, or gun-deck, and the upper one, which 
had no name at all until our sailors christened it 
spar-deck. The gun-deck possessed a complete bat- 
tery, and the spar-deck an interrupted one, mounting 
guns on the forecastle and quarter-deck. At that 
time all "two-decked" or "three-decked" (in reality 
three and four-decked) ships were liners. But in 
181 2 this had changed somewhat; as the various 
nations built more and more powerful vessels, the 
lower rates of the different divisions were dropped. 

" "La Vie et les Actions Memorables du Sr. Michel de 
Ruyter a Amsterdam, Chez Henry et Theodore Boom, 
MDCLXxxvii." The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, a surgeon 
in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally present during many of 
his battles. It is written in French, but is in tone more 
strongly anti-French than anti-English. 



86 Naval War of 1812 

Thus the British ship Cyane, captured by the Con- 
stitution, was in reaHty a small frigate, with a main- 
deck battery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar- 
deck ; a few years before she would have been called 
a 24-gun frigate, but she then ranked merely as a 
22-gun sloop. Similarly the 50 and 64-gun ships 
that had fought in the line at the Doggerbank, 
Camperdown, and even at Aboukir, were now no 
longer deemed fit for that purpose, and the 74 was 
the lowest line-of-battle ship. 

The Constitution, President, and States must then 
be compared with the existing European vessels that 
were classed as frigates. The French in 1812 had 
no 24-pounder frigates, for the very good reason 
that they had all fallen victims to the English 18- 
pounders ; but in July of that year a Danish frigate, 
the Nayadcn, which carried long 24's, was destroyed 
by the English ship Dictator, 64. 

The British frigates were of several rates. The 
lowest rated 32, carrying in all 40 guns,. 26 long 
12's on the main-deck and 14 24-pound carronades 
on the spar-deck — a broadside of 324 pounds.-^ 
The 36-gun frigates, like the Phoebe, carried 46 
guns, 26 long iS's on the gun-deck and 32-pound 
carronades above. The 38-gun frigates, like the 
Macedonian, carried 48 or 49 guns, long i8's below 
and 32-pound carronades above. The 32-gun frig- 
ates, then, presented in broadsides 13 long 12's be- 
low and 7 24-pound carronades above; the 38-gun 

" In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's or 
9's substituted for the bow-chase carronades. 



Naval War of 1812 87 

frigates, 14 long i8's below and 10 32-pound car- 
ronades above; so that a 44-gun frigate would nat- 
urally present 15 long 24's below and 12 42-pound 
carronades above, as the United States did at first. 
The rate was perfectly proper, for French, British, 
and Danes already possessed 24-pounder frigates; 
and there was really less disparity between the force 
and rate of a 44 that carried 54 guns, than there was 
in a 38 that carried 49, or, like the Shannon, 52. 
Nor was this all. Two of our three victories were 
won by the Constitution, which only carried 32- 
pound carronades, and once 54 and once 52 guns; 
and as two-thirds of the work was thus done by this 
vessel, I shall now compare her with the largest 
British frigates. Her broadside force consisted of 
15 long 24's on the main-deck, and on the spar- 
deck one long 24, and in one case 10, in the other 
1 1 32-pound carronades — a broadside of 704 or 736 
pounds.^^ There was then in the British navy the 
Acasta, 40, carrying in broadside 15 long iS's and 
II 32-pound carronades; when the spar-deck bat- 
teries are equal, the addition of 90 pounds to the 
main-deck broadside (which is all the superiority 
of the Constitution over the Acasta) is certainly not 
enough to make the distinction between a frigate 
and a disguised 74. But not considering the Acasta, 
there were in the British navy three 24-pounder 
frigates, the Cornzvallis, Indefatigable, and Endy- 
mion. We only came in contact with the latter in 

** Nominally ; in reality about 7 per cent less on account of 
the short weight in metal. 



88 Naval War of 1812 

181 5, when the Constitution had but 52 guns. The 
Endymion then had an armament of 28 long 24's, 2 
long i8's, and 20 32-pound carronades, making a 
broadside of 674 pounds,^^ or inckiding a shifting 
24-pound carronade, of 698 pounds — just six 
pounds, or i per cent, less than the force of that 
"disguised line-of-battle ship" the Constitution! 
As the Endymion only rated as a 40, and the Con- 
stitution as a 44, it was in reality the former and not 
the latter which was underrated. I have taken the 
Constitution, because the British had more to do 
with her than they did with our other two 44's taken 
together. The latter were both of heavier metal than 
the Constitution, carrying 42-pound carronades. In 
181 2 the United States carried her full 54 guns, 
throwing a broadside of 846 pounds; when cap- 
tured, the President carried 53, having substituted 
a 24-pound carronade for two of her 42's, and her 
broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or 16 per cent 
nominal, and, on account of the short weight of her 
shot, 9 per cent real excess over the Endymion. If 
this difference made her a line-of-battle ship, then 
the Endymion was doubly a line-of-battle ship com- 
pared to the Congress or Constellation. Moreover, 
the American commanders found their 42-pound 
carronades too heavy; as I have said the Constitu- 
tion only mounted 32's, and the United States land- 
ed 6 of her guns. When, in 181 3, she attempted to 
break the blockade, she carried but 48 guns, throw- 

" According to James 664 pounds; he omits the chase guns 
for no reason. 



Naval War of 1812 89 

ing a broadside of 720 pounds — just 3 per cent 
more than the Endymion.^^ If our frigates were 
Hne-of-battle ships the disguise was certainly mar- 
velously complete, and they had a number of com- 
panions equally disguised in the British ranks. 

The 44's were thus true frigates, with one com- 
plete battery of long guns and one interrupted one 
of carronades. That they were better than any 
other frigates was highly creditable to our ingenuity 
and national skill. We can not, perhaps, lay claim 
to the invention and first use of the heavy frigate, 
for 24-pounder frigates were already in the service 
of at least three nations, and the French 36-pound 
carronade, in use on their spar-decks, threw a heav- 
ier ball than our 42-pounder. But we had enlarged 
and perfected the heavy frigate, and were the first 
nation that ever used it effectively. The French 
Forte and the Danish Nayaden shared the fate of 
ships carrying guns of lighter calibre ; and the Brit- 
ish 24-pounders, like the Endymion, had never ac- 
complished anything. Hitherto there had been a 
strong feeling, especially in England, that an 18- 
pound gun was as effective as a 24 in arming a frig- 

^^ It was on account of this difference of 3 per cent that 
Captain Hardy refused to allow the Etidymion to meet the 
States (James vi, p. 470). This was during the course of 
some challenges and counter-challenges which ended in noth- 
ing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the Mace- 
donian meet the Stati'ra, unless the latter should agree not 
to take on a picked crew. He was perfectly right in this; 
but he ought never to have sent the challenge at all, as two 
ships but an hour or two out of port would be at a frightful 
disadvantage in a fight. 



90 Naval War of 1812 

ate; we made a complete revolution in this respect. 
England had been building only i8-pounder ves- 
sels when she ought to have been building 24-pound- 
ers. It was greatly to our credit that our average 
frigate was superior to the average British frigate; 
exactly as it was to our discredit that the Essex was 
so ineffectively armed. Captain Porter owed his 
defeat chiefly to his ineffective guns, but also to hav- 
ing lost his topmast, to the weather being unfavor- 
able, and, still more, to the admirable skill with 
which Hilyar used his superior armament. The 
Java, Macedonian, and Giierriere owed their defeat 
partly to their lighter guns, but much more to the 
fact that their captains and seamen did not display 
either as good seamanship or as good gunnery as 
their foes. Inferiority in armament was a factor 
to be taken into account in all the four cases, but it 
was more marked in that of the Essex than in the 
other three ; it would have been fairer for Porter to 
say that he had been captured by a line-of-battle 
ship, than for the captain of the Java to make that 
assertion. In this last case the forces of the two 
ships compared almost exactly as their rates. A 44 
was matched against a 38 ; it was not surprising that 
she should win, but it was surprising that she should 
win with ease and impunity. The long 24's on the 
Constitution's gun-deck no more made her a line-of- 
battle ship than the 32-pound carronades mounted 
on an English frigate's quarter-deck and forecastle 
made her a line-of-battle ship when opposed to a 
Frenchman with only S's and 6's on his spar-deck. 



Naval War of 1812 91 

When, a few years before, the EngHsh Phoebe had 
captured the French Nereide, their broadsides were 
respectively 407 and 258 pounds, a greater disparity 
than in any of our successful fights; yet no author 
thought of claiming that the Phoebe was anything 
but a frigate. So with the Clyde, throwing 425 
pounds, which took the Vestale, throwing but 246. 
The facts were that i8-pounder frigates had cap- 
tured i2-pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in 
turn captured the i8-pounders. 

Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, 
one of her i8-pounder frigates, the San Florenzo, 
throwing 476 lbs. in a broadside, captured the 12- 
pounder French frigate Psyche, whose broadside 
was only 246 lbs. The force of the former was 
thus almost double that of the latter, yet the battle 
was long and desperate, the English losing 48 and 
the French 124 men. This conflict, then, reflected 
as much credit on the skill and seamanship of the 
defeated as of the victorious side; the difference in 
loss could fairly be ascribed to the difference in 
weight of metal. But where, as in the famous ship- 
duels of 1812, the difference in force is only a fifth, 
instead of a half, and yet the slaughter, instead of 
being as five is to two, is as six to one, then the vic- 
tory is certainly to be ascribed as much to superi- 
ority in skill as to superiority in force. But, on the 
other hand, it should always be remembered that 
there was a very decided superiority in force. It is 
a very discreditable feature of many of our naval 
histories that they utterly ignore this superiority, 



92 Naval War of 1812 

seeming ashamed to confess that it existed. In real- 
ity it was something to be proud of. It was highly 
to the credit of the United States that her frigates 
were of better make and armament than any others ; 
it always speaks well for a nation's energy and ca- 
pacity that any of her implements of warfare are of 
a superior kind. This is a perfectly legitimate rea- 
son for pride. 

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that they 
opposed breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders of the 
Austrians ; but it would be folly to give all the credit 
of the victory to the breech-loaders and none to 
Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it must be re- 
membered that two things contributed to our vic- 
tories. One was the excellent make and armament 
of our ships ; the other was the skilful seamanship, 
\y excellent discipline, and superb gimnery of the men 

who were in them. British writers are apt only to 
speak of the first, and Americans only of the last, 
whereas both should be taken into consideration. 

To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was a 
true frigate, in build and armament, properly rated, 
stronger than a 38-gun frigate just about in the 
proportion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding in 
strength an i8-pounder frigate as much as the latter 
exceeded one carrying 12-pounders. They were in 
no way whatever line-of-battle ships ; but they were 
superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what is 
still more important, they were better manned and 
commanded than the average frigate of any other 
navy. Lord Codrington says ("Memoirs," I, p. 



Naval War of 1812 93 

310) : "But I well know the system of favoritism 
and borough corruption prevails so very much that 
many people are promoted and kept in command 
that should be dismissed the service, and while such 
is the case the few Americans chosen for their merit 
may be expected to follow up their successes except 
where they meet with our best officers on even 
terms." ^^ The small size of our navy was probably 
to a certain extent effective in keeping it up to a high 
standard; but this is not the only explanation, as 
can be seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On 
the other hand, the champions or pick of a large 
navy ought to be better than the champions of a 
small one.^2 

2' To show that I am not quoting an authority biased in 
our favor I will give Sir Edward Codrington's opinion of 
our rural better class (i, 318). "It is curious to observe the 
animosity which prevails here among what is called the bet- 
ter order of people, which I think is more a misnomer here 
than in any other country I have ever been. Their' ui htg 
and tory are democrat and federalist, and it would seem for 
the sake of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which 
marks the Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the 
term) who takes possession of a property adopts the opposite 
political creed to that of his nearest neighbor." 

^* In speaking of tonnage I wish I could have got better 
authority than James for the British side of the question. 
He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives one a distrust of 
his judgment. Thus, in speaking of the Penguin's capture, 
he, in endeavoring to show that the Horttefs loss was greater 
than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerously 
wounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was 
afraid to amputate, owing to his want of experience" ("Naval 
Occurrences," 492). Now what could persuade a writer to 
make such a foolish accusation? No matter how utterly de- 
praved and brutal Captain Biddle might be, he would cer- 



94 Naval War of 1812 

Again, the armaments of the American as well 
as of the British ships were composed of three very- 
different styles of guns. The first, or long gun, was 

tainly not throw his wounded over alive because he feared 
they might die. Again, in vol. vi, p. 546, he says: "Captain 
Stewart had caused the Cyane to be painted to resemble a 
36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize his 
exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston." No 
matter how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no 
matter how great the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, 
the Cyane (which, by the way, went to New York and not 
Boston) could no more be painted to look like a 36-gun 
frigate than a schooner could be painted to look like a brig. 
Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly in his 
work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matter 
of fact from what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the 
British official accounts when they can be reached, except in 
the case of the Java, which seem garbled. That such was 
sometimes the case with British officials is testified to by 
both James (vol. iv, p. 17) and Brenton (vol. ii, p. 454, 
note). From the "Memoir of Admiral Broke" we learn that 
his public letter was wrong in a number of particulars. See 
also any one of the numerous biographies of Lord Dundon- 
ald, the hero of the little Speed/ s fight. It is very unfor- 
tunate that the British stopped publishing official accounts 
of their defeats; it could not well help giving rise to unpleas- 
ant suspicions. 

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James' ac- 
cusations do not really detract from the interest attaching to 
the war, and its value for purposes of study. If, as he says, 
the American commanders were cowards, and their crews 
renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson that 
good training will make such men able to beat brave officers 
with loyal crews. And why did the British have such bad 
average crews as he makes out? He says, for instance, that 
the Java's was unusually bad ; yet Brenton says (vol. ii, p. 
461) it was like "the generality of our crews." It is worth 
while explaining the reason that such a crew was generally 
better than a French and worse than an American one. 



Naval War of 1812 95 

enormously long and thick-barreled in comparison 
to its bore, and in consequence very heavy; it pos- 
sessed a very long range, and varied in calibre from 
two to forty-two pounds. The ordinary calibres in 
our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24. The second 
style was the carronade, a short, light gun of large 
bore ; compared to a long gun of the same weight it 
carried a much heavier ball for a much shorter dis- 
tance. The chief calibres were 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, 
and 68 pounders, the first and the last being hardly 
in use in our navy. The third style was the colum- 
biad, of an intermediate grade between the first two. 
Thus it is seen that a gun of one style by no means 
corresponds to a gun of another style of the same 
calibre. As a rough example, a long 12, a colum- 
biad, 18, and a 32-pound carronade would be about 
equivalent to one another. These guns were mount- 
ed on two different types of vessel. The first was 
flush-decked; that is, it had a single straight open 
deck on which all the guns were mounted. This 
class included one heavy corvette (the Adams), 
the ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. Through 
the bow-chase port, on each side, each of these 
mounted a long gun ; the rest of their guns were 
carronades, except in the case of the Adams, which 
had all long guns. Above these came the frig- 
ates, whose gun-deck was covered above by an- 
other deck; on the fore and aft parts (forecastle and 
quarter-deck) on this upper, open deck were also 
mounted guns. The main-deck guns were all long, 
except on the Essex, which had carronades ; on the 



gS Naval War of 1812 

quarter-deck were mounted carronades, and on the 
forecastle also carronades, with two long bow- 
chasers. 

Where two ships of similar armament fought one 
another, it is easy to get the comparative force by 
simply comparing the weight in broadsides, each 
side presenting very nearly the same proportion of 
long guns to carronades. For such a broadside we 
take half the guns mounted in the ordinary way ; 
and all gvms mounted on pivots or shifting. Thus 
Perry's force in gims was 54 to Barclay's 63 ; yet 
each presented 34 in broadside. Again, each of the 
British brig-sloops mounted 19 gims, presenting 10 
in broadside. Besides these, some ships mounted 
bow-chasers run through the bridle-ports, or stern- 
chasers, neither of which could be used in broad- 
sides. Nevertheless, I include them, both because it 
works in about an equal number of cases against each 
navy, and because they were sometimes terribly ef- 
fective. James excludes the Guerriere's bow-chaser ; 
in reality he ought to have included both it and its 
fellow, as they worked more damage than all the 
broadside gims put together. Again, he excludes 
the Endymion's bow-chasers, though in her action 
they proved invaluable. Yet he includes those of 
the Enterprise and Argus, though the former's were 
probably not fired. So I shall take the half of the 
fixed, plus all the movable, guns aboard, in compar- 
ing broadside force. 

But the chief difficulty appears when guns of one 
style are matched against those of another. If a 



Naval War of 1812 97 

ship armed with long 12's meets one armed with 
32-pound carronades, which is superior in force? 
At long range the first, and at short range the sec- 
ond ; and of course each captain is pretty sure to in- 
sist that "circumstances" forced him to fight at a 
disadvantage. The result would depend largely on 
the skill or luck of each commander in choosing po- 
sition. 

One thing is certain ; long guns are more formid- 
able than carronades of the same calibre. There are 
exemplifications of this rule on both sides ; of course, 
American writers, as a rule, only pay attention to 
one set of cases and British to the others. The 
Cyane and Levant threw a heavier broadside than 
the Constitution but were certainly less formidably 
armed; and the Essex threw a heavier broadside 
than the Phoebe, yet was also less formidable. On 
Lake Ontario the American ship General Pike threw 
less metal at a broadside than either of her two 
chief antagonists, but neither could be called her 
equal ; while on Lake Champlain a parallel case is 
afforded by the British ship Coniiance. Supposing 
that two ships throw the same broadside weight of 
metal, one from long guns, the other from carron- 
ades, at short range they are equal ; at long, one has 
it all her own way. Her captain thus certainly has 
a great superiority of force, and if he does not take 
advantage of it it is owing to his adversary's skill 
or his own mismanagement. As a mere approxi- 
mation, it may be assumed, in comparing the broad- 
sides of two vessels or squadrons, that long guns 

Vol. IX.- 5 



98 Naval War of 1812 

count for at least twice as much as carronades of 
the same calibre. Thus on Lake Champlain Captain 
Downie possessed an immense advantage in his 
long guns, which Commodore Macdonough's ex- 
ceedingly good arrangements nullified. Sometimes 
part of the advantage may be willingly foregone, so 
as to acquire some other. Had the Constitution 
kept at long bowls with the Cyane and Levant she 
could have probably captured one without any loss 
to herself, while the other would have escaped ; she 
preferred to run down close so as to ensure the cap- 
ture of both, knowing that even at close quarters 
long gims are somewhat better than short ones (not 
to mention her other advantages in thick scantling, 
speed, etc.). The British carronades often upset in 
action; this was either owing to their having been 
insufficiently secured, and to this remaining undis- 
covered because the men were not exercised at the 
guns, or else it was because the unpracticed sailors 
would greatly overcharge them. Our better-trained 
sailors on the ocean rarely committed these blun- 
ders, but the less-skilled crews on the lakes did so 
as often as their antagonists. 

But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had heav- 
ier and better-fitted guns, they labored under one 
or two disadvantages. Our foundries were gener- 
ally not as good as those of the British, and our 
guns, in consequence, more likely to burst ; it was an 
accident of this nature which saved the British Bel- 
videra; and the General Pike, under Commodore 
Chauncy, and the new American frigate Guerriere 



Naval War of 1812 99 

suffered in the same way; while often the muzzles 
of the guns would crack. A more universal disad- 
vantage was in the short weight of our shot. When 
Captain Blakely sunk the Avon he officially reported 
that her four shot which came aboard weighed just 
32 pounds apiece, a pound and three-quarters more 
than his heaviest; this would make his average shot 
about 2}^ pounds less, or rather over 7 per cent. 
Exactly similar statements were made by the officers 
of the Constitution in her three engagements. Thus 
when she fought the Java, she threw at a broadside, 
as already stated, 704 pounds ; the Java mounted 28 
long i8's, 18 32-pound carronades, 2 long 12's, and 
one shifting 24-pound carronade, a broadside of 576 
pounds. 

Yet by the actual weighing of all the differ- 
ent shot on both sides it was found that the dif- 
ference in broadside force was only about yy 
pounds, or the Constitution's shot were about 7 per 
cent short weight. The long 24's of the United 
States each threw a shot 4^4 pounds heavier than 
the long i8's of the Macedonian; here again the 
difference was about 7 per cent. The same differ- 
ence existed in favor of the Penguin and Epervier 
compared with the Wasp and Hornet. Mr. Feni- 
more Cooper ^^ weighed a great number of shot 
some time after the war. The later castings, even, 
weighed nearly 5 per cent less than the British shot, 
and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent. The 
average is safe to take at 7 per cent less, and I shall 

^ See "Naval History," i, p. 380. 



I f>fr.. 



loo Naval War of 1812 

throughout make this allowance for ocean cruisers. ' 
The deficit was sometimes owing to windage, but 
more often the shot was of full size but defective in 
density. 

The effect of this can be gathered from the fol- 
lowing quotation from the work of a British artil- 
lerist: "The greater the density of shot of like cali- 
bres, projected with equal velocity and elevation, 
the greater the range, accuracy, and penetration." ^* 
This defectiveness in density might be a serious in- 
jury in a contest at a long distance, but would make 
but little difference at close quarters (although it 
may have been partly owing to their short weight 
that so many of the Chesapeake's shot failed to pen- 
trade the Shannon's hull) . Thus in the actions with 
the Macedonian and Java the American frigates 
showed excellent practice when the contest was car- 
ried on within fair distance, while their first broad- 
sides at long range went very wild ; but in the case 
of the Guerriere, the Constitution reserved her fire 
for close quarters, and was probably not at all af- 
fected by the short weight of her shot. 

As to the officers and crew of a 44-g"n frigate, 
the following was the regular complement estab- 
lished by law 'P 

34 "Heavy Ordnance," Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A., Lon- 
don, 1837. James supposes that the "Yankee captains" have 
in each case hunted round till they could get particularly 
small American shot to weigh; and also denies that short 
weight is a disadvantage. The last proposition carried out 
logically would lead to some rather astonishing results. 

36 See State Papers, vol. xiv, 159 (Washington. 1834) 



Naval War of 1812 loi 

1 captain, i purser, 

4 lieutenants, i surgeon, 

2 lieutenants of marines, 2 surgeon's mates, 
2 sailing masters, i clerk, 

2 master's mates, i carpenter, 

7 midshipmen, 2 carpenter's mates 

1 boatswain, i cook, 

2 boatswain's mates i chaplain. 
I yeoman of gun-room, 

I gunner, 50 

II quarter gunners. 120 able seamen, 

I coxswain, 150 ordinary seamen, 
I sailmaker, 30 boys, 

I cooper, 50 marine. 

I steward, — 

I armorer, 400 in all. 
I master of arms. 

An i8-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 
30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 
20 marines — 140 in all. Sometimes ships put to sea 
without their full complements (as in the case of 
the first Wasp), but more often with supernumer- 
aries aboard. The weapons for close quarters were 
pikes, cutlasses, and a few axes ; while the marines 
and some of the topmen had muskets, and occasion- 
ally rifles. 

In comparing the forces of the contestants I have 
always given the number of men in crew; but this 
in most cases was unnecessary. When there were 
plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails, 
make repairs, act as marines, etc., any additional 
number simply served to increase the slaughter on 
board. The Guerriere undoubtedly suffered from 
being short-handed, but neither the Macedonian nor 
lava would have been benefited by the presence of 
a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about 
as many men as Perry, but this did not give him an 
equality of force. The Penguin and Frolic would 



102 Naval War of 1812 

have been taken just as surely had the Hornet and 
Wasp had a dozen men less apiece than they did. 
The principal case where numbers would help would 
be in a hand-to-hand fight. Thus the Chesapeake 
having fifty more men than the Shannon ought to 
have been successful ; but she was not, because the 
superiority of her crew in numbers was more than 
counterbalanced by the superiority of the Shannon's 
crew in other respects. The result of the battle of 
Lake Champlain, which was fought at anchor, with 
the fleets too far apart for musketry to reach, was 
not in the slightest degree affected by the number of 
men on either side, as both combatants had amply 
enough to manage the guns and perform every other 
service. 

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties 
is taken for granted ; it was not so much a factor in 
gaining the victory, as one which if lacking was 
fatal to all chances of success. In the engagements 
between regular cruisers, not a single one was 
gained by superiority in courage. The crews of 
both the Argus and Epervier certainly flinched ; but 
had they fought never so bravely they were too un- 
skilful to win. The Chesapeake's crew could hardly 
be said to lack courage; it was more that they were 
inferior to their opponents in discipline as well as in 

skill. 

There was but one conflict during the war where 
the victory could be said to be owing to superiority 
in pluck. This was when the Neufchatel privateer 
beat off the boats of the Endymion. The privateers- 



Naval War of 1812 



103 



men suffered a heavier proportional loss than their 
assailants, and they gained the victory by sheer 
ability to stand punishment. 

For convenience in comparing them I give in 
tabulated form the force of the three British 38's 
taken by American 44's (allowing for short weight 
of metal of latter) . 



CONSTITUTION 

30 long 24's, 

2 long 24's, 

22 short 32's, 



Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs. 
real, 684 lbs. 

UNITED STATES, 

30 long 24's, 

2 long 24's, 

22 short 42's, 



Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs. 
real, 786 lbs. 



CONSTITUTION 

30 long 24's, 

2 long 24's, 

20 short 32's. 



Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs. 
real, 654 lbs. 



GUERRIERE 

30 long i8's, 

2 long i2's, 

r6 short 32's, 

1 short 18. 

Broadside, 556 lbs. 

MACEDONIAN 

28 long iS's, 

2 long 12's, 
2 long 9's, 

16 short 32's, 

1 short r8 

Broadside, 547 lbs. 

JAVA 

28 long i8's, 

2 long 12's, 
18 short 32's, 

I short 24. 

Broadside, 576 lbs. 



The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with only 
long i8's on the second deck, was armed as follows: 



28 long 32's, 
28 " i8's, 

6 " 12's, 
14 short 32's, 

7 " i8's. 



or a broadside of 1,032 lbs., 736 from long guns, 
296 from carronades ; while the Constitution threw 



I04 Naval War of 1812 

(in reality) 684 lbs., 356 from long guns, and 328 
from her carronades, and the United States 102 lbs. 
more from her carronades. Remembering the dif- 
ference between long guns and carronades, and con- 
sidering sixteen of the 74's long i8's as being re- 
placed by 42-pound carronades ^^ (so as to get the 
metal on the ships distributed in similar proportions 
between the two styles of cannon), we get as the 
74's broadside 592 lbs. from long gims, and 632 
from carronades. The United States threw nomin- 
ally 360 and 486, and the Constitution nominally 
360 and 352; so the 74 was superior even to the 
former nominally about as three is to two; while 
the Constitution, if "a line-of-battle ship," was dis- 
guised to such a degree that she was in reality of but 
little more than one half the force of one of the 
smallest true liners England possessed! 

^^ That this change would leave the force about as it was, 
can be gathered from the fact that the Adams and yohn 
Adams, both of which had been armed with 42-pound car- 
ronades (which were sent to Sackett's Harbor), had them 
replaced by long and medium i8-pounders, these being con- 
sidered to be more formidable; so that the substitution of 42- 
pound caronnades would, if anything, reduce the force of 
the 74. 



CHAPTER III 
1812 

ON THE OCEAN 

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of 
the Belvidera — Cruise of the Essex — Captain Hull's 
cruise, and escape from the squadron of Commodore 
Broke — Constitution captures Guerribre — Wasp cap- 
tures Frolic — Second unsuccessful cruise of Commo- 
dore Rodgers — United States captures Macedonian — 
Constitution captures Java — Essex starts on a cruise 
— Summary 

AT the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 
181 2, the American navy was but partially 
prepared for effective service. The Wasp, 18, was 
still at sea, on her return voyage from France; the 
Constellation, 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river 
unable to receive a crew for several months to come ; 
the Chesapeake, 38, was lying in a similar condition 
in Boston harbor; the Adams, 28, was at Washing- 
ton, being cut down and lengthened from a frigate 
into a corvette. These three cruisers were none 
of them fit to go to sea till after the end of the 
year. The Essex, 32, was in New York harbor, 
but, having some repairs to make, was not yet ready 
to put out. The Constitution, 44, was at Annapolis, 
without all of her stores, and engaged in shipping 
a new crew, the time of the old one being up. The 

(105) 



io6 Naval War of 1812 

Nautilus, 14, was cruising off New Jersey, and the 
other small brigs were also off the coast. The 
only vessels immediately available were those under 
the command of Commodore Rodgers, at New York, 
consisting of his own ship, the President, 44, and 
of the United States, 44, Commodore Decatur, 
Congress, 38, Captain Smith, Hornet, 18, Captain 
Lawrence, and Argus, 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It seems 
marvelous that any nation should have permitted 
its ships to be so scattered and many of them in 
such an unfit condition, at the beginning of hostil- 
ities. The British vessels cruising off the coast were 
not at that time very numerous or formidable, con- 
sisting of the Africa, 64, Acasta, 40, Shannon, 38, 
Guerriere, 38, Belvidera, 36, Mollis, 32, Southamp- 
ton, 32, and Minerva, 32, with a number of cor- 
vettes and sloops; their force was, however, strong 
enough to render it impossible for Commodore 
Rodgers to make any attempt on the coast towns 
of Canada or the West Indies. But the homeward 
bound plate fleet had sailed from Jamaica on May 
20th, and was only protected by the Thalia, 36, 
Capt. Vashon, and Reindeer, 18, Capt. Manners. 
Its capture or destruction would have been a serious 
blow, and one which there seemed a good chance 
of striking, as the fleet would have to pass along 
the American coast, running with the Gulf Stream. 
Commodore Rodgers had made every preparation, 
in expectation of war being declared, and an hour 
after official intelligence of it, together with his 
instructions, had been received, his squadron put to 



On the Ocean 107 

sea, on June 21st, and ran off toward the southeast^ 
to get at the Jamaica ships. Having learned from 
an American brig that she had passed the plate fleet 
four days before in lat. 36° N., long. 67° W., the 
Commodore made all sail in that direction. At 
6 A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out in the 
N.E., which proved to be the British frigate Bel- 
videra, 36, Capt. Richard Byron.^ The latter had 
sighted some of Commodore Rodgers' squadron 
some time before, and stood toward them, till at 
6.30 she made out the three largest ships to be 
frigates. Having been informed of the likelihood 
of war by a New York pilot boat, the Belvidera 
now stood away, going N.E. by E., the wind being 
fresh from the west. The Americans made all sail 
in chase, the President, a very fast ship off the 
wind, leading, and the Congress coming next. At 
noon the President bore S.W., distant 2 3-4 miles 
from the Belvidera. Nantucket shoals bearing 100 
miles N. and 48 miles E.^ The wind grew lighter, 
shifting more toward the southwest, while the ships 
continued steadily in their course, going N.E. by E. 
As the President kept gaining, Captain Byron cleared 
his ship for action, and shifted to the stern ports 
two long eighteen-pounders on the main-deck and 
two thirty-two pound carronades on the quarter- 
deck. 

' Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of 
the Navy, Sept. i, i8i2. 
^ Brenton, v, 46. 
^ Log of Belvidera, June 23, 1812. 



io8 Naval War of 1812 

At 4.30 * the President's starboard forecastle 
bow-gun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself ; 
the corresponding main-deck gun was next dis- 
charged, and then Commodore Rodgers fired again. 
These three shots all struck the stern of the Belvi- 
dera, killing and wounding nine men, — one of them 
went through the rudder coat, into the after gun- 
room, the other two into the captain's cabin. A few 
more such shots would have rendered the Belvidera's 
capture certain, but when the President's main-deck 
gun was discharged for the second time it burst, 
blowing up the forecastle deck and killing and 
wounding 16 men, among them the Commodore 
himself, whose leg was broken. This saved the 
British frigate. Such an explosion always causes a 
half panic, every gun being at once suspected. In 
the midst of the confusion Captain Byron's stern- 
chasers opened with spirit and effect, killing or 
wounding six men more. Had the President still 
pushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers until 
she closed abreast, which she could probably have 
done, the Belvidera could still have been taken ; but, 
instead, the former now bore up and fired her port 
broadside, cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly, 
but doing no other damage, while the Belvidera 
kept up a brisk and galling fire, although the long 
bolts, breeching-hooks, and breechings of the guns 
now broke continually, wounding several of the men, 

* Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117, the Presi- 
dent was then 600 yards distant from the Belvidera, half a 
point on her weather or port quarter. 



On the Ocean 109 

including Captain Byron. The President had lost 
ground by yawing, but she soon regained it, and, 
coming up closer than before, again opened from 
her bow-chasers a well-directed fire, which severely 
wounded her opponent's main-top mast, cross- jack 
yard, and one or two other spars f but shortly after- 
ward she repeated her former tactics and again lost 
ground by yawing to discharge another broadside, 
even mode ineffectual than the first. Once more she 
came up closer than ever, and once more yawed; 
the single shots from her bow-chasers doing consid- 
erable damage, but her raking broadsides none.^ 
Meanwhile the active crew of the Belvidera repaired 
everything as fast as it was damaged, while under 
the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce, 
and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired from 
her stern guns."^ Finding that if the President 
ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, Cap- 
tain Byron cut away one bower, one stream, and two 
sheet anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat, 
and started 14 tons of water. The effect of this was 
at once apparent, and she began to gain, meanwhile 
the damage the sails of the combatants had received 
had enabled the Congress to close, and when abreast 
of his consort Captain Smith opened with his bow- 
chasers, but the shot fell short. The Belvidera soon 
altered her course to east by south, set her starboard 

* James, vi, iig. He says the President was within 400 
yards. 

* Lord Howard Douglas, "Naval Gunnery," p. 419 (third 
edition). 

' James, vi, 118. 



no Naval War of 1812 

studding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; 
and three days afterward reached HaHfax harbor. 
Lord Howard Douglas' criticisms on this en- 
counter seem very just. He says that the President 
opened very well with her bow-chasers (in fact the 
Americans seemed to have aimed better and to have 
done more execution with these guns than the Brit- 
ish with their stern-chasers; but that she lost so 
much ground by yawing and delivering harmless 
broadsides as to enable her antagonist to escape. 
Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost 
to no purpose, the Commodore would have run 
alongside his opponent, and the fate of the little 36 
would have been sealed. On the other hand it must 
be remembered that it was only the bursting of the 
gun on board the President, causing such direful 
confusion and loss, and especially harmful in dis- 
abling her commander, that gave the Belvidera any 
chance of escape at all. At any rate, whether the 
American frigate does, or does not, deserve blame, 
Captain Byron and his crew do most emphatically 
deserve praise for the skill with which their guns 
were served and repairs made, the coolness with 
which measures to escape were adopted, and the 
courage with which they resisted so superior a force. 
On this occasion Captain Byron showed himself as 
good a seaman and as brave a man as he subsequent- 
ly proved a humane and generous enemy when en- 
gaged in the blockade of the Chesapeake.^ 

8 Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward the 
British, does justice to the humanity of Captains Byron and 



On the Ocean iii 

This was not a very auspicious opening of hostili- 
ties for America. The loss of the Belvidera was not 
the only thing to be regretted, for the distance the 
chase took the pursuers out of their course probably 
saved the plate fleet. When the Belvidera was first 
made out, Commodore Rodgers was in latitude 39 "^ 
26' N., and longitude 71° 10' W., at noon the same 
day the Thalia and her convoy were in latitude 39° 
N., longitude 62° W. Had they not chased the 
Belvidera the Americans would probably have run 
across the plate fleet. 

The American squadron reached the western edge 
of the Newfoundland Banks on June 29th,^ and on 
July I St, a little to the east of the Banks, fell in with 
large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, 
etc., which filled every one with great hopes of over- 
taking the quarry. On July 9th, the Hornet cap- 
tured a British privateer, in latitude 45° 30' N., and 
longitude 23° W., and her master reported that he 
had seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening ; but 
nothing further was heard or seen of them, and on 
July 13th, being within twenty hours' sail of the 
English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly 
turned southward, reaching Madeira July 21st. 
Thence he cruised toward the Azores and bv the 
Grand Banks home, there being considerable sick- 
ness on the ships. On August 31st he reached Bos- 
ton after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he had 

Hardy — which certainly shone in comparison to some of the 
rather buccaneering exploits of Cockburn's followers in 
Chesapeake Bay. 
^ Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. ist. 



112 Naval War of 1812 

made but seven prizes, all merchantmen, and had 
recaptured one American vessel. 

On July 3d the Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, 
put out of New York. As has been already ex- 
plained she was most inefficiently armed, almost en- 
tirely with carronades. This placed her at the mercy 
of any frigate with long guns which could keep at 
a distance of a few hundred yards; but in spite of 
Captain Porter's petitions and remonstrances he was 
not allowed to change his armament. On the nth 
of July at 2 A.M., latitude 33° N., longitude 66° W., 
the Essex fell in with the Minerva, 32, Captain 
Richard Hawkins, convoying seven transports, each 
containing about 200 troops, bound from Barbadoes 
to Quebec. The convoy was sailing in open order, 
and, there being a dull moon, the Essex ran in and 
cut out transport No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard. 
Having taken out the soldiers, Captain Porter stood 
back to the convoy, expecting Captain Hawkins to 
come out and fight him; but this the latter would 
not do, keeping the convoy in close order around 
him. The transports were all armed and still con- 
tained in the aggregate 1,200 -soldiers. As the Es- 
sex could only fight at close quarters these heavy 
odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to cut out 
the Minerva. Her carronades would have to be 
used at short range to be effective, and it would of 
course have been folly to run in right among the 
convoy, and expose herself to the certainty of being 
boarded by five times as many men as she pos- 
sessed. The Minerva had three less guns a side, 



On the Ocean 113 

and on her spar-deck carried 24-poimd carronades 
instead of 32's, and, moreover, had fifty men less 
than the Essex, which had about 270 men this 
cruise ; on the other hand, her main-deck was armed 
with long 12's, so that it is hard to say whether she 
did right or not in refusing to fight. She was of the 
same force as the Southampton, whose captain, Sir 
James Lucas Yeo, subsequently challenged Porter, 
but never appointed a meeting-place. In the event 
of a meeting, the advantage, in ships of such radical- 
ly different armaments, would have been with that 
captain who succeeded in outmanoeuvring the other 
and in making the fight come off at the distance best 
suited to himself. At long range either the Minerva 
or Southampton would possess an immense superi- 
ority; but if Porter could have contrived to run up 
within a couple of hundred yards, or still better, to 
board, his superiority in weight of metal and num- 
ber of men would have enabled him to carry either 
of them. Porter's crew was better trained for 
boarding than almost any other American com- 
mander's ; and probably none of the British frigates 
on the American station, except the Shannon and 
Tenedos, would have stood a chance with the Essex 
in a hand-to-hand struggle. Among her youngest 
midshipmen was one, by name David Glasgow 
Farragut, then but thirteen years old, who after- 
ward became the first and greatest admiral of the 
United States. His own words on this point will 
be read with interest. "Every day," he says,**' "the 

•0 "Life of Farragut" (embodying his journal and letters), 
p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York, 1879. 



114 Naval War of 1812 

crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms, 
and single stick. And I may here mention the fact 
that I have never been on a ship where the crew of 
the old Essex was represented but that I found them 
to be the best swordsmen on board. They had been 
so thoroughly trained as boarders that every man 
was prepared for such an emergency, with his cut- 
lass as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by the ship's 
armorer out of a file, and a pistol." ^^ 

On August 13th a sail was made out to wind- 
ward, which proved to be the British ship-sloop 
Alert, 16, Captain T. L. O. Laugharne, carrying 20 
eighteen-pound carronades and 100 men.^^ As soon 

" James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to 
bring the Minerva to action we do not see what could have 
prevented the Essex, with her superiority of sailing, from 
coming alongside of her. But no such thought, we are sure, 
entered into Captain Porter's head." What "prevented the 
Essex" was the Minerva's not venturing out of the convoy. 
Farragut, in his journal, writes: "The captured British offi- 
cers were very anxious for us to have a fight with the 
Minerva, as they considered her a good match for the 
Essex, and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify 
them with pleasure if His Majesty's commander was of their 
taste. So we stood toward the convoy, and when within gun- 
shot hove to and awaited the Minerva, but she tacked and 
stood in among the convoy, to the utter amazement of our 
prisoners, who denounced the commander as a base coward, 
and expressed their determination to report him to the Ad- 
miralty." An incident of reported "flinching" like this is 
not worth mentioning ; I allude to it only to show the value 
of James' sneers. 

'^ James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men." In the 
Naval Archives at Washington in the "Captains' Letters" 
for 1812 (vol. ii. No. 182) can be found inclosed in Porter's 
letter the parole of the officers and crew of the Alert signed 



On the Ocean 115 

as the Essex discovered the Alert she put out drags 
astern, and led the enemy to believe she was trying 
to escape by sending a few men aloft to shake out 
the reefs and make sail. Concluding the frigate to 
be a merchantman, the Alert bore down on her; 
while the Americans went to quarters and cleared 
for action, although the tompions were left in the 
guns, and the ports kept closed.^^ The Alert fired 
a gun and the Essex hove to, when the former 
passed under her stern, and when on her lee quarter 
poured in a broadside of grape and canister; but the 
sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam that her 
shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage. 
Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as 
soon as his gims would bear, tompions and all. 
The Alert now discovered her error and made off, 
but too late, for in eight minutes the Essex was 
alongside, and the Alert fired a musket and struck, 
three men being wounded and several feet of water 
in the hold. She was disarmed and sent as a cartel 
into St. Johns. It has been the fashion among 
American writers to speak of her as if she were 
"unworthily" given up, but such an accusation is 
entirely groundless. The Essex was four times her 
force, and all that could possibly be expected of her 
was to do as she did — exchange broadsides and 
strike, having suffered some loss and damage. The 

by Captain Laugharne; it contains either loo or lor names 
of the crew of the Alert, besides those of a number of other 
prisoners sent back in the same cartel. 
•3 "Life of Farragut," p. i6. 



ii6 Naval War of 1812 

Essex returned to New York on September 7th, 
having made 10 prizes, containing 423 men.^** 

The Belvidera, as has been stated, carried the 
news of the war to Halifax. On July 5th Vice- 
Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron to cruise 
against the United States, commanded by Philip 
Vere Broke, of the Shannon, 38. having under him 
the Belvidera, 36, Captain Richard Byron, Africa, 
64, Captain John Bastard, and Mollis, 32, Captain 
Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while off Nan- 
tucket, they were joined by the Gtierriere, 38, Cap- 
tain James Richard Dacres. On the i6th the squad- 
ron fell in with and captured the United States brig 
Nautilus, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which, like all the 
little brigs, was overloaded with guns and men. She 
threw her lee guns overboard and made use of every 
expedient to escape, but to no purpose. At 3 p.m. 
of the following day, when the British ships were 
abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues off shore, 
a strange sail was seen and immediately chased, in 
the' south by east, or windward quarter, standing to 
the northeast. This was the United States frigate 

" Before entering New York the Essex fell in with a Brit- 
ish force which, in both Porter's and Farragut's works, is 
said to have been composed of the Acasta and Shannon, 
each of fifty guns, and Ritigdove, of twenty. James says it 
was the Shannon, accompanied by a merchant vessel. It is 
not a point of much importance, as nothing came of the 
meeting, and the Shannon alone, with her immensely su- 
perior armament, ought to have been a match twice over for 
the Essex; although, if James is right, as seems probable, it 
gives rather a comical turn to Porter's account of his "extra- 
ordinary escape." 



On the Ocean 117 

Constitution, 44, Captain Isaac Hull.^-^ When the 
war broke out he was in the Chesapeake River get- 
ting a new crew aboard. Having shipped over 450 
men (counting officers), he put out of harbor on 
the 1 2th of July. His crew was entirely new, drafts 
of men coming on board up to the last moment.^" 
On the 17th, at 2 p.m., Hull discovered four sail, 
in the northern board, heading to the westward. 
At 3, the wind being very light, the Constitution 
made sail and tacked, in i8>4 fathoms. At 4, in 
the N.E., a fifth sail appeared, which afterward 
proved to be the Gnerriere. The first four ships 
bore N.N.W,, and were all on the starboard tack; 
while by 6 o'clock the fifth bore E.N.E. At 6.15 
the wind shifted and blew lightly from the south, 
bringing the American ship to windward. She then 
wore round with her head to the eastward, set her 
light studding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7.30 beat 
to action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the 
Guerriere. The two frigates neared one another 
gradually and at 10 the Constitution began making 
signals, which she continued for over an hour. At 

"• For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly on Cooper; 
see also "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240; James, vi, 133; 
and Marshall's "Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii, 625. 

'« In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Let- 
ters," 1812, ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his 
men were arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted 
with a ship of war, as many have but lately joined and have 
never been on an armed ship before. . . . We are doing all 
that we can to make them acquainted with their duty, and 
in a few days we shall have nothing to fear from any single 
decked ship." 



ii8 Naval War of 1812 

3.30 A.M. on the i8th the Guerriere, going gradual- 
ly toward the Constitution on the port tack, and but 
one half mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the 
Belvidera and the other British vessels, and sig- 
nalled to them. They did not answer the signals, 
thinking she must know who they were — a circum- 
stance which afterward gave rise to sharp recrim- 
inations among the captains — and Dacres, conclud- 
ing them to be Commodore Rodgers' squadron, 
tacked, and then wore round and stood away from 
the C onstitution for some time before discovering 
his mistake. 

At 5 A.M. Hull had just enough steerage way on 
to keep his head to the east, on the starboard tack; 
on his lee quarter, bearing N.E. by N., were the 
Belvidera and Guerriere and astern the Shannon, 
j^olus, and Africa. At 5.30 it fell entirely calm, 
and Hull put out his boats to tow the ship, always 
going southward. At the same time he whipped 
up a 24 from the main-deck, and got the forecastle- 
chaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give the two 
guns more freedom to work in and also running 
out, through the cabin windows, two of the long 
main-deck 24's. The British boats were towing 
also. At 6 A.M. a light breeze sprang up, and the 
Constitution set studding-sails and stay-sails ; the 
Shannon opened at her with her bow guns, but 
ceased when she found she could not reach her. At 
6.30, the wind having died away, the Shannon be- 
gan to gain, almost all the boats of the squadron 
towing her. Having sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieu- 



On the Ocean 119 

tenant Charles Morris suggested to Hull to try kedg- 
ing. All the spare rope was bent on to the cables, 
paid out into the cutters, and a kedge run out half 
a mile ahead and let go; then the crew clapped on 
and walked away with the ship, overrunning and 
tripping the kedge as she came up with the end of 
the line. Meanwhile, fresh lines and another kedge 
were carried ahead, and the frigate glided away 
from her pursuers. At 7.30 a.m. a little breeze 
sprang up, when the Constitution set her ensign and 
fired a shot at the Shannon. It soon fell calm again 
and the Shannon neared. At 9.10 a light air from 
the southward struck the ship, bringing her to wind- 
ward. As the breeze was seen coming, her sails 
were trimmed, and as soon as she obeyed her helm 
she was brought close up on the port tack. The 
boats dropped alongside ; those that belonged to the 
davits were run up, while the others were just lifted 
clear of the water, by purchases on the spare spars, 
stowed outboard, where they could be used again at 
a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on her lee beam the 
Guerriere opened fire; but her shot fell short, and 
the Americans paid not the slightest heed to it. 
Soon it again fell calm, when Hull had 2,000 gal- 
lons of water started, and again put out his boats 
to tow. The Shannon, with some of the other 
boats of the squadron helping her, gained on the 
Constitution, but by severe exertion was again left 
behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind springing 
up, the Belvidera gained on the other British ships, 
and when it fell calm she was nearer to the Con- 



I20 Naval War of 1812 

stitution than any of her consorts, their boats being 
put on to her.^'^ At 10.30, observing the benefit 
that the Constitution had derived from warping. 
Captain Byron did the same, bending all his hawsers 
to one another, and working two kedge anchors at 
the same time by paying the warp out through one 
hawse-hole as it was run in through the other op- 
posite. Having men from the other frigates aboard, 
and a lighter ship to work. Captain Byron, at 2 
P.M., was near enough to exchange bow and stern- 
chasers with the Constitution, out of range however. 
Hull expected to be overtaken, and made every ar- 
rangement to try in such case to disable the first 
frigate before her consorts could close. But neither 
the Belvidera nor the Shannon dared to tow very 
near for fear of having their boats sunk by the 
American's stern-chasers. 

The Constitution's crew showed the most excel- 
lent spirit. Officers and men relieved each other 
regularly, the former snatching their rest any where 
on deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. Gradually 
the Constitution drew ahead, but the situation con- 
tinued most critical'. All through the afternoon the 
British frigates kept towing and kedging, being 
barely out of gunshot. At 3 p.m. a light breeze 
sprung up, and blew fitfully at intervals ; every puff 

1' Cooper speaks as if this was the Shannon ; but from 
Marshall's "Naval Biography" we learn that it was the Bel- 
videra. At other times he confuses the Belvidera with the 
Guerriere. Captain Hull, of course, could not accurately 
distinguish the names of his pursuers. My account is drawn 
from a careful comparison of Marshall, Cooper, and James. 



On the Ocean 121 

was watched closely and taken advantage of to the 
utmost. At 7 in the evening the wind almost died 
out, and for four more weary hours the worn-out 
sailors towed and kedged. At 10.45 ^ httle breeze 
struck the frigate, when the boats dropped along- 
side and were hoisted up, excepting the first cutter. 
Throughout the night the wind continued very 
light, the Belvidera forging ahead till she was off 
the Constitution's lee beam ; and at 4 a.m. on the 
morning of the 19th, she tacked to the eastward, the 
breeze being light from the south by east. At 4 .20 
the Constitution tacked also; and at 5.15 the Molus, 
which had drawn ahead, passed on the contrary tack. 
Soon afterward the wind freshened so that Captain 
Hull took in his cutter. The Africa was now so far 
to leeward as to be almost out of the race ; while the 
five frigates were all running on the starboard tack 
with every stitch of canvas set. At 9 a.m. an Amer- 
ican merchantman hove in sight and bore down tow- 
ard the squadron. The Belvidera, by way of de- 
coy, hoisted American colors, when the Constitution 
hoisted the British flag, and the merchant vessel 
hauled off. The breeze continued light till noon, 
when Hull found he had dropped the British frigates 
well behind ; the nearest was the Belvidera, exactly 
in his wake, bearing W.N.W. 2^ miles distant. 
The Shannon was on his lee, bearing N. by W. ^ 
W. distant 35^ miles. The other two frigates were 
five miles off on the lee quarter. Soon afterward 
the breeze freshened, and "Old Ironsides" drew 
slowly ahead from her foes, her sails being watched 

Vol. IX.— 6 



122 Naval War of 1812 

and tended with the most consummate skill. At 4 
P.M. the breeze again lightened, but even the Belvi- 
dera was now four miles astern and to leeward. At 
6.45 there were indications of a heavy rain squall, 
which once more permitted Hull to show that in sea- 
manship he excelled even the able captains against 
whom he was pitted. The crew were stationed and 
everything kept fast till the last minute, when all 
was clewed up just before the squall struck the ship. 
The light canvas was furled, a second reef taken in 
the mizzen topsail, and the ship almost instantly 
brought under short sail. The British vessels see- 
ing this began to let go and haul down without 
waiting for the wind, and were steering on different 
tacks when the first gust struck them. But Hull as 
soon as he got the weight of the wind sheeted home, 
hoisted his fore and maintop gallant sails, and went 
off on an easy bowline at the rate of 1 1 knots. At 
7.40 sight was again obtained of the enemy, the 
squall having passed to leeward ; the Belvidera, the 
nearest vessel, had altered her bearings two points 
to leeward, and was a long way astern. Next came 
the Shannon; the Guerriere and yEolus were hull 
down, and the Africa barely visible. The wind now 
kept light, shifting occasionally in a very baffling 
manner, but the Constitution gained steadily, wet- 
ting her sails from the sky-sails to the courses. At 
6 A.M. on the morning of the 20th the pursuers were 
almost out of sight; and at 8.15 a.m. they aban- 
doned the chase. Hull at once stopped to investi- 
gate the character of two strange vessels, but found 



On the Ocean 123 

them to be only Americans; then, at midday, he 
stood toward the east, and went into Boston on July 
26th. 

In this chase Captain Isaac Hull was matched 
against five British captains, two of whom, Broke 
and Byron, w^ere fully equal to any in their navy; 
and while the latter showed great perseverance, good 
seamanship, and ready imitation, there can be no 
doubt that the palm in every way belongs to the cool 
old Yankee. Every daring expedient known to the 
most perfect seamanship was tried, and tried with 
success; and no victorious fight could reflect more 
credit on the part of the conqueror than this three 
days' chase did on Hull. Later, on two occasions, 
the Constitution proved herself far superior in gin- 
nery to the average British frigate; this time her 
officers and men showed that they could handle the 
sails as well as they could the gims. Hull out- 
manoeuvred Broke and Byron as cleverly as a month 
later he out-fought Dacres. His successful escape 
and victorious fight were both performed in a way 
that place him above any single ship captain of the 
war. 

On August 2d the Constitution made sail from 
Boston^^ and stood to the eastward, in hopes of fall- 
ing in with some of the British cruisers. She was 
unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. Then she 
ran down to the Bay of Fundy, steered along the 
coast of Nova Scotia, and thence toward Newfound- 
land, and finally took her station off Cape Race in 

1* Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 1812. 



124 Naval War of 1812 

the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she took and burned 
two brigs of Httle value. On the 15th she recap- 
tured an American brig from the British ship-sloop 
Avenger, though the latter escaped; Capt. Hull 
manned his prize and sent her in. He then sailed 
southward, and on the night of the i8th spoke a 
Salem privateer which gave him news of a British 
frigate to the south; thither he stood, and at 2 p.m. 
on the 19th, in lat. 41° 30' N. and 55° W., made 
out a large sail bearing E.S.E. and to leeward,^^ 
which proved to be his old acquaintance, the frigate 
Gnerriere, Captain Dacres. It was a cloudy day 
and the wind was blowing fresh from the north- 
west. The Giierriere was standing by the wind on 
the starboard tack, under easy canvas ;^^ she hauled 
up her courses, took in her topgallant sails, and at 
4 .30 backed her maintopsail. Hull then very de- 
liberately began to shorten sail, taking in topgallant 
sails, staysails, and flying-jib, sending down the 
royal yards and putting another reef in the top- 
sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted three ensigns, 
when the American also set his colors, one at each 
masthead, and one at the mizzen peak. 

The Constitution now ran down with the wind 
nearly aft. The Guerriere was on the starboard 
tack, and at five o'clock opened with her weather- 
guns,2i ^YiQ shot falling short, then wore round and 
fired her port broadside, of which two shots struck 

>9 Do., Aug. 30th. 

"> Letter of Capt. James R. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812, 

*' Log of Guerriere. 



On the Ocean 125 

her opponent, the rest passing over and through her 
rigging.^^ As the British frigate again wore to 
open with her starboard battery, the Constitution 
yawed a Httle and fired two or three of her port 
bow guns. Three or four times the Guerriere re- 
peated this manoeuvre, wearing and firing alternate 
broadsides, but with Httle or no effect, while the 
Constitution yawed as often to avoid being raked, 
and occasionally fired one of her bow guns. This 
continued nearly an hour, as the vessels were very 
far apart when the action began, hardly any loss 
or damage being inflicted by either party. At 6 .00 
the Guerriere bore up and ran off under her topsails 
and jib, with the wind almost astern, a little on her 
port quarter ; when the Constitution set her maintop 
gallant sail and foresail, and at 6.05 closed within 
half pistol-shot distance on her adversary's port 
beam.^^ Immediately a furious cannonade opened, 
each ship firing as the guns bore. By the time the 
ships were fairly abreast, at 6.20, the Constitution 
shot away the Guerriere's mizzenmast, which fell 
over the starboard quarter, knocking a large hole in 

^^ See in the Naval Archives (Bureau of Navigation) the 
Constitutiofi' s Log-Book (vol. ii, from Feb. i, 1812, to Dec. 
13, 1813). The point is of some little importance because 
Hull, in his letter, speaks as if both the first broadsides fell 
short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second went 
over the ship, except two shot, which came home. The hy- 
pothesis of the Gifcrrz'ere having damaged powder was 
founded purely on this supposed falling short of the first 
two broadsides. 

" "Autobiography of Commodore Morris" (Annapolis, 
1880), p. 164. 



126 Naval War of 1812 

the counter, and bringing the ship round against her 
helm. Hitherto she had suffered very greatly and 
the Constitution hardly at all. The latter, finding 
that she was ranging ahead, put her helm a-port and 
then luffed short round her enemy's bows,^'* deliv- 
ering a heavy raking fire with the starboard guns 
and shooting away the Gucrriere's mainyard. Then 
she wore and again passed her adversary's bows, 
raking with her port guns. The mizzenmast of the 
Gucrrierc, dragging in the water, had by this time 
pulled her bow round till the wind came on her star- 
board quarter; and so near were the two ships that 
the Englishman's bowsprit passed diagonally over 
the Constitution's quarterdeck, and as the latter 
ship fell off it got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and 
the vessels then lay with the Gucrriere's starboard- 
bow against the Constitution's port, or lee quarter- 
gallery.25 The Englishman's bow guns played havoc 
with Captain Hull's cabin, setting fire to it ; but the 
flames were soon extinguished by Lieutenant Hoff- 
mann. On both sides the boarders were called 
away; the British ran forward, but Captain Dacres 
relinquished the idea of attacking^^ when he saw 
the crowds of men on the American's decks. Mean- 
while, on the Constitution, the boarders and marines 
gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was running that 
they could not get on the Guerriere. Both sides 
suffered heavily from the closeness of the musketry 

** Log of Constitution. 

" Cooper, in "Putnam's Magazine," i, 475. 

" Address of Captain Dacres to the court-martial at Halifax. 



On the Ocean 127 

fire; indeed, almost the entire loss on the Constitu- 
tion occurred at this juncture. As Lieutenant Bush, 
of the marines, sprang upon the taffrail to leap on 
the enemy's decks, a British marine shot him dead; 
Mr. Morris, the first lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, 
the master, had also both leaped on the taffrail, and 
both were at the same moment wounded by the mus- 
ketry fire. On the Guerriere the loss was far heav- 
ier, almost all the men on the forecastle being picked 
off. Captain Dacres himself was shot in the back 
and severely wounded by one of the American miz- 
zen topmen, while he was standing on the starboard 
forecastle hammocks cheering on his crew f^ two of 
the lieutenants and the master were also shot down. 
The ships gradually worked round till the wind was 
again on the port quarter, when they separated, and 
the Guerriere' s foremast and mainmast at once went 
by the board, and fell over on the starboard side, 
leaving her a defenceless hulk, rolling her main- 
deck guns into the water.^^ At 6.30 the Constitu- 
tion hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a little dis- 
tance to the eastward, and lay to. Her braces and 
standing and running rigging were much cut up and 
some of the spars wounded, but a few minutes suf- 
ficed to repair damages, when Captain Hull stood 
under his adversary's lee, and the latter at once 
struck, at 7 .00 p.m. ,2^ just two hours after she had 
fired the first shot. On the part of the Constitution, 
however, the actual fighting, exclusive of six or 

" James, vi, 144. ** Brenton, v, 51. 

'* Log of the Constitution. 



128 Naval War of 1812 

eight guns fired during the first hour, while closing, 
occupied less than 30 minutes. 

The tonnage and metal of the combatants have 
already been referred to. The Constitution had, as 
already said, about 456 men aboard, while of the 
Giierriere's crew, 267 prisoners were received aboard 
the Constitution; deducting 10 who were Americans 
and would not fight, and adding the 15 killed out- 
right, we get 2y2 ; 28 men were absent in prizes. 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 





Tons 


Guns 


Broad- 
side 


Men 


Loss 


Compara' 
Compara- live loss 
tive Force Inflicted 


Constitution 


1576 


27 


684 


456 


14 


I.OO 1. 00 


Guerriere 


1338 


25 


5S6 


272 


79 


.70 .18 



The loss of the Constitution included Lieutenant 
AVilliam S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen 
killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, mas- 
ter John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine, 
wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. 
Almost all this loss occurred when the ships came 
foul, and was due to the Guerriere' s musketry and 
the two guns in her bridle-ports. 

The Guerriere lost 23 killed and mortally 
wounded, including her second lieutenant, Henry 
Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly, in- 
cluding Captain Dacres himself, the first lieutenant, 
Bartholomew Kent, master Robert Scott, two mas- 
ter's mates, and one midshipman. 

The third lieutenant of the Constitution, Mr. 
George Campbell Read, was sent on board the prize, 
and the Constitution remained by her during the 



On the Ocean 



129 



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&oa 



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SJS 



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,„„ / naemERE 

■•»: ris M \ 





SJS 



'v 

^•*1^ 

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130 Naval War of 1812 

night; but at daylight it was found that she was in 
danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began re- 
moving the prisoners, and at three o'clock in the 
afternoon set the Giierriere on fire, and in a quarter 
of an hour she blew up. He then set sail for Bos- 
ton, where he arrived on August 30th. "Captain 
Hull and his officers," writes Captain Dacres in his 
official letter, "have treated us like brave and gener- 
ous enemies ; the greatest care has been taken that 
we should not lose the smallest trifle." 

The British laid very great stress on the rotten 
and decayed condition of the Guerriere; mentioning 
in particular that the mainmast fell solely because 
of the weight of the falling foremast. But it must 
be remembered that until the action occurred she 
was considered a very fine ship. Thus, in Brighton's 
"Memoir of Admiral Broke," it is declared that 
Dacres freely expressed the opinion that she could 
take a ship in half the time the Shannon could. 
The fall of the mainmast occurred when the fight 
was practically over; it had no influence whatever 
on the conflict. It was also asserted that her powder 
was bad, but on no authority ; her first broadside fell 
short, but so, under similar circumstances, did the 
first broadside of the United States. None of these 
causes accounts for the fact that her shot did not hit. 
Her opponent was of such superior force^ — nearly in 
the proportion of 3 to 2 — that success would have 
been very difficult in any event, and no one can 
doubt the gallantry and pluck with which the Brit- 
ish ship was fought; but the execution was very 



On the Ocean 131 

greatly disproportioned to the force. The gunnery 
of the Guerriire was very poor, and that of the 
Constitution excellent; during the few minutes the 
ships were yardarm and yardarm, the latter was not 
hulled once, while no less than 30 shot took effect 
on the former's engaged side,^^ five sheets of copper 
beneath the bends. The Guerriere, moreover, was 
out-manoeuvred ; "in wearing several times and ex- 
changing broadsides in such rapid and continual 
changes of position, her fire was much more harm- 
less than it would have been if she had kept more 
steady." ^^ The Constitution was handled fault- 
lessly ; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skill 
of a veteran in the way in which he managed, first 
to avoid being raked, and then to improve the ad- 
vantage which the precision and rapidity of his fire 
had gained. "After making every allowance claimed 
by the enemy, the character of this victory is not 
essentially altered. Its peculiarities were a fine dis- 
play of seamanship in the approach, extraordinary 
efficiency in the attack, and great readiness in re- 
pairing damages ; all of which denote cool and capa- 
ble officers, with an expert and trained crew; in a 
word, a disciplined man-of-war. "^2 ^he disparity 
of force, 10 to 7, is not enough to account for the 
disparity of execution, 10 to 2. Of course, some- 
thing must be allowed for the decayed state of the 
Englishman's masts, although I really do not think 

*> Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial. 
" Lord Howard Douglas' "Treatise on Naval Gunnery" 
(London, 1851). p. 454. 
^'^ Cooper, ii, 173. 



132 Naval War of 1812 

it had any influence on the battle, for he was beaten 
when the mainmast fell ; and it must be remembered, 
on the other hand, that the American crew was ab- 
solutely new, while the Guerriere was manned by 
old hands. So that, while admitting and admiring 
the gallantry, and, on the whole, the seamanship, of 
Captain Dacres and his crew, and acknowledging 
that he fought at a great disadvantage, especially in 
being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that 
the combat showed a marked superiority, particu- 
larly in gunnery, on the part of the Americans. Had 
the ships not come foul. Captain Hull would prob- 
ably not have lost more than three or four men; as 
it was, he suffered but slightly. That the Guerriere 
was not so weak as she was represented to be can 
be gathered from the fact that she mounted two 
more maindeck guns than the rest of her class ; thus 
carrying on her maindeck 30 long i8-pounders in 
battery to oppose to the 30 long 24's, or rather (al- 
lowing for the short weight of shot) long 22's, of 
the Constitution. Characteristically enough, James, 
though he carefully reckons in the long bow-chasers 
in the bridle-ports of the Argus and Enterprise, yet 
refuses to count the two long eighteens mounted 
through the bridle-ports on the Guerriere's main- 
deck. Now, as it turned out, these two bow guns 
were used very effectively, when the ships got foul, 
and caused more damage and loss than all of the 
other maindeck guns put together. 

Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed 
the ten Americans on board to go below, so as not 



On the Ocean 133 

to fight against their flag; and in his address to the 
court-martial mentions, among the reasons for his 
defeat, "that he was very much weakened by per- 
mitting the Americans on board to quit their quar- 
ters." Couphng this with the assertion made by 
James and most other British writers that the Con- 
stitution was largely manned by Englishmen, we 
reach the somewhat remarkable conclusion, that the 
British ship was defeated because the Americans on 
board would not fight against their country, and 
tKat the American was victorious because the Brit- 
ish on board would. However, as I have shown, 
in reality there were probably not a score of British 
on board the Constitution. 

In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate ac- 
tions, every one must admit that there was a great 
superiority in force on the side of the victors, and 
British historians have insisted that this superiority 
was so great as to preclude any hopes of a success- 
ful resistance. That this was not true, and that the 
disparity between the combatants was not as great 
as had been the case in a number of encounters in 
which English frigates had taken French ones, can 
be best shown by a few accounts taken from the 
French historian Troude, who would certainly not 
exaggerate the difference. Thus on March i, 1799, 
the English 38-gun i8-pounder frigate Sybil, cap- 
tured the French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate Forte, 
after an action of two hours and ten minutes. ^^ In 

33 "Batailles Navales de la France." O. Troude (Paris, 
1868), iv, 171. 



134 Naval War of 1812 

actual weight the shot thrown by one of the main- 
deck guns of the defeated Forte was over six pounds 
heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main- 
deck guns of the victorious Constitution or United 
States.^^ 

There are later examples than this. But a very 
few years before the declaration of war by the 
United States, and in the same struggle that was 
then still raging, there had been at least two victo- 
ries gained by English frigates over French foes 
as superior to themselves as the American 44's were 
to the British ships they captured. On Aug. 10, 1805, 
the Phoenix, 36, captured the Did on, 40, after 2,^2 
hours' fighting, the comparative broadside force 
being :^^ 

PHCENIX DIDON 

13X18 14X18 

2X 9 2X 8 

6X32 7X36 



21 guns, 444 lbs. 23 guns, 522 lbs. 

(nominal; about 
000, real) 

On March 8, 1808, the San Florenso, 36, captured 
the Piedmontaise, 40, the force being exactly what 
it was in the case of the Phoenix and Didon.^^ 
Comparing the real, not the nominal, weight of 
metal, we find that the Didon and Piedmontaise 
were proportionately of greater force compared to 
the Phoenix and San Florenso, than the Constitu- 
tion was compared to the Guerriere or Java. The 

^ See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot. 

^^ Ibid, iii, 425. 

** "Batailles Navales de la France," iii, 199. 



On the Ocean 135 

French i8's threw each a shot weighing but about 
two pounds less than that thrown by an American 
24 of 181 2, while their 36-pound carronades each 
threw a shot over 10 pounds heavier than that 
thrown by one of the Constitution's spar-deck 32's. 

That a 24-pounder cannot always whip an 18- 
pounder frigate is shown by the action of the Brit- 
ish frigate Eurotas with the French frigate Chlor- 
inde, on Feb. 25, 1814.^'^ The first with a crew 
of 329 men threw 625 pounds of shot at a broadside, 
the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463 
pounds ; yet the result was indecisive. The French 
lost 90 and the British 60 men. The action showed 
that heavy metal was not of much use unless used 
well. 

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's victory 
caused in the United States, and the intense an- 
noyance it created in England, it must be remem- 
bered that during the past twenty years the Island 
Power had been at war with almost every State 
in Europe, at one time or another, and in the course 
of about two hundred single conflicts between ships 
of approximately equal force (that is, where the 
difference was less than one-half), waged against 
French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish, Algerine, Rus- 
sian, Danish, and Dutch antagonists, her ships had 
been beaten and captured in but five instances. 
Then war broke out with America, and in eight 
months five single-ship actions occurred, in every 
one of which the British vessel was captured. 

^^ James, vi, 391. 



136 Naval War of 1812 

Even had the victories been due solely to superior 
force this would have been no mean triumph for 
the United States. 

On October 13, 18 12, the American i8-gun ship 
sloop Wasp, Captain Jacob Jones, with 137 men 
aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran off south- 
east to get into the track of the West India vessels ; 
on the 1 6th a heavy gale began to blow, causing 
the loss of the jib-boom and two men who were on 
it. The next day the weather moderated somewhat, 
and at 11.30 p.m., in latitude 37° N., longitude 
65° W., several sail were descried.^^ These were 
part of a convoy of 14 merchantmen which had 
quitted the bay of Honduras on September 12th, 
bound for England,^^ under the convoy of the Brit- 
ish i8-gun brig-sloop Frolic, of 19 guns and no 
men. Captain Thomas Whinyates. They had been 
dispersed by the gale of the i6th, during which 
the Frolic's main-yard was carried away and both 
her top-sails torn to pieces ;'*° next day she spent in 
repairing damages, and by dark six of the missing 
ships had joined her. The day broke almost cloud- 
less on the i8th (Sunday), showing the convoy, 
ahead and to leeward of the American ship, still 
some distance off, as Captain Jones had not thought 
it prudent to close during the night, while he was 
ignorant of the force of his antagonists. The Wasp 
now sent down her top-gallant yards, close reefed 

'8 Capt. Jones' official letter, Nov. 24, 1812. 

^' James' History, vi, 158. 

" Capt. Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 1812. 



On the Ocean 137 

her top-sails, and bore down under short fighting 
canvas; while the Frolic removed her main-yard 
from the casks, lashed it on deck, and then hauled 
to the wind under her boom main-sail and close- 
reefed foretopsail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy 
the stranger under her guns, and permit the convoy 
to escape. At 1 1.32 the action began — the two ships 
running parallel on the starboard tack, not 60 yards 
apart, the Wasp firing her port, and the Frolic her 
starboard guns. The latter fired very rapidly, de- 
livering three broadsides to the Wasp's two,*^ both 
crews cheering loudly as the ships wallowed through 
the water. There was a very heavy sea running, 
which caused the vessels to pitch and roll heavily. 
The Americans fired as the engaged side of their 
ship was going down, aiming at their opponent's 
hull;*^ while the British delivered their broadsides 
w^hile on the crests of the seas, the shot going high. 
The water dashed in clouds of spray over both 
crews, and the vessels rolled so that the muzzles 
of the guns went under.*^ But in spite of the rough 
weather, the firing was not only spirited but well 
directed. At 11.36 the Wasp's maintop-mast was 
shot away and fell, with its yard, across the port 
fore and foretop-sail braces, rendering the head 
yards unmanageable; at 11.46 the gaff and miz- 
zentop-gallant mast came down, and by 11.52 every 
brace and most of the rigging was shot away.*"* It 
would now have been very difiicult to brace any 

*' Cooper, 182. ** Niles' Register, iii, p. 324. 

« Do. ** Capt. Jones' letter. 



138 Naval War of 1812 

of the yards. But meanwhile the Frolic suffered 
dreadfully in her hull and lower masts, and had 
her gaff and head braces shot away.*^ The slaugh- 
ter among her crew was very great, but the survi- 
vors kept at their work with the dogged courage 
of their race. At first the two vessels ran side by 
side, but the American gradually forged ahead, 
throwing in her fire from a position in which she 
herself received little injury; by degrees the ves- 
sels got so close that the Americans struck the 
Frolic's side with their rammers in loading,*^ and 
the British brig was raked with dreadful effect. 
The Frolic then fell aboard her antagonist, her jib- 
boom coming in between the main and mizzen-rig- 
ging of the Wasp and passing over the heads of 
Captain Jones and Lieutenant Biddle, who were 
standing near the capstan. This forced the Wasp 
up in the wind, and she again raked her antagonist. 
Captain Jones trying to restrain his men from board- 
ing till he could put in another broadside. But they 
could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a 
New Jersey seaman, leaped on the Frolic's bowsprit. 
Lieutenant Biddle then mounted on the hammock 
cloth to board, but his feet got entangled in the 
rigging, and one of the midshipmen seizing his 
coat-tails to help himself up, the lieutenant tumbled 
back on the deck. At the next swell he succeeded 
in getting on the bowsprit, on which there were 
already two seamen whom he passed on the fore- 
castle. But there was no one to oppose him; not 

« Capt. Whinyates" letter. *« Capt. Jones' letter. 



On the Ocean 139 

twenty Englishmen were left unhurt.'*'' The man 
at the wheel was still at his post, grim and undaunt- 
ed, and two or three more were on deck, including 
Captain Whinyates and Lieutenant Wintle, both so 
severely wounded that they could not stand without 
support.*^ There could be no more resistance, and 
Lieutenant Biddle lowered the flag at 12.15 — J^st 
43 minutes after the beginning of the fight.^^ A 
minute or two afterward both the Frolic's masts 

DIAGRAM 60 

% WASP 



/ 



lf.3S 






..*••• 







\ 

eUDLIff 



^lUS 



« Capt. Whinyates' letter. *^ James, vi, i6i. 

" Capt. Jones' letter. 

^0 It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of the manoeuvres 
in this action. James says "larboard" where Cooper says 
"starboard"; one says the Wasp wore, the other says that 
she could not do so, etc. 



I40 Naval War of 1812 

went by the board — the foremast about fifteen feet 
above the deck, the other short off. Of her crew, 
as already said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt. 
Every officer was wounded; two of them, the first 
lieutenant, Charles McKay, and master, John 
Stephens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over 
90;^^ about 30 of whom were killed outright or 
died later. The Wasp suffered very severely in her 
rigg-ing and aloft generally, but only two or three 
shots struck her hull ; five of her men were killed — 
two in her mizzen-top and one in her maintop-mast 
rigging — and five wounded, chiefly while aloft. 

The two vessels were practically of equal force. 
The loss of the Frolic's main-yard had merely con- 
verted her into a brigantine, and, as the roughness 
of the sea made it necessary to fight under very 
short canvas, her inferiority in men was fully com- 
pensated for by her superiority in metal. She had 
been desperately defended; no men could have 
fought more bravely than Captain Whinyates and 
his crew. On the other hand, the Americans had 
done their work with a coolness and skill that could 
not be surpassed; the contest had been mainly one 
of gunnery, and had been decided by the greatly 
superior judgment and accuracy with which they 
fired. Both officers and crew had behaved well; 
Captain Jones particularly mentions Lieutenant 
Claxton, who, though too ill to be of any service, 

*' Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, and is, of 
course, to be taken as authority ; the Bermuda account makes 
it 69, and James only 62. 



On the Ocean 141 

persisted in remaining on deck throughout the en- 
gagement. 

The Wasp was armed with 2 long 12's and 16 
32-pound carronades ; the Frolic with 2 long 6's, 16 
32-pound carronades, and i shifting 12-pound car- 
ronade. 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 

Tons No. Guns Weight Metal Crews Loss 

Wasp 450 9 250 135 10 

Frolic 467 10 274 no 90 

Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Graviere comments on 
this action as follows :^^ 

"The American fire showed itself to be as accu- 
rate as it was rapid. On occasions when the rough- 
ness of the sea would seem to render all aim exces- 
sively uncertain, the effects of their artillery were 
not less murderous than under more advantageous 
conditions. The corvette Wasp fought the brig 
Frolic in an enormous sea, under very short canvas, 
and yet, forty minutes after the beginning of the ac- 
tion, when the two vessels came together, the Amer- 
icans who leaped aboard the brig found on the deck, 
covered with dead and dying, but one brave man, 
who had not left the wheel, and three officers, all 
wounded, who threw down their swords at the feet 
of the victors." Admiral de la Graviere's criticisms 
are especially valuable, because they are those of an 
expert, who only refers to the War of 18 12 in order 
to apply to the French navy the lessons which it 
teaches, and who is perfectly unprejudiced. He 

" "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 287 (Septieme Edition. Paris, 
1881). 



142 Naval War of 1812 

cares for the lesson taught, not the teacher, and is 
quite as willing to learn from the defeat of the 
Chesapeake as from the victories of the Constitution 
— while most American critics only pay heed to the 
latter. 

The characteristics of the action are the practical 
equality of the contestants in point of force and the 
enormous disparity in the damage each suffered ; nu- 
merically, the Wasp was superior by 5 per cent, 
and inflicted a ninefold greater loss. 

Captain Jones was not destined to bring his prize 
into port, for a few hours afterward the Poictiers, 
a British 74, Captain John Poer Beresford, hove in 
sight. Now appeared the value of the Frolic's des- 
perate defence ; if she could not prevent herself from 
being captured, she had at least ensured her own 
recapture, and also the capture of the foe. When 
the Wasp shook out her sails they were found to 
be cut into ribbons aloft, and she could not make off 
with sufficient speed. As the Poictiers passed the 
Frolic, rolling like a log in the water, she threw a 
shot over her, and soon overtook the Wasp. Both 
vessels were carried into Bermuda. Captain Whin- 
yates was again put in command of the Frolic. Cap- 
tain Jones and his men were soon exchanged; 25,- 
000 dollars prize-money was voted them by Con- 
gress, and the Captain and Lieutenant Biddle were 
both promoted, the former receiving the captured 
ship Macedonian. Unluckily the blockade was too 
close for him to succeed in getting out during the 
remainder of the war. 



On the Ocean 143 

On Oct. 8th Commodore Rodgers left Boston 
on his second cruise, with the President, United 
States, Congress, and Argus^^ leaving the Hornet 
in port. Four days out, the United States and Ar- 
gus separated, while the remaining two frigates 
continued their cruise together. The Argiis^^ Cap- 
tain Sinclair, cruised to the eastward, making prizes 
of 6 valuable merchantmen, and returned to port on 
January 3d. During the cruise she was chased for 
three days and three nights (the latter being moon- 
light) by a British squadron, and was obliged to cut 
away her boats and anchors and start some of her 
water. But she saved her guns, and was so cleverly 
handled that during the chase she actually suc- 
ceeded in taking and manning a prize, though the 
enemy got near enough to open fire as the vessels 
separated. Before relating what befell the United 
States, we shall bring Commodore Rodgers' cruise 
to an end. 

On Oct. loth the Commodore chased, but failed 
to overtake, the British frigate Nymphe, 38, Cap- 
tain Epworth. On the i8th, off the great Bank of 
Newfoundland, he captured the Jamaica packet 
Swallow, homeward bound, with 200,000 dollars in 
specie aboard. On the 31st at 9 a.m., lat. 33° N., 
long. 2^° W., his two frigates fell in with the Brit- 
ish frigate Galatea, 36, Captain Woodley Losack, 
convoying two South Sea ships, to windward. The 
Galatea ran down to reconnoitre, and at 10 a.m., 

" Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Jan. i, 1813. 
^* Letter of Capt. Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4. 1813. 



144 Naval War of 1812 

recognizing her foes, hauled up on the starboard 
tack to escape. The American frigates made all 
sail in chase, and continued beating to windward, 
tacking several times, for about three hours. Seeing 
that she was being overhauled, the Galatea now 
edged away to get on her best point of sailing; at 
the same moment one of her convoy, the Argo, bore 
up to cross the hawse of her foes, but was inter- 
cepted by the Congress, who lay to to secure her. 
Meanwhile the President kept after the Galatea; 
she set her topmast, topgallant mast and lower stud- 
ding-sails, and when it was very dusk, the President 
lost sight of the chase, and, toward midnight, hauled 
to the wind to rejoin her consort. The two frigates 
cruised to the east as far as 22° W., and then ran 
down to 17° N. ; but during the month of Novem- 
ber they did not see a sail. They had but slightly 
better luck on their return toward home. Passing 
120 miles north of Bermuda, and cruising a little 
while toward the Virginia capes, they re-entered 
Boston on Dec. 31st, having made 9 prizes, most of 
them of little value. 

When four days out, on Oct. 12th, Commodore 
Decatur had separated from the rest of Rodgers' 
squadron and cruised east; on the 25th, in lat. 29° 
N., and long. 29° 30', W., while going close-hauled 
on the port tack, with the wind fresh from the 
S. S. E., a sail was descried on the weather beam, 
about 12 miles distant.^^ This was the British 38- 
gun frigate Macedonian, Captain John Surnam Car- 

" Oflacial letter of Commodore Decatur, Oct. 30, 1812. 



On the Ocean 145 

den. She was not, like the Guerriere, an old ship 
captured from the French, but newly built of oak, 
and larger than any American i8-pounder frigate; 
she was reputed (very wrongfully) to be a "crack 
ship." According to Lieut. David Hope, "the state 
of discipline on board was excellent; in no British 
ship was more attention paid to gunnery. Before 
this cruise the ship had been engaged almost every 
day with the enemy; and in time of peace the crew 
were constantly exercised at the great guns." ^*^ 
How they could have practiced so much and learned 
so little is certainly marvelous. 

The Macedonian set her foretopmast and top- 
gallant studding-sails and bore away in chase,^'^ 
edging down with the wind a little aft the star- 
board beam. Her first lieutenant wished to con- 
tinue on this course and pass down ahead of the 
United States^^ but Captain Garden's over-anxiety 
to keep the weather-gage lost him this opportunity 
of closing.^^ Accordingly he hauled by the wind 
and passed way to windward of the American. As 
Commodore Decatur got within range, he eased off 
and fired a broadside, most of which fell short ;^^ 
he then kept his luff, and, the next time he fired, 
his long 24's told heavily, while he received very 
little injury himself.^^ The fire from his main-deck 

" Marshall's "Naval Biography," vol. iv, p. 1018. 
" Capt. Garden to Mr. Croker, Oct. 28, 1812. 
*8 James, vi, 166. 

"' Sentence of Court-martial held on the San Domingo, 74, 
at the Bermudas, May 27, 1812. 
^0 Marshall, iv, 1080. " Cooper, ii, 178. 

Vol. IX.— 7 



146 Naval War of 1812 

(for he did not use his carronades at all for the first 
half-hour) ^2 ^^g gQ y^j-y j-apid that it seemed as 

if the ship was on fire; his broadsides were delivered 
with almost twice the rapidity of those of the En- 
glishman.^3 The latter soon found he could not play 
at long bowls with any chance of success ; and, hav- 
ing already erred either from timidity or bad judg- 
ment, Captain Garden decided to add rashness to the 
catalogue of his virtues. Accordingly he bore up, 
and came down end on toward his adversary, with 
the wind on his port quarter. The States now 
(10.15) laid her maintopsail aback, and made heavy 
play with her long guns, and, as her adversary came 
nearer, with her carronades also. The British ship 
would reply with her starboard guns, hauHng up to 
do so; as she came down, the American would ease 
off, run a little way and again come to, keeping 
up a terrific fire. As the Mecedonian bore down to 
close, the chocks of all her forecastle guns (which 
were mounted on the outside) were cut away f^ her 
fire caused some damage to the American's rig- 
ging, but hardly touched her hull, while she herself 
suffered so heavily both alow and aloft that she 
gradually dropped to leeward, while the American 
forereached on her. Finding herself ahead and to 
windward, the States tacked and ranged up under 
her adversary's lee, when the latter struck her col- 
ors at 1 1. 1 5, just an hour and a half after the begin- 
ning of the action.^^ 

*' Letter of Commodore Decatur. ** James, vi, 169. 

^* Letter of Captain Cardan. 
*^ Letter of Com modore Decatur. 



On the Ocean 



147 



I 



m*^ 







s 



\ 



148 Naval War of 1812 

The United States had suffered surprisingly little; 
what damage had been done was aloft. Her miz- 
zen topgallant mast was cut away, some of the spars 
were wounded, and the rigging a good deal cut ; the 
hull was only struck two or three times. The ships 
were never close enough to be within fair range of 
grape and musketry,^^ and the wounds were mostly 
inflicted by round shot and were thus apt to be 
fatal. Hence the loss of the Americans amounted 
to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th of the ship) 
and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and only 
five severely and slightly wounded. 

The Macedonian, on the other hand, had received 
over a hundred shot in her hull, several between 
wind and water ; her mizzenmast had gone by the 
board; her fore and maintopmasts had been shot 
away by the caps, and her mainyard in the slings; 
almost all her rigging was cut away (only the fore- 
sail being left) ; on the engaged side all of her car- 
ronades but two, and two of her maindeck guns, 
were dismounted. Of her crew 43 were killed and 
mortally wounded, and 61 (including her first and 
third lieutenants) severely and slightly wounded.®' 
Among her crew were eight Americans (as shown 
by her muster-roll) ; these asked permission to go 
below before the battle, but it was refused by Cap- 
tain Garden, and three were killed during the ac- 
tion. James says that they were allowed to go be- 
low, but this is untrue; for if they had the three 

^^ Letter of Commodore Decatur. 
" Letter of Captain Carden. 



On the Ocean 149 

would not have been slain. The others testified that 
they had been forced to fight, and they afterward 
entered the American service — the only ones of the 
Macedonian's crew who did, or who were asked to. 
The Macedonian had her full complement of 301 
men ; the States had, by her muster-roll of October 
20th, 428 officers, petty officers, seamen, and boys, 
and 50 officers and privates of marines, a total of 
478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his "Naval Bi- 
ography" makes it). 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 





Broadside 
Size Guns 


Weight 
Metal Men Loss 


United States 
Macedonian 


1576 27 
1325 25 


786 478 12 
547 301 104 




Comparative 
Force 


Comparative Loss 
Inflicted 


States 
Macedonian 


100 
66 


ICX) 

II 



That is, the relative force being about as three 
is to two,^® the damage done was as nine to one ! 

*^ I have considered the Uttz'ted States as mounting her 
full allowance of 54 guns; but it is impossible that she had 
no more than 49. In Decatur's letter of challenge of Jan. 17, 
1814 (which challenge, by the way, was a most blustering 
affair, reflecting credit neither on Decatur, nor his opponent. 
Captain Hope, nor on any one else excepting Captain Stack- 
pole of H. M. S. Statzra), she is said to have had that num- 
ber; her broadside would then be 15 long 24's below, i long 
24, I 12-pound, and 8 42-pound, carronades above. Her real 
broadside weight of metal would thus be about 680 lbs., and 
she would be superior to the Macedonian in the proportion 
of 5 to 4. But it is possible that Decatur had landed some of 
his guns in 1813, as James asserts; and though I am not at all 
sure of this, I have thought it best to be on the safe side in 
describing his force. 



150 Naval War of 1812 

Of course, it would have been almost impossible 
for the Macedonian to conquer with one-third less 
force; but the disparity was by no means sufficient 
to account for the ninefold greater loss suffered, and 
the ease and impunity with which the victory was 
won. The British sailors fought with their accus- 
tomed courage, but their gunnery was exceedingly 
poor; and it must be remembered that though the 
ship was bravely fought, still the defence was by 
no means so desperate as that made by the Essex 
or even the Chesapeake, as witnessed by their re- 
spective losses. The Macedonian, moreover, was 
surrendered when she had suffered less damage 
than either the Guerriere or Java. The chief cause 
of her loss lay in the fact that Captain Garden was 
a poor commander. The gunnery of the Java, Guer- 
riere, and Macedonian was equally bad; but while 
Captain Lambert proved himself to be as able as he 
was gallant, and Captain Dacres did nearly as well, 
Captain Carden, on the other hand, was first too 
timid, and then too rash, and showed bad judgment 
at all times. By continuing his original course he 
could have closed at once ; but he lost his chance by 
over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage, and was cen- 
sured by the court-martial accordingly. Then he 
tried to remedy one error by another, and made a 
foolishly rash approach. A very able and fair- 
minded English writer says of this action : "As a 
display of courage the character of the service was 
nobly upheld, but we would be deceiving ourselves 
were we to admit that the comparative expertness 



On the Ocean 151 

of the crews in gunnery was equally satisfactory. 
Now, taking the difference of effect as given by Cap- 
tain Garden, we must draw this conckision — that the 
comparative loss in killed and wounded (104 to 12), 
together with the dreadful account he gives of the 
condition of his own ship, while he admits that the 
enemy's vessel was in comparatively good order, 
must have arisen from inferiority in gunnery as 
well as in force." ^^ 

On the other hand, the American crew, even ac- 
cording to James, were as fine a set of men as ever 
were seen on shipboard. Though not one-fourth 
were British by birth, yet many of them had served 
on board British ships of war, in some cases volun- 
tarily, but much more often because they were im- 
pressed. They had been trained at the guns with 
the greatest care by Lieutenant Allen. And finally 
Commodore Decatur handled his ship with abso- 
lute faultlessness. To sum up: a brave and skilful 
crew, ably commanded, was matched against an 
equally brave but unskilful one, with an incompetent 
leader; and this accounts for the disparity of loss 
being so much greater than the disparity in force. 

At the outset of this battle the position of the 
parties was just the reverse of that in the case of the 
Constitution and Guerriere; the Englishman had the 
advantage of the wind, but he used it in a very dif- 
ferent manner from that in which Captain Hull had 
done. The latter at once ran down to close, but 
manoeuvred so cautiously that no damage could be 

" Lord Howard Douglas, "Naval Gunnery," p. 515. 



152 Naval War of 1812 

done him till he was within pistol shot. Captain 
Garden did not try to close till after fatal indecision, 
and then made the attempt so heedlessly that he was 
cut to pieces before he got to close quarters. Com- 
modore Decatur, also, manoeuvred more skilfully 
than Captain Dacres, although the difference was 
less marked between these two. The combat was a 
plain cannonade; the States derived no advantage 
from the superior number of her men, for they were 
not needed. The marines in particular had nothing 
whatever to do, while they had been of the greatest 
service against the Giierriere. The advantage was 
simply in metal, as 10 is to 7. Lord Howard Doug- 
las' criticisms on these actions seem to me only 
applicable in part. He says (p. 524) : "The Ameri- 
cans would neither approach nor permit us to join 
in close battle until they had gained some extraordi- 
nary advantage from the superior faculties of their 
long guns in distant cannonade, and from the in- 
trepid, uncircumspect, and often very exposed ap- 
proach of assailants who had long been accustomed 
to contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were 
crippled in distant cannonade from encountering 
rashly the serious disadvantage of making direct 
attacks; the uncircumspect gallantry of our com- 
manders led our ships unguardedly into the snares 
which wary caution had spread." 

These criticisms are very just as regards the 
Macedonian, and I fully agree with them (possibly 
reserving the right to doubt Captain Garden's gal- 
lantry, though readily admitting his uncircumspec- 



On the Ocean 153 

tion). But the case of the Guerriere differed widely. 
There the American ship made the attack, while the 
British at first avoided close combat; and, so far 
from trying to cripple her adversary by a distant 
cannonade, the Constitution hardly fired a dozen 
times until within pistol shot. This last point is 
worth mentioning-, because in a work on "Heavy 
Ordnance," by Captain T. F. Simmons, R.A. (Lon- 
don, 1837), it is stated that the Guerriere received 
her injuries before the closing, mentioning especially 
the "thirty shot below the water-line"; whereas, by 
the official accounts of both commanders, the re- 
verse was the case. Captain Hull, in his letter, and 
Lieutenant Morris (in his autobiography) say they 
only fired a few guns before closing; and Captain 
Dacres, in his letter, and Captain Brenton, in his 
"History," say that not much injury was received 
by the Guerriere until about the time the mizzen- 
mast fell, which was three or four minutes after 
close action began. 

Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the Macedonian 
as prize-master; he secured the fore and mainmasts 
and rigged a jury mizzenmast, converting the vessel 
into a bark. Commodore Decatur discontinued his 
cruise to convoy his prize back to America ; they 
reached New London Dec. 4th. Had it not been for 
the necessity of convoying the Macedonian, the 
States would have continued her cruise, for the dam- 
age she suffered was of the most trifling character. 

Captain Carden stated (in Marshall's "Naval 
Biography") that the States measured 1,670 tons, 



154 Naval War of 1812 

was manned by 509 men, suffered so from shot un- 
der water that she had to be pumped out every watch 
and that two eighteen-pound shot passed in a hori- 
zontal hne through her mainmast; all of which 
statements were highly creditable to the vividness 
of his imagination. The States measured but 1,576 
tons (and by English measurement very much less), 
had 478 men aboard, had not been touched by a 
shot under water-line and her lower masts were 
unwounded. James states that most of her crew 
were British, which assertion I have already dis- 
cussed; and that she had but one boy aboard, and 
that he was seventeen years old, — in which case 29 
others, some of whom (as we learn from the "Life 
of Decatur") were only twelve, must have gro^vn 
with truly startling rapidity during the hour and a 
half that the combat lasted. 

During the twenty years preceding 1812, there 
had been almost incessant warfare on the ocean, 
and although there had been innumerable single con- 
flicts between French and English frigates, there had 
been but one case in which the French frigate, sin- 
gle-handed, was victorious. This was in the year 
1805, when the Milan captured the Cleopatra. Ac- 
cording to Troude, the former threw at a broadside 
574 pounds (actual), the latter but 334; and the 
former lost 35 men out of her crew of 350; the lat- 
ter 58 out of 200. Or, the forces being as 100 to 58. 
the loss inflicted was as 100 to 60 ; while the States' 
force compared to the Macedonian's being as 100 to 
66, the loss she inflicted was as 100 to 11. 



On the Ocean 155 

British ships, moreover, had often conquered 
against odds as great; as, for instance, when the 
Sea Horse captured the great Turkish frigate Ba- 
dcre-Zaffer; when the Astrea captured the French 
frigate Gloire, which threw at a broadside 286 
pounds of shot, while she threw but 174; and when, 
most glorious of all. Lord Dundonald, in the gal- 
lant little Speedy, actually captured the Spanish 
xebec Gamo, of over five times her own force ! Sim- 
ilarly, the corvette Comiis captured the Danish frig- 
ate Fredrickscoarn, the brig Onyx captured the 
Dutch sloop Manly, the little cutter Thorn captured 
the French Courier-National, and the Pasley the 
Spanish Virgin; while there had been many in- 
stances of drawn battles between English 12-pound 
frigates and French or Spanish i8-pounders. 

Captain Hull having resigned the command of 
the Constitution she was given to Captain Bain- 
bridge, of the Constellation, who was also entrusted 
with the command of the Essex and Hornet. The 
latter ship was in the port of Boston with the Con- 
stitution, under the command of Captain Lawrence. 
The Essex was in the Delaware, and accordingly 
orders were sent to Captain Porter to rendezvous at 
the island of San Jago; if that failed several other 
places were appointed, and if, after a certain time, 
he did not fall in with his commodore he was to act 
at his own discretion. 

On October 26th the Comtitution and Hornet 
sailed, touched at the different rendezvouses, and 
on December 13th arrived off San Salvador, where 



156 Naval War of 1812 

Captain Lawrence found the Bonne Citoyenne, 18, 
Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene. The Bonne Cito- 
yenne was armed with 18 32-pound carronades and 
2 long nines, and her crew of 150 men was exactly 
equal in number to that of the Hornet; the latter's 
short weight in metal made her antagonist supe- 
rior to her in about the same proportion that she 
herself was subsequently superior to the Penguin, 
or, in other words, the ships were practically equal. 
Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain Greene 
to single fight, giving the usual pledges that the 
Constitution should not interfere. The challenge 
was not accepted for a variety of reasons; among 
others the Bonne Citoyenne was carrying home half 
a million pounds in specie '^^ Leaving the Hornet 

'"' Brenton and James both deny that Captain Greene was 
blockaded by the Hornet, and claim that he feared the Con- 
stitution. James says (p. 275) that the occurrence was one 
which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned 
greatly to their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only 
sent the challenge because "it could not be accepted," and 
so he would "suffer no personal risk." He states that the 
reason it was sent, as well as the reason that it was refused, 
was because the Constitution was going to remain in the 
offing and capture the British ship if she proved conqueror. 
It is somewhat surprising that even James should have had 
the temerity to advance such arguments. According to his 
own account (p. 277) the Constitution left ior Boston on Jan. 
6th, and the //<?r«^/ remained blockading the Bonne'Citoyenne 
till the 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived. During these 
eighteen days there could have been no possible chance of 
the Constitution or any other ship interfering, and it is ridic- 
ulous to suppose that any such fear kept Captain Greene 
from sailing out to attack his foe. No doubt Captain Greene's 
course was perfectly justifiable, but it is curious that with all 



On the Ocean 157 

to blockade her, Commodore Bainbridge ran off to 
the southward, keeping the land in view. 

At 9 A.M., Dec. 29, 1812, while the Constitution 
was running along the coast of Brazil, about thirty 
miles off shore in latitude 13° 6' S., and longitude 
31° W., two strange sail were made,"^^ inshore and 
to windward. These were H. B. M. frigate Java, 
Captain Lambert, forty-eight days out of Spithead, 
England, with the captured ship William in com- 
pany. Directing the latter to make for San Salva- 
dor, the Java bore down in chase of the Constitu- 
tion.'^2 'pj^g ^^jj^^ ^^^g blowing light from the 
N.N.E., and there was very little sea on. At 10 the 
Java made the private signals, English, Spanish, and 
Portuguese in succession, none being answered; 
meanwhile the Constitution was standing up toward 
the Java on the starboard tack; a little after 11 
she hoisted her private signal, and then, being satis- 
fied that the strange sail was an enemy, she wore 
and stood off toward the S.E., to draw her antago- 
nist away from the land,'^^ which was plainly visible. 
The Java hauled up, and made sail in a parallel 
course, the Constitution bearing about three points 

the assertions made by James as to the cowardice of the Ameri- 
cans, this is the only instance throughout the war in which a 
ship of either party declined a contest with an antagonist 
of equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir 
George Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate 
of the opposing ships). 

" Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan. 3, 1813. 

" Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec. 31, 1812. 

" Log of the Constitution. 



158 Naval War of 1812 

on her lee bow. The Java gained rapidly, being 
much the swifter. 

At 1.30 the Constitntion luffed up, shortened her 
canvas to topsails, topgallant sails, jib, and spanker, 
and ran easily off on the port tack, heading toward 
the southeast; she carried her commodore's pendant 
at the main, national ensigns at the mizzen-peak 
and main topgallant masthead, and a Jack at the 
fore. The Java also had taken in the mainsail and 
royals, and came down in a lasking course on her 
adversary's weather-quarter,'^^ hoisting her ensign 
at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at the mizzen top- 
gallant masthead, and another lashed to the main- 
rigging. At 2 P.M., the Constitution fired a shot 
ahead of her, following it quickly by a broadside,'^^ 
and the two ships began at long bowls, the English 
firing the lee or starboard battery while the Amer- 
icans replied with their port guns. The cannonade 
was very spirited on both sides, the ships suffering 
about equally. The first broadside of the Java was 
very destructive, killing and wounding several of 
the Constitution's crew. The Java kept edging 
down, and the action continued, with grape and 
musketry in addition; the swifter British ship soon 
fore-reached and kept away, intending to wear 
across her slower antagonist's bow and rake her; 
but the latter wore in the smoke, and the two com- 
batants ran off to the westward, the Englishman 

'* Lieutenant Chads' Address to the Court-martial, April 

23, 1813- 
" Commodore Bainbridge's letter. 



On the Ocean 159 

still a-weather and steering freer than the Consti- 
tution, Avhich had luffed to close.'^^ The action 
went on at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes, 
however, the Java again forged ahead, out of the 
weight of her adversary's fire, and then kept off, as 
before, to cross her bows; and, as before, the Con- 
stitution avoided this by wearing, both ships again 
coming round with their heads to the east, the 
American still to leeward. The Java kept the 
weather-gage tenaciously, fore-reaching a little, and 
whenever the Constitution luffed up to close,' ^ the 
former tried to rake her. But her gunnery was now 
poor, little damage being done by it; most of the 
loss the Americans suffered was early in the action. 
By setting her foresail and mainsail the Constitu- 
tion got up close on the enemy's lee beam, her fire 
being very heavy and carrying away the end of the 
Java's bowsprit and her jibboom.'^^ The Constitu- 
tion forged ahead and repeated her former manoeu- 
vre, wearing in the smoke. The Java at once hove 
in stays, but owing to the loss of headsail fell off 
very slowly, and the American frigate poured a 
heavy raking broadside into her stern, at about two 
cables' length distance. The Java replied with her 
port guns as she fell off.*^® Both vessels then bore 
up and ran off free, with the wind on the port quar- 
ter, the Java being abreast and to windward of her 
antagonist, both with their heads a little east of 
south. The ships were less than a cable's length 

■"^ Log of the Constit,utwn. " Do. 

'8 Lieutenant Chads' letter. " Lieut. Chads' letter. 



i6o Naval War of 1812 

apart, and the Constitution inflicted great damage 
while suffering very little herself. The British lost 
many men by the musketry of the American topmen, 
and suffered still more from the round and grape, 
especially on the forecastle,^" many marked instances 
of valor being shown on both sides. The Java's 
masts were wounded and her rigging cut to pieces, 
and Captain Lambert then ordered her to be laid 
aboard the enemy, who was on her lee beam. The 
helm was put a-weather, and the Java came down 
for the Constitution's main-chains. The boarders 
and marines gathered in the gangways and on the 
forecastle, the boatswain having been ordered to 
cheer them up with his pipe that they might make a 
clean spring.^^ The Americans, however, raked the 
British with terrible effect, cutting off their main 
topmast above the cap, and their foremast near the 
cat harpings.^^ The stump of the Java's bowsprit 
got caught in the Constitution's mizzen-rigging, and 
before it got clear the British suffered still more. 
Finally the ships separated, the Java's bowsprit 
passing over the taffrail of the Constitution; the lat- 
ter at once kept away to avoid being raked. The 
ships again got nearly abreast, but the Constitution, 
in her turn, fore-reached; whereupon Commodore 
Bainbridge wore, passed his antagonist, luffed up 
under his quarter, raked him with the starboard 

so Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in minutes of the 
Court-martial on board H. M. S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth, 
April 23, 1813. 

8' Testimony of James Humble, in do., do. 

^* Log of Constitution. 



On the Ocean i6i 

guns, then wore, and recommenced the action with 
his port broadside at about 3.10. Again the ves- 
sels were abreast, and the action went on as fu- 
riously as ever. The wreck of the top hamper on the 
Java lay over her starboard side, so that every dis- 
charge of her guns set her on fire,^^ and in a few 
minutes her able and gallant commander was mor- 
tally wounded by a ball fired by one of the American 
maintopmen.^* The command then devolved on the 
first lieutenant. Chads, himself painfully wounded. 
The slaughter had been terrible, yet the British 
fought on with stubborn resolution, cheering lustily. 
But success was now hopeless, for nothing could 
stand against the cool precision of the Yankee fire. 
The stump of the Java's foremast was carried away 
by a double-headed shot, the mizzenmast fell, the 
gaff and spanker boom were shot away, also the 
main-yard, and finally the ensign was cut down by 
a shot, and all her guns absolutely silenced ; when at 
4.05 the Constitution, thinking her adversary had 
struck,^^ ceased firing, hauled aboard her tacks, and 
passed across her adversary's bows to windward, 
with her topsails, jib, and spanker set. A few 
minutes afterward the Java's mainmast fell, leaving 
her a sheer hulk. The Constitution assumed a 
weatherly position, and spent an hour in repairing 
damages and securing her masts ; then she wore and 
stood toward her enemy, whose flag was again fly- 

^^ Lieut. Chads' Address. 

^* Surgeon J. C. Jones' Report. 

85 Log of the Constitution (as given in Bainbridge's letter). 



i62 Naval War of 1812 

ing, but only for bravado, for as soon as the Con- 
stitution stood across her forefoot she struck. At 
5.25 she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Par- 
ker, 1st of the Constitution, in one of the latter's 
only two remaining boats. 

The American ship had suffered comparatively 
little. But a few round shot had struck her hull, 
one of which carried away the wheel; one 18- 
pounder went through the mizzenmast ; the foremast, 
maintopmast, and a few other spars were slightly 
wounded, and the running rigging and shrouds were 
a good deal cut; but in an hour she was again in 
good fighting trim. Her loss amounted to 8 sea- 
men and I marine killed; the 5th lieutenant, John 
C. Ayhvin, and 2 seamen, mortally. Commodore 
Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely, and 7 seamen 
and 2 marines, slightly wounded ; in all 12 killed and 
mortally wounded, and 22 wounded severely and 
slightly.^^ 

"The Java sustained unequally injuries beyond 
the Constitution," says the British account.^'^ These 
have already been given in detail ; she was a riddled 
and entirely dismasted hulk. Her loss (for discus- 
sion of which see further on) was 48 killed (in- 
cluding Captain Henry Lambert, who died soon 
after the close of the action, and five midshipmen), 
and 102 wounded, among them Lieutenant Henry 
Ducie Chads, Lieutenant of Marines David Davies. 
Commander John Marshall, Lieutenant James Saun- 

8^ Report of Surgeon Amos A. Evans. 
87 "Naval Chronicle," xxix, 452. 



On the Lakes 163 

ders, the boatswain, James Humble, master. Batty 
Robinson, and four midshipmen. 

In this action both ships displayed equal gallantry 
and seamanship. "The Java," says Commodore 
Bainbridge, "was exceedingly well handled and 
bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was a dis- 
tinguished and gallant officer, and a most worthy 
man, whose death I sincerely regret." The manoeu- 
vring on both sides was excellent; Captain Lam- 
bert used the advantage which his ship possessed in 
her superior speed most skilfully, always endeav- 
oring to run across his adversary's bows and rake 
him when he had fore-reached, and it was only owing 
to the equal skill which his antagonist displayed that 
he was foiled, the length of the combat being due 
to the number of evolutions. The great superiority 
of the Americans was in their gunnery. The fire 
of the Java was both less rapid and less well-directed 
than that of her antagonist; the difference of force 
against her was not heavy, being about as ten is to 
nine, and was by no means enough to account for 
the almost fivefold greater loss she suffered. 

On next page is a diagram of the battle. It 
differs from both of the official accounts, as these 
conflict greatly both as to time and as regards some 
of the evolutions. I generally take the mean in cases 
of difference; for example, Commodore Bainbridge's 
report makes the fight endure but i hour and 55 
minutes, Lieutenant Chads' 2 hours and 25 minutes; 
I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc., etc. 

The tonnage and weight of metal of the comba- 



164 



Naval War of 181 2 



^^••.^^ 





'••mi%*»»' 



On the Ocean 165 

tants have already been stated ; I will give the com- 
plements shortly. The following is the 

COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS 

Tons Weight Metal No. Men Loss 

Constitution 1576 654 475 34 

Java 1340 576 426 150 





Relative 
Force 


Relative Loss 
Inflicted 


Constitution 
Java 


100 
89 


100 
23 



In hardly another action of the war do the ac- 
counts of the respective forces differ so widely; 
the official British letter makes their total of men at 
the beginning of the action 377, of whom Commo- 
dore Bainbridge officially reports that he paroled 
378 ! The British state their loss in killed and mor- 
tally wounded at 24; Commodore Bainbridge reports 
that the dead alone amounted to nearly 60! Usu- 
ally I have taken each commander's account of his 
own force and loss, and I should do so now if it 
were not that the British accounts differ among 
themselves, and whenever they relate to the Ameri- 
cans are flatly contradicted by the affidavits of the 
latter's officers. The British first handicap them- 
selves by the statement that the surgeon of the Con- 
stitution was an Irishman and lately an assistant 
surgeon in the British navy ("Naval Chronicle," 
xxix, 452) ; which draws from Surgeon Amos A. 
Evans a solemn statement in the Boston "Gazette" 
that he was born in Maryland and was never in the 
British navy in his life. Then Surgeon Jones of 
the Java, in his official report, after giving his own 



i66 Naval War of 1812 

killed and mortally wounded at 24, says that the 
Americans lost in all about 60, and that 4 of their 
amputations perished under his own eyes; where- 
upon Surgeon Evans makes the statement ("Niles' 
Register," vi, p. 35), backed up by affidavits of his 
brother officers, that in all he had but five amputa- 
tions, of whom only one died, and that one a month 
after Surgeon Jones had left the ship. To meet the 
assertions of Lieutenant Chads that he began action 
with but 377 men, the Constitution's officers pro- 
duced the Java's muster-roll, dated Nov. 17th, or 
five days after she had sailed, which showed 446 
persons, of whom 20 had been put on board a prize. 
The presence of this large number of supernumer- 
aries on board is explained by the fact that the Java 
was carrying out Lieutenant-General Hislop, the 
newly-appointed Governor of Bombay, and his suite, 
together with part of the crews for the Cornzvallis, 
74, and gun-sloops Chameleon and Icarus; she also 
contained stores for those two ships. 

Besides conflicting with the American reports, 
the British statements contradict one another. The 
official published report gives but two midshipmen 
as killed; while one of the volumes of the "Naval 
Chronicle" (vol. xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from 
one of the Java's lieutenants, in which he states that 
there were five. Finally, Commodore Bainbridge 
found on board the Constitution, after the prisoners 
had left, a letter from Lieutenant H. D. Cornick, 
dated Jan. i, 181 3, and addressed to Lieutenant 
Peter V. Wood, 22d Regiment, foot, in which he 



On the Ocean 167 

states that 65 of their men were killed. James 
("Naval Occurrences") gets around this by stating 
that it was probably a forgery; but aside from the 
improbability of Commodore Bainbridge being a 
forger, this could not be so, for nothing would have 
been easier than for the British lieutenant to have 
denied having written it, which he never did. On 
the other hand, it would be very likely that in the 
heat of the action, Commodore Bainbridge and the 
Java's own officers should overestimate the latter's 
loss.^^ 

Taking all these facts into consideration, we find 
446 men on board the Java by her own muster-list ; 
378 of these were paroled by Commodore Bain- 
bridge at San Salvador ; 24 men were acknowledged 
by the enemy to be killed or mortally wounded ; 20 
were absent in a prize, leaving 24 unaccounted for, 
who were undoubtedly slain. 

The British loss was 48 men killed and mortally 
wounded, 102 wounded severely and slightly. The 
Java was better handled and more desperately de- 
fended than the Macedonian or even the Guerriere, 
and the odds against her were much smaller ; so she 
caused her opponent greater loss, though her gun- 
nery was no better than theirs. 

88 For an account of the shameless corruption then exist- 
ing in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord 
Dundonald's "Autobiography of a Seaman." The letters of 
the commanders were often garbled, as is mentioned by 
Brenton. Among numerous cases that he gives, may be 
mentioned the cutting out of the Chevrette, where he dis- 
tinctly says, "our loss was much greater than was ever ac- 
knowledged." (Vol. i, p. 505, edition of 1837.) 



i68 Naval War of 1812 

Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the Java, re- 
moved all the prisoners and baggage to the Consti- 
tution, and reported the prize to be in a very dis- 
abled state; owing partly to this, but more to the 
long distance from home and the great danger there 
was of recapture, Commodore Bainbridge destroyed 
her on the 31st, and then made sail for San Salvador. 
"Our gallant enemy," reports Lieutenant Chads, 
"has treated us most generously" ; and Lieutenant- 
Gcneral Hislop presented the Commodore with a 
very handsome sword as a token of gratitude for the 
kindness with which he had treated the prisoners. 

Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries, 
but especially because of her decayed condition, 
Commodore Bainbridge sailed from San Salvador 
on Jan. 6, 18 13, reaching Boston Feb. 27th, after 
his four months' cruise. At San Salvador he left 
the Hornet still blockading the Bonne Citoyenne. 

In order "to see oureslves as others see us," I 
shall again quote from Admiral Jurien de la Gra- 
viere,^^ as his opinions are certainly well worthy of 
attention both as to these first three battles, and as 
to the lessons they teach. "When the American 
Congress declared w^ar on England in 1812," he 
says, "it seemed as if this unequal conflict would 
crush her navy in the act of being born ; instead, it 
but fertilized the germ. It is only since that epoch 
that the United States has taken rank among mari- 
time powers. Some combats of frigates, corvettes, 
and brigs, insignificant without doubt as regards 

«9 "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 284 (Paris, 1881). 



On the Ocean 169 

material results, sufficed to break the charm which 
protected the standard of St. George, and taught 
Europe what she could have already learned from 
some of our combats, if the louder noise of our de- 
feats had not drowned the glory, that the only in- 
vincibles on the sea are good seamen and good ar- 
tillerists. 

"The English covered the ocean with their crui- 
sers when this unknown navy, composed of six frig- 
ates and a few small craft hitherto hardly numbered, 
dared to establish its cruisers at the mouth of the 
Channel, in th^^very centre of the British power. 
But already the, Constitution had captured the Giier- 
riere and Java,^e United States had made a prize 
of the Macedonian, the Wasp of the Frolic, and the 
Hornet of the Peacock. The honor of the new 
flag was established. England, humiliated, tried to 
attribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size 
of the vessels which Congress had had constructed 
in 1799, and which did the fighting in 18 12. She 
wished to refuse them the name of frigates, and 
called them, not without some appearance of reason, 
disguised line-of-battle ships. Since then all mari- 
time powers have copied these gigantic models, as 
the result of the war of 18 12 obliged England her- 
self to change her naval material; but if they had 
employed, instead of frigates, cut-dovra 74's (vais- 
seaux rases), it would still be difficult to explain 
the prodigious success of the Americans. . . . 

"In an engagement which terminated in less than 
half an hour, the English frigate Guerriere, com- 

VoL. IX.— 8 



lyo Naval War of 1812 

pletely dismasted, had fifteen men killed, sixty-three 
wounded, and more than thirty shot below the water- 
line. She sank twelve hours after the combat. The 
Constitution, on the contrary, had but seven men 
killed and seven wounded, and did not lose a mast. 
As soon as she had replaced a few cut ropes and 
changed a few sails, she was in condition, even by 
the testimony of the British historian, to take an- 
other Guerriere. The United States took an hour 
and a half to capture the Macedonian, and the same 
difference made itself felt in the damage suffered by 
the two ships. The Macedonian had her mast shat- 
tered, two of her maindeck and all her spardeck guns 
disabled ; more than a hundred shot had penetrated 
the hull, and over a third of the crew had suffered 
by the hostile fire. The American frigate, on the 
contrary, had to regret but five men killed and seven 
wounded; her guns had been fired each sixty-six 
times to the Macedonian's thirty-six. The combat 
of the Constitution and the Java lasted two hours, 
and was the most bloody of these three engagements. 
The Java only struck when she had been razed like a 
sheer hulk; she had twenty-two men killed and one 
hundred and two wounded. 

• •••••••»• 

"This war should be studied with unceasing dili- 
gence ; the pride of two peoples to whom naval af- 
fairs are so generally familiar has cleared all the de- 
tails and laid bare all the episodes, and through the 
sneers which the victors should have spared, merely 
out of care for their own glory, at every step can be 



On the Ocean 171 

seen that great truth, that there is only success for 
those who know how to prepare it. 

"It belongs to us to judge impartially these ma- 
rine events, too much exalted perhaps by a national 
vanity one is tempted to excuse. The Americans 
showed, in the War of 181 2, a great deal of skill 
and resolution. But if, as they have asserted, the 
chances had always been perfectly equal between 
them and their adversaries, if they had only owed 
their triumphs to the intrepidity of Hull, Decatur, 
and Bainbridge, there would be for us but little 
interest in recalling the struggle. We need not seek 
lessons in courage outside of our own history. On 
the contrary, what is to be well considered is that 
the ships of the United States constantly fought with 
the chances in their favor, and it is on this that the 
American Government should found its true title 
to glory. . . . The Americans in 1812 had secured 
to themselves the advantage of a better organiza- 
tion [than the English]." 

The fight between the Constitution and the Java 
illustrates best the proposition, "that there is only 
success for those who know how to prepare it." 
Here the odds in men and metal were only about as 
10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to say 
that they might have been reversed without vitally 
affecting the result. In the fight Lambert handled 
his ship as skilfully as Bainbridge did his; and the 
lava's men proved by their indomitable courage that 
they were excellent material. The Java's crew was 



172 Naval War of 1812 

new shipped for the voyage, and had been at sea 
but six weeks ; in the Constitution's first fight her 
crew had been aboard of her but five weeks. So 
the chances should have been nearly equal, and the 
difference in fighting capacity that was shown by 
the enormous disparity in the loss, and still more 
in the damage inflicted, was due to the fact that 
the officers of one ship had, and the officers of the 
other had not, trained their raw crews. The Con- 
stitution's men were not "picked," but simply aver- 
age American sailors, as the Java's were average 
British sailors. The essential difference was in the 
training. 

During the six weeks the Java was at sea, her men 
had fired but six broadsides, of blank cartridges; 
during the first five weeks the Constitution cruised, 
her crew were incessantly practiced at firing with 
blank cartridges, and also at a target.^*^ The Java's 
crew had only been exercised occasionally, even in 
pointing the gims, and when the captain of a gun 
was killed the effectiveness of the piece was tem- 
porarily ruined, and, moreover, the men did not 
work together. The Constitution's crew were exer- 
cised till they worked like machines, and yet with 
enough individualityto render it impossible to cripple 
a gun by killing one man. The unpracticed British 
sailors fired at random ; the trained Americans took 

90 In looking through the logs of the Constitution, Hornet, 
etc., we continually find such entries as "beat to quarters," 
"exercised the men at the great guns," "exercised with mus- 
ketry," "exercised the boarders," "exercised the great guns, 
blank cartridges, and afterward firing at mark." 



On the Ocean 173 

aim. The British marines had not been taught any- 
thing approximating to skirmishing or sharpshoot- 
ing; the Americans had. The British sailors had 
not even been trained enough in the ordinary duties 
of seamen; while the Americans in five weeks had 
been rendered almost perfect. The former were at 
a loss what to do in an emergency at all out of their 
own line of work ; they were helpless when the wreck 
fell over their guns, when the Americans would have 
cut it away in a jiffy. As we learn from Commo- 
dore Morris' "Autobiography," each Yankee sailor 
could, at need, do a little carpentering or sail-mend- 
ing, and so was more self-reliant. The crew had 
been trained to act as if guided by one mind, yet 
each man retained his own individuality. The petty 
officers were better paid than in Great Britain, and 
so were of a better class of men, thoroughly self- 
respecting; the Americans soon got their subor- 
dinates in order, while the British did not. To sum 
up : one ship's crew had been trained practically and 
thoroughly, while the other crew was not much bet- 
ter off than the day it sailed ; and, as far as it goes, 
this is a good test of the efficiency of the two 
navies. 

The U. S. brig Vixen, 12, Lieutenant George U. 
Read, had been cruising off the southern coast; on 
Nov. 22d she fell in with the Southampton, 32, 
Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and was captured 
after a short but severe trial of speed. Both vessels 
were wrecked soon afterward. 



174 Naval War of 1812 

The Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, left the 
Delaware on Oct, 28th, two days after Commodore 
Bainbridge had left Boston. She expected to make 
a very long cruise and so carried with her an un- 
usual quantity of stores and sixty more men than or- 
dinarily, so that her muster-roll contained 319 names. 
Being deep in the water she reached San Jago after 
Bainbridge had left. Nothing was met with until 
after the Essex had crossed the equator in long. 
30° W. on Dec. nth. On the afternoon of the next 
day a sail was made out to windward, and chased. 
At nine in the evening it was overtaken, and struck 
after receiving a volley of musketry which killed one 
man. The prize proved to be the British packet Noc- 
ton, of 10 guns and 31 men, with $55,000 in specie 
aboard. The latter was taken out, and the Nocton 
sent home with Lieutenant Finch and a prize crew 
of 17 men, but was recaptured by a British frigate. 

The next appointed rendezvous was the Island 
of Fernando de Noronha, where Captain Porter 
found a letter from Commodore Bainbridge, inform- 
ing him that the other vessels were off Cape Frio. 
Thither cruised Porter, but his compatriots had left. 
On the 29th he captured an English merchant ves- 
sel ; and he was still cruising when the year closed. 

The year 18 12, on the ocean, ended as gloriously 
as it had begun. In four victorious fights the dis- 
parity in loss had been so great as to sink the dis- 
parity of force into insignificance. Our successes 
had been unaccompanied by any important reverse. 



On the Ocean 175 

Nor was it alone by the victories, but by the cruises, 
that the year was noteworthy. The Yankee men- 
of-war sailed almost in sight of the British coast 
and right in the track of the merchant fleets and their 
armed protectors. Our vessels had shown them- 
selves immensely superior to their foes. 

The reason of these striking and unexpected suc- 
cesses was that our navy in 18 12 was the exact 
reverse of what our navy is now, in 1882. I am 
not alluding to the personnel, which still remains ex- 
cellent; but, whereas we now have a large number 
of worthless vessels, standing veiy low down in 
their respective classes, we then possessed a few ves- 
sels, each unsurpassed by any foreign ship of her 
class. To bring up our navy to the condition in 
which it stood in 18 12 it would not be necessary 
(although in reality both very wise and in the end 
very economical) to spend any more money than at 
present; only instead of using it to patch up a hun- 
dred antiquated hulks, it should be employed in build- 
ing half a dozen ships on the most effective model. 
If in 18 1 2 our ships had borne the same relation 
to the British ships that they do now, not all the 
courage and skill of our sailors would have won us 
a single success. As it was, we could only cope with 
the lower rates, and had no vessels to oppose to the 
great "liners"; but to-day there is hardly any for- 
eign ship, no matter how low its rate, that is not 
superior to the corresponding American ones. It is 
too much to hope that our political short-sightedness 
will ever enable us to have a navy that is first-class 



176 Naval War of 1812 

in point of size ; but there certainly seems no reason 
why what ships we have should not be of the very 
best quality. The effect of a victory is twofold, 
moral and material. Had we been as roughly han- 
dled on water as we were on land during the first 
year of the war, such a succession of disasters would 
have had a most demoralizing effect on the nation 
at large. As it was, our victorious sea-fights, while 
they did not inflict any material damage upon the 
colossal sea-might of England, had the most impor- 
tant results in the feelings they produced at home 
and even abroad. Of course they were magnified 
absurdly by most of our writers at the time; but 
they do not need to be magnified, for as they are any 
American can look back upon them with the keenest 
national pride. For a hundred and thirty years 
England had had no equal on the sea ; and now she 
suddenly found one in the untried navy of an al- 
most unknown power. 

BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN 1812 

Name Guns Tonnage Remarks 

Guerriere 49 1.34° 

Macedonian 49 i ,325 

Java 49 1,340 

Frolic 19 477 Recaptured 

Alert 20 325 



186 4.807 

19 477 Deducting Frolic 



167 4-330 

AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED 

Name Guns Tonnage 

Wasp 18 450 

Nautilus 14 185 

Vixen 14 185 

46 820 



On the Ocean 



177 





VESSELS 


BUILT 


IN 


1812 






Name 


Rig Guns Tonnage Where Built 


Cost 


Nonsuch 


Schooner 14 


148 Charleston 


$15,000 


Carolina 


Schooner 14 


230 Charleston 


8,743 


Louisiana 


Ship 16 


341 New Orleans 


15.500 




PRIZES MADE 91 






Ship 


No. of Prizes 






President . 


7 






United States 








2 






Constitution 








9 






Congress 








2 






Chesapeake 








I 






Essex . 








II 






Wasp . 








2 






Hornet 








I 






A rgus 








6 






Small craft 








S 





46 



»' These can only be approximately given; the records are 
often incomplete or contradictory, especially as regards the 
small craft. Most accounts do not give by any means the full 
number. 



CHAPTER IV 
1812 

ON THE LAKES 

Preliminary— The combatants starting nearly on an 
equality— Difficulties of creating a naval force— Diffi- 
culty of comparing the force of the rival squadrons— 
Meagreness of the published accounts— Unreliability of 
James— Ontario— Extraordinary nature of the Ameri- 
can squadron— Canadian squadron forming only a kind 
of water militia— Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by 
Commodore Earle— Commodore Chauncy bombards 
York— Erie— Lieutenant Elliott captures the Detroit 
and Ca/^^£»«z«— Unsuccessful expedition of Lieutenant 
Angus. 

AT the time we are treating of, the State of 
Maine was so sparsely settled, and covered 
with such a dense growth of forest, that it was prac- 
tically impossible for either of the contending parties 
to advance an army through its territory. A con- 
tinuation of the same wooded and mountainous dis- 
trict protected the northern parts of Vermont and 
New Hampshire, while in New York the Adirondack 
region was an impenetrable wilderness. It thus 
came about that the northern boundary was formed, 
for military purposes, by Lake Huron, Lake Erie, the 
Niagara, Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence, and, after 
an interval, by Lake Champlain. The road into the 
States by the latter ran close along shore, and with- 
out a naval force the invader would be wholly un- 
(178) 



On the Lakes 179 

able to protect his flanks, and would probably have 
his communications cut. This lake, however, was 
almost wholly within the United States, and did not 
become of importance till toward the end of the war. 
Upon it were two American gunboats, regularly 
officered and manned, and for such smooth water 
sufficiently effective vessels. 

What was at that time the western part of the 
northern frontier became the main theatre of mili- 
tary operations, and as it presented largely a water 
front, a naval force was an indispensable adjunct, 
the command of the lakes being of the utmost im- 
portance. As these lakes were fitted for the manoeu- 
vring of ships of the largest size, the operations upon 
them were of the same nature as those on the ocean, 
and properly belong to naval and not to military 
history. But while on the ocean America started 
with too few ships to enable her really to do any 
serious harm to her antagonist, on the inland waters 
the two sides began very nearly on an equality. 
The chief regular forces either belligerent possessed 
were on Lake Ontario. Here the United States had 
a man-of-war brig, the Oneida, of 240 tons, carrying 
16 24-pound carronades, manned by experienced 
seamen, and commanded by Lieutenant M. T. Wool- 
sey. Great Britain ix)ssessed the Royal George, 22, 
Prince Regent, 16, Earl of Moira, 14, Gloucester, 
10, Seneca, 8, and Simco, 8, all under the command 
of a Commodore Earle ; but though this force was 
so much the more powerful it was very inefficient, 
not being considered as belonging to the regular 



i8o Naval War of 1812 

navy, the sailors being undisciplined, and the offi- 
cers totally without experience, never having been 
really trained in the British service. From these 
causes it resulted that the struggle on the lakes 
was to be a work as much of creating as of using a 
navy. On the seaboard success came to those who 
made best use of the ships that had already been 
built; on the lakes the real contest lay in the build- 
ing. And building an inland navy was no easy task. 
The country around the lakes, especially on the 
south side, was still very sparsely settled, and all the 
American naval supplies had to be brought from the 
seaboard cities through the valley of the Mohawk. 
There was no canal or other means of communica- 
tion, except very poor roads intermittently relieved 
by transportation on the Mohawk and on Oneida 
Lake, when they were navigable. Supplies were 
thus brought up at an enormous cost, with tedious 
delays and great difficulty; and bad weather put a 
stop to all travel. Very little indeed, beyond tim- 
ber, could be procured at the stations on the lakes. 
Still a few scattered villages and small towns had 
grown up on the shores, whose inhabitants were 
largely engaged in the carrying trade; the ves- 
sels used for the purpose were generally small 
sloops or schooners, swift and fairly good sailers, 
but very shallow and not fitted for rough weather. 
The frontiersmen themselves, whether Canadian or 
American, were bold, hardy seamen, and when prop- 
erly trained and led made excellent man-of-war's- 
men ; but on the American side they were too few in 



On the Lakes i8i 

number and too untrained to be made use of, and 
the seamen had to come from the coast. But the 
Canadian shores had been settled longer, the inhabi- 
tants were more numerous, and by means of the St. 
Lawrence the country was easy of access to Great 
Britain; so that the seat of war, as regards getting 
naval supplies, and even men, was nearer to Great 
Britain than to us. Our enemies also possessed in 
addition to the squadron on Lake Ontario another 
on Lake Erie, consisting of the Queen Charlotte, 17, 
Lady Prevost, 13, Hunter, 10, Caledonia, 2, Little 
Belt, 2, and Chippeway, 2. These two squadrons 
furnished training schools for some five hundred 
Canadian seamen, whom a short course of disci- 
pline under experienced officers sufficed to render 
as good men as their British friends or American 
foes. Very few British seamen ever reached Lake 
Erie (according to James, not over fifty) ; but on 
Lake Ontario, and afterward on Lake Champlain, 
they formed the bulk of the crews, "picked seamen, 
sent out by government expressly for service on the 
Canada lakes." ^ As the contrary has sometimes 
been asserted it may be as well to mention that Ad- 
miral Codrington states that no want of seamen con- 
tributed to the British disasters on the lakes, as their 
sea-ships at Quebec had men drafted from them 
for that service till their crews were utterly de- 
pleted.^ I am bound to state that while I think that 

1 James vi, 353. 

"^ Memoirs, i, 322, referring especially to battle of Lake 
Champlain. 



i82 Naval War of 1812 

on the ocean our sailors showed themselves superior 
to their opponents, especially in gun practice, on the 
lakes the men of the rival fleets were as evenly 
matched, in skill and courage, as could well be. The 
difference, when there was any, appeared in the 
officers, and, above all, in the builders; which was 
the more creditable to us, as in the beginning we 
were handicapped by the fact that the British al- 
ready had a considerable number of war vessels, 
while we had but one. 

The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation be- 
tween Erie and Ontario; so there were three inde- 
pendent centres of naval operations on the northern 
frontier. The first was on Lake Champlain, where 
only the Americans possessed any force, and, singu- 
larly enough, this w^as the only place w^here the Brit- 
ish showed more enterprise in shipbuilding than we 
did. Next came Lake Ontario, where both sides 
made their greatest efforts, but where the result was 
indecisive, though the balance of success was slightly 
inclined toward us. Our naval station was at Sack- 
ett's Harbor; that of our foes at Kingston. The 
third field of operations was Lake Erie and the 
waters above it. Here both sides showed equal dar- 
ing and skill in the fighting, and our advantage must 
be ascribed to the energy and success with which 
we built and equipped v^essels. Originally we had 
no force at all on these waters, while several ves- 
sels were opposed to us. It is a matter of wonder 
that the British and Canadian governments should 
have been so supine as to permit their existing force 



On the Lakes 183 

to go badly armed, and so unenterprising as to build 
but one additional ship, when they could easily have 
preserved their superiority. 

It is very difficult to give a full and fair account 
of the lake campaigns. The inland navies were 
created especially for the war, and, after it were al- 
lowed to decay, so that the records of the tonnage, 
armament, and crews are hard to get at. Of course, 
where everything had to be created, the services 
could not have the regular character of those on the 
ocean. The vessels employed were of widely differ- 
ent kinds, and this often renders it almost impos- 
sible to correctly estimate the relative force of two 
opposing squadrons. While the Americans were 
building their lake navy, they, as make-shifts, made 
use of some ordinary merchant schooners, which 
were purchased and fitted up with one or two long, 
heavy guns each. These gun-vessels had no quar- 
ters, and suffered under all the other disadvantages 
which make a merchant vessel inferior to a regu- 
larly constructed man-of-war. The chief trouble 
was that in a heavy sea they had a strong ten- 
dency to capsize, and were so unsteady that the guns 
could not be aimed when any wind was blowing. 
Now, if a few of these schooners, mounting long 
32's, encountered a couple of man-of-w^ar brigs, 
armed with carronades, which side was strongest? 
In smooth water the schooners had the advantage, 
and in rough weather they were completely at the 
mercy of the brigs ; so that it would be very hard to 
get at the true worth of such a contest as each side 



184 Naval War of 18 12 

would be tolerably sure to insist that the weather 
was such as to give a great advantage to the other. 
In all the battles and skirmishes on Champlain, Erie, 
and Huron, at least there was no room left for doubt 
as to who were the victors. But on Lake Ontario 
there was never any decisive struggle, and when- 
ever an encounter occurred, each commodore al- 
ways claimed that his adversary had "declined the 
combat," though "much superior in strength." It 
is, of course, almost impossible to find out which 
really did decline the combat, for the official letters 
flatly contradict each other ; and it is often almost as 
difficult to discover where the superiority in force 
lay, when the fleets differed so widely in character 
as was the case in 18 13. Then Commodore 
Chauncy's squadron consisted largely of schooners ; 
their long, heavy gims made his total foot up in 
a very imposing manner, and similar gun-vessels did 
very good work on Lake Erie ; so Commodore Yeo, 
and more especially Commodore Yeo's admirers, 
exalted these schooners to the skies, and conveyed 
the impression that they were most formidable craft, 
by means of which Chauncy ought to have won 
great victories. Yet when Yeo captured two of 
them he refused to let them even cruise with his 
fleet, and they were sent back to act as coast gun- 
boats and transports, which certainly would not have 
been done had they been fitted to render any effectual 
assistance. Again, one night a squall came on 
and the two largest schooners went to the bottom, 
which did not tend to increase the confidence felt 



On the Lakes 185 

in the others. So there can be no doubt that in all 
but very smooth water the schooners could almost 
be counted out of the fight. Then the question 
arises in any given case, was the water smooth? 
And the testimony is as conflicting as ever. 

It is not too easy to reconcile the official letters 
of the commanders, and it is still harder to get 
at the truth from either the American or British his- 
tories. Cooper is very inexact, and, moreover, paints 
ever}^thing couleur de rose, paying no attention to 
the British side of the question, and distributing so 
much praise to everybody that one is at a loss to 
know where it really belongs. Still, he is very use- 
ful, for he lived at the time of the events he nar- 
rates, and could get much information about them 
at first hand, from the actors themselves. James is 
almost the only British authority on the subject; but 
he is not nearly as reliable as when dealing with 
the ocean contests, most of this part of his work be- 
ing taken up with a succession of acrid soliloquies 
on the moral defects of the American character. 
The British records for this extraordinary service 
on the lakes were not at all carefully kept, and so 
James is not hampered by the necessity of adhering 
more or less closely to official documents, but lets his 
imagination run loose. On the ocean and seaboard 
his account of the British force can generally be re- 
lied upon; but on the lakes his authority is ques- 
tionable in everything relating either to friends or 
foes. This is the more exasperating because it is 
done wilfulty, when, if he had chosen, he could have 



1 86 Naval War of 1812 

written an invaluable history; he must often have 
known the truth when, as a matter of preference, he 
chose either to suppress or alter it. Thus he igriores 
all the small "cutting out" expeditions in which the 
Americans were successful, and where one would 
like to hear the British side. For example, Captain 
Yeo captured two schooners, the Julia and Growler, 
but Chauncy recaptured both. We have the Amer- 
ican account of this recapture in full, but James 
does not even hint at it, and blandly puts down both 
vessels in the total "American loss" at the end of his 
smaller work. Worse still, when the Grozvler again 
changed hands, he counts it in again, in the total, as 
if it were an entirely different boat, although he in- 
variably rules out of the American list all recap- 
tured vessels. A more serious perversion of facts 
are his statements about comparative tonnage. This 
was at that time measured arbitrarily, the depth of 
hold being estimated at half the breadth of beam; 
and the tonnage of our lake vessels was put down ex- 
actly as if they were regular ocean cruisers of the 
same dimensions in length and breadth. But on 
these inland seas the vessels really did not draw 
more than half as much water as on the ocean, and 
the depth would of course be much less. James, 
in comparing the tonnage, gives that of the Ameri- 
cans as if they were regular ocean ships, but in the 
case of the British vessels, carefully allows for their 
shallowness, although professing to treat the two 
classes in the same way; and thus he makes out a 
most striking and purely imaginary difference. The 



On the Lakes 187 

best example is furnished by his accounts of the fleets 
on Lake Erie. The captured vessels were appraised 
by two captains and the shipbuilder, Mr. Henry 
Eckford, their tonnage being computed precisely as 
the tonnage of the American vessels. The appraise- 
ment was recorded in the Navy Department, and 
was first made public by Cooper, so that it could not 
have been done for effect. Thus measured it was 
found that the tonnage was in round numbers as fol- 
lows : Detroit, 490 tons ; Queen Charlotte, 400: Lady 
Prevost, 230; Hunter, 180; Little Bell, 90; Chippe- 
way, 70. James makes them measure respectively 
305, 280, 120, 74, 54, and 32 tons, but carefully 
gives the American ships the regular sea tonnage. 
So also he habitually deducts about 25 per cent from 
the real number of men on board the British ships ; 
as regards Lake Erie he contradicts himself so much 
that he does not need to be exposed from outside 
sources. But the most glaring and least excusable 
misstatements are made as to the battle of Lake 
Champlain, where he gives the American as greatly 
exceeding the British force. He reaches this conclu- 
sion by the most marvelous serious of garblings and 
misstatements. First, he says that the ConHance and 
the Saratoga were of nearly equal tonnage. The 
Coniiance being captured was placed on our naval 
lists, where for years she ranked as a 36-gun frigate, 
while the Saratoga ranked among the 24-gun cor- 
vettes; and by actual measurement the former was 
half as large again as the latter. He gives the 
Coniiance but 270 men; one of her officers, in a 



i88 Naval War of 1812 

letter published in the "London Naval Chronicle," ^ 
gives her over 300 ; more than that number of dead 
and prisoners were taken out of her. He misstates 
the calibre of her guns, and counts out two of them 
because they were used through the bow-ports; 
whereas, from the method in which she made her 
attack, these would have been peculiarly effec- 
tive. The grms are given accurately by Cooper, 
on the authority of an officer,^ who was on board 
the Constitution within 15 minutes after the Linnet 
struck, and who was in charge of her for two 
months. 

Then James states that there were but 10 British 
galleys, while Sir George Prevost's official account, 
as well as all the American authorities, state the 
number to be 12. He says that the Finch grounded 
opposite an American battery before the engagement 
began, while in reality it was an hour afterward, 
and because she had been disabled by the shot of the 
American fleet. The galleys were largely manned 
by Canadians, and James, anxious to put the blame 
on these rather than the British, says that they 
acted in the most cowardly way, whereas in reality 
they caused the Americans more trouble than Dow- 
nie's smaller sailing vessels did. His account of the 
armament of these vessels differs widely from the 
official reports. He gives the Linnet and Chubb a 
smaller number of men than the number of prisoners 

3 Vol. xxxii, p. 272. The letter also says that hardly five 
of her men remained unhurt. 
* Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette. 



On the Lakes 189 

that were actually taken out of them, not including 
the dead. Even misstating Downie's force in guns, 
underestimating the number of his men, and leav- 
ing out two of his gunboats, did not content James ; 
and to make the figures show a proper disproportion, 
he says (Vol. VI, p. 504) that he shall exclude the 
Finch from the estimate, because she grounded, and 
half of the gunboats, because he does not think they 
acted bravely. Even were these assertions true, it 
would be quite as logical for an American writer to 
put the Chesapeake's crew down as only 200, and say 
he should exclude the other men from the estimate 
because they flinched; and to exclude all the guns 
that were disabled by shot, would be no worse than 
to exclude the Finch. James' manipulation of the 
figures is a really curious piece of audacity. Nat- 
urally, subsequent British historians have followed 
him without inquiry. James' account of this battle, 
alone, amply justifies our rejecting his narrative en- 
tirely, as far as affairs on the lakes go, whenever 
it conflicts with any other statement, British or 
American. Even when it does not conflict, it must 
be followed with extreme caution, for whenever he 
goes into figures the only thing certain about them 
is that they are wrong. He gives no details at all 
of most of the general actions. Of these, however, 
we already p£)ssess excellent accounts, the best being 
those in the "Manual of Naval Tactics," by Com- 
mander J. H. Ward, U. S. N. (1859), and in Los- 
sing's "Field-Book of the War of 181 2." and 
Cooper's "Naval History." The chief difficulty oc- 



190 Naval War of 18 12 

curs in connection with matters on Lake Ontario,^ 
where I have been obhged to have recourse to a 
perfect patchwork of authors and even newspapers, 
for the details, using Niles' "Register" and James as 
mutual correctives. The armaments and equipments 
being so irregular I have not, as in other cases, 
made any allowance for the short weight of the 
American shot, as here the British may have suf- 
fered under a similar disadvantage; and it may be 
as well to keep in mind that on these inland waters 
the seamen of the two navies seem to have been 
as evenly matched in courage and skill as was pos- 
sible. They were of exactly the same stock, with 
the sole exception that among and under, but en- 
tirely distinct from, the Canadian-English, fought 
the descendants of the conquered Canadian-French ; 
and even these had been trained by Englishmen, 
were led by English captains, fought on ships built 
by English gold, and with English weapons and 
discipline. 

* The accounts of the two commanders on Lake Ontario 
are as difficult to reconcile as are those of the contending 
admirals in the battles which the Dutch waged against the 
English and French during the years 1672-1675. In every 
one of De Ruyter's last six battles each side regularly 
claimed the victory, although there can be but little doubt 
that on the whole the strategical, and probably the tactical, 
advantage remained with De Ruyter. Every historian ought 
to feel a sense of the most lively gratitude toward Nelson ; in 
his various encounters he never left any possible room for 
dispute as to which side had come out first best. 



On the Lakes 191 



ON LAKE ONTARIO 

There being, as already explained, three inde- 
pendent centres of inland naval operations, the 
events at each will be considered separately. 

At the opening of the war Lieutenant Woolsey, 
wath the Oneida, was stationed at Sackett's Harbor, 
which was protected at the entrance by a small fort 
with a battery composed of one long 32. The Ca- 
nadian squadron of six ships, mounting nearly 80 
guns, was of course too strong to be meddled with. 
Indeed, had the Royal George, 22, the largest vessel, 
been commanded by a regular British sea-officer, 
she would have been perfectly competent to take 
both the Oneida and Sackett's Harbor; but before 
the Canadian commodore, Earle, made up his mind 
to attack, Lieut. Woolsey had time to make one or 
two short cruises, doing some damage among the 
merchant vessels of the enemy. 

On the 19th of July Earle's ships appeared off 
the Harbor; the Oneida was such a dull sailor that 
it was useless for her to try to escape, so she was 
hauled up under a bank where she raked the entrance, 
and her off guns landed and mounted on the shore, 
while Lieut. Woolsey took charge of the "battery," 
or long 32, in the fort. The latter was the only 
gun that was of much use, for after a desultory can- 
nonade of about an hour, Earle withdrew, having 
suffered very little damage, inflicting none at all, 
and proved himself and his subordinates to be 
grossly incompetent. 



192 Naval War of 1812 

Acting under orders, Lieut. Woolsey now set 
about procuring merchant schooners to be fitted and 
used as gun-vessels until more regular cruisers 
could be built. A captured British schooner was 
christened the Julia, armed with a long 32 and two 
6's, manned with 30 men, under Lieut. Henry Wells, 
and sent down to Ogdensburg. "On her way 
thither she encountered and actually beat off, with- 
out losing a man, the Moira, of 14, and Gloucester, 
of 10 guns."^ Five other schooners were also pur- 
chased ; the Hamilton, of 10 guns, being the largest, 
while the other four, the Governor Tompkins, 
Growler, Conquest, and Pert had but 1 1 pieces be- 
tween them. Nothing is more difficult than to 
exactly describe the armaments of the smaller lake 
vessels. The American schooners were mere make- 
shifts, and their guns were frequently changed;''' as 
soon as they could be dispensed with they were laid 
up, or sold, and forgotten. 

It was even worse with the British, who mani- 
fested the most indefatigable industry in intermit- 
tently changing the armament, rig, and name of 
almost every vessel, and, the records being very 
loosely kept, it is hard to find what was the force 

« James, vi, 350. 

■* They were always having accidents happen to them that 
necessitated some alteration. If a boat was armed with a 
long 32, she rolled too much, and they substituted a 14; if 
she also had an 18-pound carronade, it upset down the hatch- 
way in the middle of a fight, and made way for a long 12, 
which burst as soon as it was used, and was replaced by two 
medium 6's. So a regular gamut of changes would be rung. 



On the Lakes 193 

at any one time. A vessel which in one conflict 
was armed with long i8's, in the next would have 
replaced some of them with 68-pound carronades; 
or, beginning life as a ship, she would do most of 
her work as a schooner, and be captured as a brig, 
changing her name even oftener than anything else. 
On the first of September Commodore Isaac 
Chauncy was appointed commander of the forces 
on the lakes (except of those on Lake Champlain), 
and he at once bent his energies to preparing an 
effective flotilla. A large party of ship-carpenters 
were immediately despatched to the Harbor; and 
they were soon followed by about a hundred offi- 
cers and seamen, with gims, stores, etc. The keel 
of a ship to mount 24 32-pound carronades, and to 
be called the Madison, was laid down, and she was 
launched on the 26th of November, just when navi- 
gation had closed on account of the ice. Late in the 
autumn, four more schooners were purchased, and 
named the Ontario, Scourge, Fair American, and 
Asp, but these were hardly used until the following 
spring. The cruising force of the Americans was 
composed solely of the Oneida and the six schooners 
first mentioned. The British squadron was of near- 
ly double this strength, and had it been officered 
and trained as it was during the ensuing summer, 
the Americans could not have stirred out of port. 
But as it was, it merely served as a kind of water 
militia, the very sailors, who subsequently did well, 
being then almost useless, and unable to oppose 
their well-disciplined foes, though the latter were so 

Vol. IX.— 9 



194 Naval War of 1812 

inferior in number and force. For the reason that 
it was thus practically a contest of regulars against 
militia, I shall not give numerical comparisons of 
the skirmishes in the autumn of 181 2, and shall 
touch on them but slightly. They teach the old les- 
son that, whether by sea or land, a small, well- 
officered, and well-trained force, can not, except 
very rarely, be resisted by a greater number of mere 
militia; and that in the end it is true economy to 
have the regular force prepared beforehand, with- 
out waiting until we have been forced to prepare 
it by the disasters happening to the irregulars. The 
Canadian seamen behaved badly, but no worse than 
the American land forces did at the same time; 
later, under regular training, both nations retrieved 
their reputations. 

Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's Har- 
bor in October, and appeared on the lake on Novem- 
ber 8th, in the Oneida, Lieutenant Woolsey, with the 
six schooners Conquest, Lieutenant Elliott; Ham- 
ilton, Lieutenant McPherson; Tompkins, Lieuten- 
ant Brown; Pert, Sailing-master Arundel; Julia, 
Sailing-master Trant ; Grozvlcr, Sailing-master Mix. 
The Canadian vessels were engaged in conveying 
supplies from the westward. Commodore Chauncy 
discovered the Royal George off the False Duck 
Islands, and chased her under the batteries of Kings- 
ton, on the 9th. Kingston was too well defended 
to be taken by such a force as Chauncy's; but the 
latter decided to make a reconnaissance, to discover 
the enemy's means of defence and see if it was 



On the Lakes 195 

possible to lay the Royal George aboard. At 3 p.m. 
the attack was made. The Hamilton and Tompkins 
were absent chasing, and did not arrive until the 
fighting had begun. The other four gunboats, Con- 
quest, Julia, Pert, and Grozvler, led, in the order 
named, to open the attack with their heavy guns, 
and prepare the way for the Oneida, which followed. 
At the third discharge the Pert's gun burst, putting 
her nearly hors de combat, badly wounding her 
gallant commander, Mr. Arundel (who shortly 
afterward fell overboard and was drowned), and 
slightly wounding four of her crew. The other 
gunboats engaged the five batteries of the enemy, 
while the Oneida pushed on without firing a shot till 
at 3.40 she opened on the Royal George, and after 
20 minutes' combat actually succeeded in compelling 
her opponent, though of double her force, to cut 
her cables, run in, and tie herself to a wharf, where 
sorne of her people deserted her ; here she was under 
the protection of a large body of troops, and the 
Americans could not board her in face of the land 
forces. It soon began to grow dusk, and Chauncy's 
squadron beat out through the channel against a 
fresh head-wind. In this spirited attack the Ameri- 
can loss had been confined to half a dozen men, 
and had fallen almost exclusively on the Oneida. 
The next day foul weather came on, and the squad- 
ron sailed for Sackett's Harbor. Some merchant 
vessels were taken, and the Simco, 8, was chased, 
but unsuccessfully. 

The weather now became cold and tempestuous, 



196 Naval War of 1812 

but cruising continued till the middle of November. 
The Canadian commanders, however, utterly refused 
to fight; the Royal George even fleeing from the 
Oneida, when the latter was entirely alone, and leav- 
ing the American commodore in undisputed com- 
mand of the lake. Four of the schooners continued 
blockading Kingston till the middle of November; 
shortly afterward navigation closed.^ 

LAKE ERIE 

On Lake Erie there was no American naval force ; 
but the army had fitted out a small brig, armed 
with six 6-pounders. This fell into the hands of 
the British at the capture of Detroit, and was named 
after that city, so that by the time a force of Ameri- 
can officers and seamen arrived at the lake there 
was not a vessel on it for them to serve in, while 
their foes had eight. But we only have to deal with 
two of the latter at present. The Detroit, still 
mounting six 6-pounders, and with a crew of 56 
men, under the command of Lieutenant of Marines 
Rolette, of the Royal Navy, assisted by a boatswain 
and gunner, and containing also 30 American pris- 
oners, and the Caledonia, a small brig mounting two 
4-pounders on pivots, with a crew of 12 men, Cana- 
dian-English, under Mr. Irvine, and having aboard 
also 10 American prisoners, and a very valuable 
cargo of furs, worth about $200,000, moved down 

8 These preliminary events were not very important, and 
the historians on both sides agree almost exactly, so that I 
have not considered it necessary to quote authorities. 



On the Lakes , i97 

the lake, and on Oct. 7th anchored under Fort 

Erie.® 

Commander Jesse D. EIHott had been sent up to 
Erie some time before with instructions from Com- 
modore Chauncy to construct a naval force, partly 
by building two brigs of 300 tons each,i« and partly 
by purchasing schooners to act as gunboats. No 
sailors had yet arrived; but on the very day on 
which the two brigs moved down and anchored 
under Fort Erie, Captain Elliott received news that 
the first detachment of the promised seamen, 51 in 
number, including officers," was but a few miles 
distant. He at once sent word to have these men 
hurried up, but when they arrivel they were found 
to have no arms, for which application was made 
to the military authorities. The latter not only gave 
a sufficiency of sabres, pistols, and muskets to the 
sailors, but also detailed enough soldiers, under Cap- 
tain N. Towson and Lieutenant Isaac Roach, to 
make the total number of men that took part in the 
expedition 124. This force left Black Rock at one 
o'clock on the morning of the 8th in two large boats, 
one under the command of Commander Elliott, as- 

9 Letter of Captain Jesse D. Elliott to Secretary of Navy, 
Black Rock, Oct. 5, 1812. 

10 That is, of 300 tons actual capacity ; measured as if they 
had been ordinary sea vessels they each tonned 480. Their 
opponent, the ship Detroit, similarly tonned 305, actual 
measurement, or 490. computing it in the ordinary manner. 

" The number of men in this expedition is taken from 
Lossing's "Field-book of the War of 1812," by Benson J. 
Lossing, New York, 1869, p. 385, note, where a complete 
list of the names is given. 



198 Naval War of 1812 

sisted by Lieutenant Roach, the other under Sailing- 
master George Watts and Captain Towson. After 
two hours' rowing they reached the foe, and the 
attack was made at three o'clock. Elliott laid his 
boat alongside the Detroit before he was discovered, 
and captured her after a very brief struggle, in 
which he lost but one man killed, and Midshipman 
J. C. Cummings wounded with a bayonet in the leg. 
The noise of the scuffle roused the hardy provincials 
aboard the Caledonia, and they were thus enabled 
to make a far more effectual resistance to Sailing- 
master Watts than the larger vessel had to Captain 
Elliott. As Watts pulled alongside he was greeted 
with a volley of musketry, but at once boarded and 
carried the brig, the twelve Canadians being cut 
down or made prisoners; one American was killed 
and four badly wounded. The wind was too light 
and the current too strong to enable the prizes to 
beat out and reach the lake, so the cables were cut 
and they ran down stream. The Caledonia was 
safely beached under the protection of an American 
battery near Black Rock. The Detroit, however, 
was obliged to anchor but four hundred yards from 
a British battery, which, together with some flying 
artillery, opened on her. Getting all his guns on 
the port side, Elliott kept up a brisk cannonade till 
his ammunition gave out, when he cut his cable and 
soon grounded on Squaw Island. Here the Detroit 
was commanded by the guns of both sides, and 
whichever party took possession of her was at once 
driven out by the other. The struggle ended in her 



On the Lakes i99 

destruction, most of her guns being taken over to 
the American side. This was a very daring and 
handsome exploit, reflecting great credit on Com- 
mander ElHott, and giving the Americans, in the 
Caledonia, the nucleus of their navy on Lake Erie; 
soon afterward Elliott returned to Lake Ontario, 
a new detachment of seamen under Commander S. 
Angus having arrived. 

On the 28th of November, the American general. 
Smith, despatched two parties to make an attack 
on some of the British batteries. One of these con- 
sisted of 10 boats, under the command of Captain 
King of the 15th infantry, with 150 soldiers, and 
with him went Mr. Angus with 82 sailors, including 
officers. The expedition left at one o'clock in the 
morning, but was discovered and greeted with a 
warm fire from a field battery placed in front of 
some British barracks known as the Red House. Six 
of the boats put back ; but the other four, containing 
about a hundred men, dashed on. While the soldiers 
were forming line and firing, the seamen rushed in 
with their pikes and axes, drove off the British, 
captured their commander. Lieut. King, of the Royal 
Army, spiked and threw into the river the guns, 
and then took the barracks and burned them, after 
a desperate fight. Great confusion now ensued, 
which ended in Mr. Angus and some of the seamen 
going off in the boats. Several had been killed; 
eight, among whom were Midshipmen Wragg, Dud- 
ley, and Holdup, all under 20 years old, remained 
with the troops under Captain King, and having 



200 "■ Naval War of 1812 

utterly routed the enemy found themselves deserted 
by their friends. After staying on the shore a 
couple of hours some of them found two boats and 
got over ; but Captain King and a few soldiers were 
taken prisoners. Thirty of the seamen, including 
nine of the twelve officers, were killed or wounded 
— among the former being Sailing-masters Sisson 
and Watts, and among the latter Mr. Angus, Sail- 
ing-master Carter, and Midshipmen Wragg, Hold- 
up, Graham, Brailesford, and Irvine. Some twenty 
prisoners were secured and taken over to the Ameri- 
can shore; the enemy's loss was more severe than 
ours, his resistance being very stubborn, and a good 
many cannon were destroyed, but the expedition 
certainly ended most disastrously. The accounts of 
it are hard to reconcile, but it is difficult to believe 
that Mr. Angus acted correctly. 

Later in the winter Captain Oliver Hazard Perry 
arrived to take command of the forces on Lake 
Erie. 



CHAPTER V 
1813 

ON THE OCEAN 

Blockade of the American coast— The Essex in the South 
Pacific— The Hornet captures the Peacock— h.m&x\Q,z.n 
privateers cut-out by British boats— Unsuccessful cruise 
of Commodore Rodgers— The Chesapeake is captured 
by the Shatinori—YxxWX^ gunboat actions— Defence of 
Craney Island— Cutting-out expeditions— The Argus 
is captured by the /'^/z<;a«— The Enterprise captures 
the Boxer — Summary 

BY the beginning of the year 1813 the British 
had been thoroughly aroused by the American 
successes, and active measures were at once taken to 
counteract them. The force on the American sta- 
tion was largely increased, and a strict blockade be- 
gun, to keep the American frigates in port. The 
British frigates now cruised for the most part in 
couples and orders were issued by the Board of 
Admiralty that an i8-pounder frigate was not to 
engage an American 24-pounder. Exaggerated ac- 
counts of the American 44's being circulated, a new 
class of spar-deck frigates was constructed to meet 
them, rating 50 and mounting 60 guns; and some 
74's were cut down for the same purpose.^ These 
new ships were all much heavier than their intended 
opponents. 

' James, vi, p. 206. 

(201) 



202 Naval War of 1812 

As New England's loyalty to the Union was, not 
unreasonably, doubted abroad, her coasts were at 
first troubled but little. A British squadron was 
generally kept cruising off the end of Long Island 
Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of course 
America had no means of raising a blockade, as 
each squadron contained generally a 74 or a razee, 
vessels too heavy for any in our navy to cope with. 
Frigates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of New 
Jersey, the Carolinas, and Georgia, Delaware 
Bay no longer possessed the importance it had 
during the Revolutionary War, and as the only war 
vessels in it were some miserable gunboats, the 
British generally kept but a small force on that sta- 
tion. Chesapeake Bay became the principal scene 
of their operations; it was there their main body 
collected, and their greatest efforts were made. In 
it a number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, 
and cutters had been collected, and early in the sea- 
son Admiral Sir John Warren and Rear-Admiral 
Cockburn arrived to take command. The latter 
made numerous descents on the coast, and frequent- 
ly came into contact with the local militia, who gen- 
erally fled after a couple of volleys. These expedi- 
tions did not accomplish much, beyond burning the 
houses and driving off the live-stock of the farmers 
along shore, and destroying a few small towns — one 
of them, Hampton, being sacked with revolting 
brutality.^ The Government of the United States 

" James (vi, 340) says: The conduct of the British troops 
on this occasion was "revolting to human nature" and "dis- 
graceful to the flag." 



On the Ocean 203 

was, in fact, supported by the people in its war 
policy very largely on account of these excesses, 
which were much exaggerated by American writers. 
It was really a species of civil war, and in such a 
contest, at the beginning of this century, it was im- 
possible that some outrages should not take place. 
The American frigate Constellation had by this 
time got ready for sea, and, under the command of 
Captain Stewart, she prepared to put out early in 
January. As the number of blockaders rendered a 
fight almost certain within a few days of her depar- 
ture, her crew were previously brought to the high- 
est state of discipline, the men being exercised with 
especial care in handling the great guns and in firing 
at a target.^ However, she never got out ; for when 
she reached Hampton Roads she fell in with a Brit- 
ish squadron of line-of-battle ships and frigates. 
She kedged up toward Norfolk, and when the tide 
rose ran in and anchored between the forts; and a 
few days later dropped down to cover the forts 
which were being built at Craney Island. Here she 
was exposed to attacks from the great British force 
still lying in Hampton Roads, and, fearing they 
would attempt to carry her by surprise. Captain 
Stewart made every preparation for defence. She 
was anchored in the middle of the narrow channel, 
flanked by gunboats, her lower ports closed, not a 
rope left hanging over the sides ; the boarding net- 
tings, boiled in half-made pitch till they were as 

» Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jon«s (Savannah, 
1878). p. 15. 



204 Naval War of 1812 

hard as wire, were triced out-board toward the yard- 
arms, and loaded with kentledge to fall on the at- 
tacking boats when the tricing lines were cut, while 
the carronades were loaded to the muzzle with mus- 
ket balls, and depressed so as to sweep the water 
near the ship.* Twice, a force of British, estimated 
by their foes to number 2,000 men, started off at 
night to carry the Constellation by surprise; but 
on each occasion they were discovered and closely 
watched by her guard-boats, and they never ventured 
to make the attack. However, she was unable to get 
to sea, and remained blockaded to the close of the 
war. 

At the beginning of the year several frigates and 
smaller craft were at sea. The Chesapeake, Cap- 
tain Evans, had sailed from Boston on Dec. 13, 
1812.^ She ran down past Madeira, the Canaries, 
and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and for six 
weeks cruised to the south of the line between longi- 
tudes 16° to 25° W. Thence she steered to the west, 
passing near Surinam, over the same spot on which 
the Hornet had sunk the Peacock but a day previous. 
Cruising northward through the West Indies, she 
passed near the Bermudas, where she was chased by 
a 74 and a frigate ; escaping from them she got into 
Boston on April 9th, having captured five merchant- 
men, and chased unsuccessfully for two days a brig- 
sloop. The term of two years for which her crew 

* For an admirable account of these preparations, as well 
as of the subsequent events, see Cooper, ii, 242. 

8 Statistical "History of the U. S. Navy," by Lieutenant 
C. E. Emmons. 



On the Ocean 205 

were enlisted now being up, they, for the most part, 
left, in consequence of some trouble about the prize- 
money. Captain Evans being in ill health. Captain 
James Lawrence was appointed to command her. 
He reached Boston about the middle of May ^ and 
at once set about enlisting a new crew, and tried, 
with but partial success, to arrange matters with the 
old sailors, who were now almost in open mutiny. 
When the year 18 12 had come to an end, the 
Essex, 32, was in the South Atlantic, and Captain 
Porter shortly afterward ran into St. Catherines to 
water. Being at a loss where to find his consorts, 
he now decided to adopt the exceedingly bold meas- 
ure of doubling Cape Horn and striking at the Brit- 
ish whalers in the Pacific. This was practically go- 
ing into the enemy's waters, the Portuguese and 
Spanish countries being entirely under the influ- 
ence of Britain, while there were no stations where 
Porter could revictual or repair in safety. How- 
ever, the Essex started, doubled the Horn, and on 
March 13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. 
Her adventurous cruise in the Pacific was the most 
striking feature of the war ; but as it has been most 
minutely described by Commodore Porter himself, 
by his son. Admiral Porter, by Admiral Farragut, 
and by Cooper, I shall barely touch upon it. 

6 He was still on the Hornet at New York on May loth, as 
we knew from a letter of Biddle's, written on that date (in 
letters of "Masters-Commandant," 1813, No. 58), and so 
could hardly have been with the Chesapeake two weeks be- 
fore he put out ; and had to get his crew together and train 
them during that time. 



2o6 Naval War of 1812 

On March 20th the Essex captured the Peruvian 
corsair Nereyda, 16, hove her guns and small arms 
overboard, and sent her into port. She made the 
island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and thence 
went to the Gallipagos, getting everything she 
wanted from her prizes. Then she went to Tumbez, 
and returned to the Gallipagos; thence to the Mar- 
quesas, and finally back to Valparaiso again. By 
this year's campaign in the Pacific, Captain Porter 
had saved all our ships in those waters, had not cost 
the government a dollar, living purely on the enemy, 
and had taken from him nearly 4,000 tons of ship- 
ping and 400 men, completely breaking up his whal- 
ing trade in the South Pacific. 

The cruise was something sid generis in modern 
warfare, recalling to mind the cruises of the early 
English and Dutch navigators. An American ship 
was at a serious disadvantage in having no harbor 
of refuge away from home; while on almost every 
sea there were British, French, and Spanish ports 
into which vessels of those nations could run for 
safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a small 
frigate to cruise a year and a half in an enemy's wa- 
ters, and supply herself during that time, purely from 
captured vessels, with everything — cordage, sails, 
guns, anchors, provisions, and medicines, and even 
money to pay the officers and men ! Porter's cruise 
was the very model of what such an expedition 
should be, harassing the enemy most effectually at 
no cost whatever. Had the Essex been decently 
armed with long guns, instead of carronades, the 



On the Ocean 207 

end might have been as successful as it was glorious. 
The whalers were many of them armed letters-of- 
marque, and, though of course unable to oppose the 
frigate, several times smart skirmishes occurred in 
attacking them with boats, or in captured ships ; as 
when Lieutenant Downs and 20 men in the prize 
Georgiana after a short brush captured the Hector, 
with 25 men, two of whom were killed and six 
wounded; and when, under similar circumstances, 
the prize Greenwich, of 25 men, captured the Serin- 
ga patam of 40. The cruise of the Essex, the first 
American man-of-war ever in the Pacific, a year and 
a half out and many thousand miles away from 
home, was a good proof of Porter's audacity in 
planning the trip and his skill and resource in carry- 
ing it out. 

To return now to the Hornet. This vessel had 
continued blockading the Bonne Citoyenne until 
January 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived to- 
ward evening and chased her into port. As the 
darkness came on the Hornet wore, stood out to sea, 
passing into the open without molestation from the 
74, and then steered toward the northeast, cruising 
near the coast, and making a few prizes, among 
which was a brig, the Resolution, with $23,000 in 
specie aboard, captured on February 14th. On the 
24th of February, while nearing the mouth of the 
Demerara River, Captain Lawrence discovered a 
brig to leeward, and chased her till he ran into quar- 
ter less five, when, having no pilot, he hauled off- 
shore. Just within the bar a man-of-war brig was 



2o8 Naval War of 1812 

lying at anchor; and while beating round Caroband 
Bank, in order to get at her, Captain Lawrence dis- 
covered another sail edging down on his weather- 
quarterJ The brig at anchor was the Espiegle, of 
18 guns, 32-pound carronades, Captain John Tay- 
lor;^ and the second brig seen was the Peacock, 
Captain William Peake,^ which, for some unknown 
reason, had exchanged her 32-pound carronades for 
24's. She had sailed from the Espiegle's anchorage 
the same morning at 10 o'clock. At 4.20 p.m. the 
Peacock hoisted her colors ; then the Hornet beat to 
quarters and cleared for action. Captain Lawrence 
kept close by the wind, in order to get the weather- 
gage; when he was certain he could weather the 
enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the Hornet hoisted 
her colors. The ship and the brig now stood for 
each other, both on the wind, the Hornet being on 
the starboard and the Peacock on the port tack, 
and at 5.25 they exchanged broadsides, at half pis- 
tol-shot distance, while going in opposite directions, 
the Americans using their lee and the British their 
weather battery. The guns were fired as they bore, 
and the Peacock suffered severely, while her an- 
tagonist's hull was uninjured, though she suffered 
slightly aloft and had her pennant cut off by the 
first shot fired.io One of the men in the mizzen-top 
was killed by a round shot, and two more were 
wounded in the main-top.^ ^ As soon as they were 

' Letter of Captain Lawrence, March 29, 1813. 

8 James, vi, 278. » Do. '" Cooper, p. 200. 

" See entry in her log for the day (In "Log-Book of 



On the Ocean 209 

clear, Captain Peake put his hehu hard up and wore, 
firing his starboard guns ; but the Hornet had 
watched him closely, bore up as quickly, and coming 
down at 5.35, ran him close aboard on the star- 
board quarter. Captain Peake fell at this moment, 
together with many of his crew, and, unable to with- 
stand the Hornet's heavy fire, the Peacock surren- 
dered at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first shot; 
and directly afterward hoisted her ensign union 
down in the fore-rigging as a signal of distress. Al- 
most immediately her mainmast went by the board. 
Both vessels then anchored, and Lieutenant J. T. 
Shubrick, being sent on board the prize, reported 
her sinking. Lieutenant D. Connor was then sent 
in another boat to try to save the vessel ; but though 
they threw the guns overboard, plugged the shot 
holes, tried the pumps, and even attempted bailing, 
the water gained so rapidly that the Hornet's offi- 
cers devoted themselves to removing the wounded 
and other prisoners ; and while thus occupied the 
short tropical twilight left them. Immediately after- 
ward the prize settled, suddenly and easily, in 53^ 
fathoms of water, carrying with her three of the 
Hornet's people and nine of her own, who were 
rummaging below; meanwhile four others of her 
crew had lowered her damaged stern boat, and in 
the confusion got off unobserved and made their 
way to the land. The foretop still remained above 
water, and four of the prisoners saved themselves 

Hortiei, Wasp, and Argus, from July 20, 1809, to October 
6, 1813,") in the Bureau of Navigation, at Washington. 



2IO Naval War of 1812 

by running" up the rigging into it. Lieutenant Con- 
nor and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come 
on board) saved themselves, together with most of 
their people and the remainder of the Peacock's 
crew, by jumping into the launch, which was lying 
on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship with 
pieces of boards in default of oars. 

The Hornet's complement at this time was 150, 
of whom she had 8 men absent in a prize and 7 
on the sick list,^^ leaving 135 fit for duty in the 
action ;^^ of these one man was killed, and two 
wounded, all aloft. Her rigging and sails were a 
good deal cut, a shot had gone through the fore- 
mast, and the bowsprit was slightly damaged; the 
only shot that touched her hull merely glanced 
athwart her bows, indenting a plank beneath the 
cat-head. The Peacock's crew had amounted to 
134, but 4 were absent in a prize, and but 122^^ fit 
lor action; of these she lost her captain, and seven 
men killed and mortally wounded, and her master, 
one midshipman, and 28 men severely and slightly 
wounded, — in all 8 killed and 30 wounded, or about 
13 times her antagonist's loss. She suffered under 
the disadvantage of light metal, having 24's op- 
posed to 32's ; but judging from her gunnery this 
was not much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have 
inflicted nearly as great damage. She was well 
handled and bravely fought; but her men showed 

'^ Letter of Captain Lawrence. 
'^ Letter of Lieutenant D. Conner, April 26, 1813. 
'* Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright (of the Peacock), 
April 17, 18 13. 



On the Ocean 



211 



a marvelous ignorance of gtinnery. It appears that 
she had long been known as "the yacht," on ac- 




count of the tasteful arrangement of her deck; the 
breechings of the carronades were lined with white 
canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy the 



212 Naval War of 1812 

polish upon the traversing bars and elevating 
screws.^ ^ In other words, Captain Peake had con- 
founded the mere incidents of good discipline with 
the essentials.^^ 

The Hornet's victory can not be regarded in any 
other light than as due, not to the heavier metal, 
but to the far more accurate firing of the Ameri- 
cans; "had the guns of the Peacock been of the 
largest size they could not have changed the result, 
as the weight of shot that do not hit is of no great 
moment." Any merchant-ship might have been as 
well handled and bravely defended as she was; and 
an ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as 
creditable a defence. 

During the entire combat the Espiegle was not 
more than 4 miles distant and was plainly visible 
from the Hornet; but for some reason she did not 
come out, and her commander reported that he knew 
nothing of the action till the next day. Captain 
Lawrence of course was not aware of this, and made 
such exertions to bend on new sails, stow his boats, 
and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he was 
again prepared for action,^ ^ and at 2 p.m. got under 
way for the N.W. Being now overcrowded with 
people and short of water he stood for home, an- 
choring at Holmes' Hole in Martha's Vineyard on 
the 19th of March. 

On their arrival at New York the officers of the 

'* James, vi, 280. 

" Codrington ("Memoirs," i, 310) comments very forcibly 
on the uselessness of a mere martinet. 
" Letter of Captain Lawrence. 



On the Ocean 213 

Peacock published a card expressing in the warmest 
terms their appreciation of the way they and their 
men had been treated. Say they: "We ceased to 
consider ourselves prisoners; and everything that 
friendship could dictate was adopted by you and 
the officers of the Hornet to remedy the inconven- 
ience we would otherwise have experienced from 
the unavoidable loss of the whole of our property 
and clothes owing to the sudden sinking of the 
Peacock."^^ This was signed by the first and sec- 
ond lieutenants, the master, surgeon and purser. 



Tonnag^e Guns 


Weight 
Metal Men 


Los! 


■nei 480 10 
cock 477 10 


279 135 
210 122 


3 

38 


Relative 
Force 


Relative Loss 
Inflicted 




Hornet i.oo 
Peacock .83 


1.00 
.08 





That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 11, 
the relative execution was about as 13 is to i. 

The day after the capture Captain Lawrence re- 
ported 2JJ souls aboard, including the crew of the 
English brig Resolution which he had taken, and 
of the American brig Hunter, prize to the Peacock. 
As James, very ingeniously, tortures these figures 
into meaning what they did not, it may be well to 
show exactly what the 2yy included. Of the Hor- 
net's original crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize, 
I killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick) 
138; of the Peacock's original 134, 4 were absent 

18 Quoted in full in Niles* "Register" and Lossing's "Field 
Book." 



214 Naval War of 1812 

in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4 escaped, leav- 
ing (including 8 sick and 3 mortally wounded) 
112; there were also aboard 16 other British pris- 
oners, and the Hunter's crew of 11 men — making 
just 277.^* According to Lieutenant Connor's let- 
ter, written in response to one from Lieutenant 
Wright, there were in reality 139 in the Peacock's 
crew when she began action; but it is, of course, 
best to take each commander's account of the num- 
ber of men on board his ship that were fit for duty. 
On January 17th the Viper, 12, Lieutenant J. D. 
Henly, was captured by the British frigate Narcis- 
sus, 32, Captain Lumly. 

On February 8th, while a British squadron, con- 
sisting of the four frigates Bclvidera (Captain 
Richard Byron), Maidstone, Junon, and Statira, 
were at anchor in Lynnhaven Bay, a schooner was 
observed in the northeast standing down Chesa- 
peake Bay.2« This was the Lottery, letter-of- 
marque, of six 12-pounder carronades and 25 men, 
Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimore 
to Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under 
the command of Lieutenant Kelly Nazer, were 
sent against her, and, a calm coming on, over- 

" The 277 men were thus divided into: Hornets crew, 138; 
Peacock's crew, 112; Resolution's crew, 16; Hunter's crew, 
II. James quotes "270" men, which he divides as follows: 
Hornet, 160; Peacock, loi ; Hunter, 9 — leaving out the 
Resolution'' s crew, 11 of the Peacock's, and 2 of the 
Hunter's. 

'''* James, vi, 325. 



On the Ocean 215 

took her. The schooner opened a well-directed fire 
of round and grape, but the boats rushed forward 
and boarded her, not carrying her till after a most 
obstinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and 
19 of his men, together with 13 of the assailants, 
were killed or wounded. The best warship of a 
regular navy might be proud of the discipline and 
courage displayed by the captain and crew of the 
little Lottery. Captain Byron on this, as well as 
on many another occasion, showed himself to be as 
humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain 
Southcomb, mortally wounded, was taken on board 
Byron's frigate, where he was treated with the 
greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, and 
when he died his body was sent ashore with every 
mark of the respect due to so brave an officer. 
Captain Stewart (of the Constellation) wrote Cap- 
tain Byron a letter of acknowledgment for his great 
courtesy and kindness.^^ 

On March i6th a British division of five boats 
and 105 men, commanded by Lieutenant James 
Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateer 
schooner Dolphin of 12 guns and 70 men, and the 
letters-of-marque. Racer, Arab, and Lynx, each of 
six guns and 30 men. Lieutenant Polkinghorne, 
after pulling 15 miles, found the four schooners 
all prepared to receive him, but in spite of his great 
inferiority in force he dashed gallantly at them. 

" The correspondence between the two captains is given 
in full in Niles' "Register," which also contains fragmen- 
tary notes on the action, principally as to the loss incurred. 



2i6 Naval War of 1812 

The Arab and Lynx surrendered at once ; the Racer 
was carried after a sharp struggle in which Lieuten- 
ant Polkinghorne was wounded, and her guns turned 
on the Dolphin. Most of the latter's crew jumped 
overboard; a few ralHed round their captain, but 
they were at once scattered as the British seamen 
came aboard. The assailants had 13, and the pri- 
vateersmen 16 men killed and wounded in the fight. 
It was certainly one of the most brilliant and daring 
cutting-out expeditions that took place during the 
war, and the victors well deserved their success. 
The privateersmen (according to the statement of 
the Dolphin's master, in "Niles' Register,") were 
panic-struck, and acted in anything but a brave 
manner. All irregular fighting-men do their work 
by fits and starts. No regular cruisers could be- 
have better than did the privateers Lottery, Chas- 
seur, and General Armstrong; none would behave 
as badly as the Dolphin, Lynx, and Arab. The 
same thing appears on shore. Jackson's irregulars 
at New Orleans did as well, or almost as well, as 
Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's troops 
would never have suffered from such a panic as 
overcame the militia at Bladensburg. 

On April 9th the schooner Nonvich, of 14 guns 
and 61 men. Sailing-master James Monk, captured 
the British privateer Caledonia, of 10 guns and 41 
men, after a short action in which the privateer lost 
7 men. 

On April 30th Commodore Rodgers, in the 
President, 44, accompanied by Captain Smith in 



On the Ocean 217 

the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise.^^ On 
May 26. he fell in with and chased the British sloop 
Curlew, 18, Captain Michael Head, but the latter 
escaped by knocking away the wedges of her masts 
and using other means to increase her rate of sail- 
ing. On the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., long. 60° 
W., the Congress parted company, and sailed off 
toward the southeast, making four prizes, of no 
great value, in the North Atlantic f^ when about 
in long. 35° W. she steered south, passing to the 
south of the line. But she never saw a man-of- 
war, and during the latter part of her cruise not 
a sail of any kind, and after cruising nearly eight 
months returned to Portsmouth Harbor on Decem- 
ber 14th, having captured but four merchantmen. 
Being unfit to cruise longer, owing to her decayed 
condition, she was disarmed and laid up; nor was 
she sent to sea again during the war.^^ 

Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the eastern 
edge of the Grand Bank until he reached latitude 
48°, without meeting anything, then stood to the 
southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. 

'* Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813. 

^^ Letter of Captain Smith, Dec. 15, 1813. 

** James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the 

Tenedos during part of 1814, but was too much awed by 

the fate of the Chesapeake to come out during the "long 

blockade" of Captain Parker. Considering the fact that she 

was too decayed to put to sea, had no guns aboard, no crew, 

and was, in fact, laid up, the feat of the Tenedos was not 

very wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded" her 

quite as well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the 

way Tames alters a fact by suppressing half of it. 

Vol. IX. — 10 



21 8 Naval War of 1812 

Then he crowded sail to the northeast after a 
Jamaica fleet of which he had received news, but 
which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th, in 
lat. 46°, long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped 
his course toward the North Sea, still without any- 
good luck befalling him. On June 27th he put into 
North Bergen in the Shetlands for water, and thence 
passed the Orkneys and stretched toward the North 
Cape, hoping to intercept the Archangel fleet. On 
July 19th, when off the North Cape, in lat. 71'^ 
52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in with two sails 
of the enemy, who made chase; after four days' 
pursuit the commodore ran his opponents out of 
sight. According to his letter the two sail were 
a line-of-battle ship and a frigate;- according to 
James they were the 12-pounder frigate Alexandria, 
Captain Carthcart, and Spitfire , 16, Captain Ellis. 
James quotes from the logs of the two British ships, 
and it would seem that he is correct, as it would not 
be possible for him to falsify the logs so utterly. In 
case he is true, it was certainly carrying caution to 
an excessive degree for the commodore to retreat 
before getting some idea of what his antagonists 
really were. His mistaking them for so much 
heavier ships was a precisely similar error to that 
made by Sir George Collier and Lord Stuart at a 
later date about the Cyane and Levant. James 
wishes to prove that each party perceived the force 
of the other, and draws a contrast (p. 312) between 
the "gallantry of one party and pusillanimity of 
the other." This is nonsense, and, as in similar 



On the Ocean 219 

cases, James overreaches himself by proving too 
much. If he had made an i8-pounder frigate hke 
the Congress flee from another i8-pounder, his 
narrative would be within the bounds of possibility 
and would need serious examination. But the lit- 
tle i2-pounder Alexandria, and the ship-sloop with 
her 18-pound carronades, would not have stood the 
ghost of a chance in the contest. Any man who 
would have been afraid of them would also have 
been afraid of the 'Little Belt, the sloop Rodgers cap- 
tured before the war. As for Captains Cathcart 
and Ellis, had they known the force of the President, 
and chased her with a view of attacking her, their 
conduct would have only been explicable on the 
ground that they were afflicted with emotional 
insanity. 

The President now steered southward and got 
into the mouth of the Irish Channel ; on August 2d 
she shifted her berth and almost circled Ireland; 
then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked 
south along the coast. On September 23d, a little 
south of Nantucket, she decoyed under her guns and 
captured the British schooner HigMyer, 6, Lieut. 
William Hutchinson, and 45 men; and went into 
Newport on the 27th of the same month, having 
made some 12 prizes. 

On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the United 
States, which had sent ashore six carronades, and 
now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied by Captain 
Jones in the Macedonian, 38, and Captain Biddle in 
the Wasp, 20, left New York, passing through Hell 



220 Naval War of 1812 

Gate, as there was a large blockading force off the 
Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point the main-mast of 
the States was struck by lightning, which cut off 
the broad pendant, shot down the hatchway into 
the doctor's cabin, put out his candle, ripped up the 
bed, and entering between the skin and ceiling of 
the ship tore off two or three sheets of copper near 
the water-line, and disappeared without leaving a 
trace! The Macedonian, which was close behind, 
hove all aback, in expectation of seeing the States 
blown up. 

At the end of the Sound, Commodore Decatur 
anchored to watch for a chance of getting out. Early 
on June ist he started; but in a couple of hours met 
the British Captain R. D. Oliver's squadron, con- 
sisting of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. These chased 
him back, and all his three ships ran into New Lon- 
don. Here, in the mud of the Thames River, the two 
frigates remained blockaded till the close of the war ; 
but the little sloop slipped out later, to the enemy's 
cost. 

We left the Chesapeake, 38, being fitted out at 
Boston by Captain James Lawrence, late of the 
Hornet. Most of her crew, as already stated, their 
time being up, left, dissatisfied with the ship's ill luck, 
and angry at not having received their due share of 
prize-money. It was very hard to get sailors, most 
of the men preferring to ship in some of the numer- 
ous privateers where the discipline was less strict 
and the chance of prize-money much greater. In 
consequence of this an unusually large number of 



On the Ocean 221 

foreigners had to be taken, including- about forty 
British and a number of Portuguese. The latter 
were peculiarly troublesome; one of their number, 
a boatswain's mate, finally almost brought about a 
mutiny among the crew, which was only pacified by 
giving the men prize-checks. A few of the Constitu- 
tion's old crew came aboard, and these, together 
with some of the men who had been on the Chesa- 
peake during her former voyage, made an excellent 
nucleus. Such men needed very little training at 
either guns or sails; but the new hands were un- 
practiced, and came on board so late that the last 
draft that arrived still had their hammocks and 
bags lying in the boats stowed over the booms 
when the ship was captured. The officers were 
largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant, 
Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former 
cruise; the third and fourth lieutenants were not 
regularly commissioned as such, but were only mid- 
shipmen acting for the first time in higher positions. 
Captain Lawrence himself was of course new to all, 
both officers and crew.^^ In other words, the Chesa- 
peake possessed good material, but in an exceeding- 
ly unseasoned state. 

''^ On the day on which he sailed to attack the ShaiinoTt, 
Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows: 
"Lieutenant Paige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with 
the ship. At the urgent request of Acting-Lieutenant Pierce 
I have granted him, also, permission to go on shore; one in- 
ducement for my granting his request was his being at vari- 
ance with every oflficer in his mess." "Captains' Letters," 
vol. 29, No. i, in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither 
officers nor men had shaken together. 



222 Naval War of 1812 

Meanwhile the British frigate Shannon, 38, 
Captain PhiHp Bowes Vere Broke, was cruising off 
the mouth of the harbor. To give some idea of 
the reason why she proved herself so much more 
formidable than her British sister frigate it may be 
well to quote, slightly condensing, from James : 

"There was another point in which the generality 
of British crews, as compared with any one Ameri- 
can crew, were miserably deficient; that is, skill in 
the art of gunnery. While the American seamen 
were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, 
except in particular cases, scarcely did so once in a 
year ; and some ships could be named on board which 
not a shot had been fired in this way for upward of 
three years. Nor was the fault wholly the cap- 
tain's. The instructions under which he was bound 
to act forbade him to use, during the first six months 
after the ship had received her armament, more 
shots per month than amounted to a third in number 
of the upper-deck guns ; and, after these six months, 
only half the quantity. Many captains never put a 
shot in the guns till an enemy appeared; they em- 
ployed the leisure time of the men in handling the 
sails and in decorating the ship." Captain Broke 
was not one of this kind. "From the day on which 
he had joined her, the 14th of September, 1806, 
the Shannon began to feel the effect of her captain's 
proficiency as a gunner and zeal for the service. 
The laying of the ship's ordnance so that it may be 
correctly fired in a horizontal direction is justly 
deemed a most important operation, as upon it de- 



On the Ocean 223 

pends in a great measure the true aim and destruct- 
ive effect of the shot ; this was attended to by Captain 
Broke in person. By draughts from other ships, 
and the usual means to which a British man-of- 
war is obhged to resort, the Shannon got together a 
crew; and in the course of a year or two, by the 
paternal care and excellent regulations of Captain 
Broke, the ship's company became as pleasant to 
command as it was dangerous to meet." The 
Shannon's guns were all carefully sighted, and, 
moreover, "every day, for about an hour and a half 
in the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the 
state of the weather, the men were exercised at 
training the guns, and for the same time in the after- 
noon in the use of the broadsword, pike, musket, 
etc. Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both 
with great guns and musketry; and Captain Broke, 
as an additional stimulus beyond the emulation ex- 
cited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man that 
put a shot through the bull's eye." He would fre- 
quently have a cask thrown overboard and suddenly 
order some one gun to be manned to sink the cask. 
In short, the Shannon was very greatly superior, 
thanks to her careful training, to the average Brit- 
ish frigate of her rate, while the Chesapeake, owing 
to her having a raw and inexperienced crew, was 
decidedly inferior to the average American frigate 
of the same strength. 

In force the two frigates compared pretty 
equally,^^ the American being the superior in just 

** Taking each commander's account for his own force. 



224 Naval War of 1812 

about the same proportion that the Wasp was to 
the Frolic, or, at a later date, the Hornet to the Pen- 
guin. The Chesapeake carried 50 guns (26 in 
broadside), 28 long i8's on the gun-deck, and on 
the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 18, eighteen 
32-pound carronades, and one 12-pound carronade 
(which was not used in the fight, however). Her 
broadside, allowing for the short weight of metal, 
was 542 lbs. ; her complement, 379 men. The Shan- 
non carried 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long i8's 
on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck four long 9's, 
one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades, and three 12- 
pound carronades (two of which were not used in 
the fight). Her broadside was 550 lbs.; her crew 
consisted of 330 men, 30 of whom were raw hands. 
Early on the morning of June ist. Captain Broke 
sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American pris- 
oner, a letter of challenge, which for courteousness, 
manliness, and candor is the very model of what 
such an epistle should be. Before it reached Boston, 
however, Captain Lawrence had weighed anchor, 
to attack the Shannon, which frigate was in full 
sight in the offing. It has been often said that he 
engaged against his judgment, but this may be 
doubted. His experience with the Bonne Citoy- 
enne, Espiegle and Peacock had not tended to give 
him a very high idea of the navy to which he was op- 
posed, and there is no doubt that he was confident 
of capturing the Shannon.^'' It was most unfortu- 

^'' In his letter written just before sailing (already quoted 
on p. 221) he says: "An English frigate is now in sight from 



On the Ocean 225 

nate that he did not receive Broke's letter, as the 
latter in it expressed himself willing to meet Law- 
rence in any latitude and longitude he might appoint ; 
and there would thus have been some chance of the 
American crew having time enough to get into shape. 
At midday of June i, 1812, the Chesapeake 
weighed anchor, stood out of Boston Harbor, and 
at I P.M. rounded the Light-house. The Shannon 
stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 hauled up and 
reefed top-sails. At 4 p.m. she again bore away 
with her foresail brailed up, and her main top-sail 
braced flat and shivering, that the Chesapeake might 
overtake her. An hour later, Boston Light-house 
bearing west distant about six leagues, she again 
hauled up, with her head to the southeast, and lay 
to under top-sail, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker. 
Meanwhile, as the breeze freshened the Chesapeake 
took in her studding-sails, top-gallant sails, and roy- 
als, got her royal yards on deck, and came down very 
fast under top-sails and jib. At 5.30, to keep under 
command and be able to wear if necessary, the 
Shannon filled her main top-sail and kept a close 
luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5.25 
the Chesapeake hauled up her foresail, and with 

our deck. ... I am in hopes to give a good account of her 
before night." My account of the action is mainly taken 
from James' "Naval History" and Brighton's "Memoir of 
Admiral Broke" (according to which the official letter of 
Captain Broke was tampered with) ; see also the letter of 
Lieut. George Budd, June 15, 1813; the report of the Court 
of Inquiry, Commodore Bainbridge presiding, and the court- 
martial held on board frigate United S/ates April is, 1814, 
Commodore Decatur presiding. 



226 Naval War of 1812 

three ensigns flying, steered straight for the Shan- 
non's starboard quarter. Broke was afraid that 
Lawrence would pass under the Shannon's stern, 
rake her, and engage her on the quarter ; but either 
overlooking or waiving this advantage, the Ameri- 
can captain luffed up within 50 yards upon the 
Shannon's starboard quarter, and squared his main- 
yard. On board the Shannon the captain of the 
14th gun, William Mindham, had been ordered not 
to fire till it bore into the second main-deck port 
forward; at 5.50 it was fired, and then the other 
guns in quick succession from aft forward, the 
Chesapeake replying with her whole broadside. At 
5.53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead, hauled 
up a little. The Chesapeake's broadsides were do- 
ing great damage, but she herself was suffering even 
more than her foe; the men in the Shannon's tops 
could hardly see the deck of the American frigate 
through the clouds of splinters, hammocks, and other 
wreck that was flying across it. Man after man was 
killed at the wheel ; the fourth lieutenant, the master, 
and the boatswain were slain; and at 5.56, having 
had her jib sheet and foretop-sail tie shot away, and 
her spanker brails loosened so that the sail blew out, 
the Chesapeake came up into the wind somewhat, so 
as to expose her quarter to her antagonist's broad- 
side, which beat in her stern-ports and swept the men 
from the after guns. One of the arm chests on the 
quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade 
thrown from the Shannon?^ The Chesapeake was 

'^ This explosion may have* had more effect than is com- 
monly supposed in the capture of the Chesapeake. Commo- 



On the Ocean 227 

now seen to have stern-way on and to be paying 
slowly off; so the Shannon put her helm a-starboard 
and shivered her mizzen top-sail, so as to keep off 
the wind and delay the boarding. But at that mo- 
ment her jib stay was shot away, and, her headsails 
becoming becalmed, she went off very slowly. In 
consequence, at 6 p.m. the two frigates fell aboard, 
the Chesapeake's quarter pressing upon the Shan- 
non's side just forward the starboard main-chains, 
and the frigates were kept in this position by the 
fluke of the Shannon's anchor catching in the Chesa- 
peake's quarter port. 

The Shannon's crew had suffered severely, but 
not the least panic or disorder existed among them. 
Broke ran forward, and seeing his foes flinching 
from the quarter-deck guns, he ordered the ships 
to be lashed together, the great guns to cease firing, 
and the boarders to be called. The boatswain, who 
had fought in Rodney's action, set about fastening 

dore Bainbridge, writing from Charlestown, Mass., on June 
2, 1813 (see "Captains' Letters," vol. xxix, No. lo), says: 
"Mr. Knox, the pilot on board, left the Chesapeake at 5 
P.M. ... At 6 P.M., Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, 
and at 12 minutes past six both ships were laying alongside 
one another as if 'in the act of boarding; at that moment an 
explosion took place on board the Chesapeake, which spread 
a fire on her upper deck from the foremast to the mizzen- 
mast, as high as her tops, and enveloped both ships in smoke 
for several minutes. After it cleared away they were seen 
separate, with the British flag hoisted on board the Chesa- 
peake over the American." James denies that the explosion 
was caused by a hand-grenade, though he says there were 
some of these aboard the Shannon. It is a point of no 
interest. 



228 Naval War of 1812 

the vessels together, which the grim veteran suc- 
ceeded in doing, though his right arm was literally 
hacked off by a blow from a cutlass. All was con- 
fusion and dismay on board the Chesapeake. Lieu- 
tenant Ludlow had been mortally wounded and car- 
ried below; Lawrence himself, while standing on 
the quarter-deck, fatally conspicuous by his full- 
dress uniform and commanding stature, was shot 
down, as the vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law of 
the British marines. He fell dying, and was car- 
ried below, exclaiming: "Don't give up the ship" 
— a phrase that has since become proverbial among 
his countrymen. The third lieutenant, Mr. W. S. 
Cox, came on deck, but utterly demoralized by the 
aspect of affairs, he basely ran below without stay- 
ing to rally the men^ and was court-martialed after- 
ward for so doing. At 6.02 Captain Broke stepped 
from the Shannon's gangway rail on to the muzzle 
of the Chesapeake's aftermost carronade, and thence 
over the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, followed 
by about 20 men. As they came aboard, the Chesa- 
peake's foreign mercenaries and the raw natives 
of the crew deserted their quarters; the Portuguese 
boatswain's mate removed the gratings of the berth- 
deck, and he ran below, followed by many of the 
crew, among them one of the midshipmen named 
Deforest. On the quarter-deck almost the only man 
that made any resistance was the chaplain, Mr. 
Livermore, who advanced, firing his pistol at Broke, 
and in return nearly had his arm hewed off by a 
stroke from the latter's broad Toledo blade. On 



On the Ocean 229 

the upper deck the only men who behaved well were 
the marines, but of their original number of 44 men, 
14, including Lieutenant James Broom and Cor- 
poral Dixon, were dead, and 20, including Sergeants 
Twin and Harris, wounded, so that there were left 
but one corporal and nine men, several of whom 
had been knocked down and bruised, though re- 
ported unwounded. There was thus hardly any 
resistance. Captain Broke stopping his men for a 
moment till they were joined by the rest of the 
boarders under Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. 
The Chesapeake's mizzen-topmen began firing at 
the boarders, mortally wounding a midshipman, 
Mr. Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt; but one 
of the Shannon's long nines was pointed at the 
top and cleared it out, being assisted by the Eng- 
lish main-topmen, under Midshipman Coshnahan. 
At the same time the men in the Chesapeake's main- 
top were driven out of it by the fire of the Shannon's 
fore-topmen, under Midshipman Smith. Lieutenant 
George Budd, who was on the main-deck, now for 
the first time learned that the English had boarded, 
as the upper-deck men came crowding down, and at 
once called on his people to follow him; but the 
foreigners and novices held back, and only a few 
of the veterans followed him up. As soon as he 
reached the spar-deck, Budd, followed by only a 
dozen men, attacked the British as they came along 
the gangways, repulsing them for a moment, and 
killing the British purser, Aldham, and captain's 
clerk, Dunn; but the handful of Americans were at 



230 Naval War of 1812 

once cut doAvn or dispersed, Lieutenant Budd being 
wounded and knocked down the main hatchway. 
"The enemy," writes Captain Broke, "fought des- 
perately, but in disorder." Lieutenant Ludlow, al- 
ready mortally wounded, struggled up on deck, fol- 
lowed by two or three men, but was at once disabled 
by a sabre cut. On the forecastle a few seamen 
and marines turned to bay. Captain Broke was 
still leading his men with the same brilliant per- 
sonal courage he had all along shown. Attacking 
the first American, who was armed with a pike, he 
parried a blow from it, and cut down the man; at- 
tacking another he was himself cut down, and only 
saved by the seaman Mindham, already mentioned, 
who slew his assailant. One of the American ma- 
rines, using his clubbed musket, killed an English- 
man, and so stubborn was the resistance of the little 
group that for a moment the assailants gave back, 
having lost several killed and wounded; but im- 
mediately afterward they closed in and slew their 
foes to the last man. The British fired a volley or 
two down the hatchway, in response to a couple of 
shots fired up; all resistance was at an end, and at 
6.05, just fifteen minutes after the first gun had 
been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had 
come aboard, the colors of the Chesapeake were 
struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61 were killed 
or mortally wounded, including her captain, her 
first and fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of ma- 
rines, the master (White), boatswain (Adams), 
and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and slightly 



On the Ocean 231 

wounded, including both her other h'eutenants, five 
midshipmen, and the chaplain, total, 148; the loss 
falling almost entirely upon the American portion 
of the crew. 

Of the Shannon's men, 33 were killed outright 
or died of their wounds, including her first lieuten- 
ant, purser, captain's clerk, and one midshipman, 
and 50 wounded, including the captain himself and 
the boatswain; total, 83. 

The Chesapeake was taken into Halifax, where 
Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow were 
both buried with military honors. Captain Broke 
was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieuten- 
ants Wallis and Falkiner were both made com- 
manders. 

The British writers accuse some of the American 
crew of treachery; the Americans in turn, accuse 
the British of revolting brutality. Of course in 
such a fight things are not managed with urbane 
courtesy, and, moreover, writers are prejudiced. 
Those who would like to hear one side are referred 
to James; if they wish to hear the other, to the 
various letters from officers published in "Niles* 
Register," especially Vol. V, p. 142. 

Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower 
masts, especially the two mizzen-masts, were badly 
wounded. The Americans at that period were 
fond of using bar shot, which were of very ques- 
tionable benefit, being useless against a ship's hull, 
though said to be sometimes of great help in un- 
rigging an antagonist from whom one was desirous 



232 



Naval War of 1812 



of escaping, as in the case of the President and 
Endymion. 

It is thus seen that the Shannon received from 
shot alone only about half the damage the Chesa- 
peake did; the latter was thoroughly beaten at the 
guns, in spite of what some American authors say 
to the contrary. And her victory was not in the 



AM 



9Jt* 






xss 



S.S3 



/ 









s.eo 



•CllSlAfKAXS" mVCX BY 


" SHANNON " cntucic n 


39 eighteeO'pound shot. 
3S thirty-two-pound sbot, 
a nine-pouad shot, 
306 giape, 

36a shot. 


12 eiph'.een-pound rhot, 

13 thirty-two-pouod sbol, 

14 bar slid,- 
liy grape. 

158 shot 



slightest degree to be attributed to, though it may 
have been slightly hastened by, accident. Training 
and discipline won the victory, as often before; only 
in this instance the training and discipline were 
against us. 

It is interesting to notice that the Chesapeake 
battered the Shannon's hull far more than either the 
Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian did the hulls of 
their opponents, and that she suffered less in re- 



On the Ocean i;^^ 

turn (not in loss but in damage) than they did. 
The Chesapeake was a better fighter than either the 
Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian, and could have 
captured any one of them. The Shannon of course 
did less damage than any of the American 44's, 
probably just about in the proportion of the differ- 
ence in force. 

Almost all American writers have treated the 
capture of the Chesapeake as if it waS' due simply 
to a succession of unfortunate accidents; for ex- 
ample, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism, 
says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its 
short duration, are "altogether the results of the 
chances of war," and that it was mainly decided by 
"fortuitous events as unconnected with any particu- 
lar merit on the one side as they are with any 
particular demerit on the other,"^^ Most naval 
men consider it a species of treason to regard the 
defeat as due to anything but extraordinary ill 
fortune. And yet no disinterested reader can help 
acknowledging that the true reason of the defeat 
was the very simple one that the Shannon fought 
better than the Chesapeake. It has often been said 
that up to the moment when the ships came to- 
gether the loss and damage suffered by each were 

^^ The worth of such an explanation is very aptly gauged 
in General Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClel- 
lan's Campaign of 1862" (Nfew York, 1881), p. 35, where he 
speaks of "those unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which 
are vaguely described as the 'fortune of war,' but which usu- 
ally prove to be the superior ability or resources of the an- 
tagonist." 



234 Naval War of 1812 

about the same. This is not true, and even if it 
was, would not affect the question. The heavy loss 
on board the Shannon did not confuse or terrify 
the thoroughly trained men with their implicit re- 
liance on their leaders; and the experienced officers 
were ready to defend any point that was menaced. 
An equal or greater amount of loss, aboard the 
Chesapeake disheartened and confused the raw 
crew, who simply had not had the time or chance 
to become well disciplined. Many of the old hands, 
of course, kept their wits and their pluck, but the 
novices and the disaffected did not. Similarly with 
the officers; some, as the Court of Inquiry found, 
had not kept to their posts, and all being new to 
each other and the ship, could not show to their 
best. There is no doubt that the Chesapeake was 
beaten at the guns before she was boarded. Had 
the ships not come together, the fight would have 
been longer, the loss greater, and more nearly equal ; 
but the result would have been the same. Cooper 
says that the enemy entered with great caution, and 
so slowly that twenty resolute men could have re- 
pulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Cap- 
tain Broke and his few followers to leap on board, 
unsupported, and then they only waited for the 
main body to come up; and no twenty men could 
have repulsed such boarders as followed Broke. 
The fight was another lesson, with the parties re- 
versed, to the effect that want of training and disci- 
pline is a bad handicap. Had the Chesapeake's 
crew been in service as many months as the SItan- 



On the Ocean 22 s 

non's had been years, such a captain as Lawrence 
would have had his men perfectly in hand; they 
would not have been cowed by their losses, nor 
some of the officers too demoralized to act properly, 
and the material advantages which the Chesapeake 
possessed, although not very great, would probably 
have been enough to give her a good chance of 
victory. It is well worth noticing that the only 
thoroughly disciplined set of men aboard (all ac- 
cording to James himself, by the way, native Ameri- 
cans), namely, the marines, did excellently, as 
shown by the fact that three-fourths of their num- 
ber were among the killed and wounded. The 
foreigners aboard the Chesapeake did not do as 
well as the Americans, but it is nonsense to ascribe 
the defeat in any way to them ; it was only rendered 
rather more disastrous by their actions. Most of 
the English authors give very fair accounts of the 
battle, except that they hardly allude to the peculiar 
disadvantages under which the Chesapeake suf- 
fered when she entered into it. Thus, James 
thinks the Java was unprepared because she had 
only been to sea six weeks; but does not lay any 
weight on the fact that the Chesapeake had been 
out only as many hours. 

Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that 
written by M. de la Graviere.^*^ "It is impossible 
to avoid seeing in the capture of the Chesapeake 
a new proof of the enormous power of a good or- 
ganization, when it has received the consecration 

30 "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 272. 



236 Naval War of 1812 

of a few years' actual service on the sea. On this 
occasion, in effect, two captains equally renowned, 
the honor of two navies, were opposed to each 
other on two ships of the same tonnage and num- 
ber of guns. Never had the chances seemed better 
balanced, but Sir Philip Broke had commanded the 
Shannon for nearly seven years, while Captain 
Lawrence had only commanded the Chesapeake for 
a few days. The first of these frigates had cruised 
for eighteen months on the coast of America; the 
second was leaving port. One had a crew long 
accustomed to the habits of strict obedience; the 
other was manned by men who had just been en- 
gaged in mutiny. The Americans were wrong to 
accuse fortune on this occasion. Fortune was not 
fickle, she was merely logical. The Shannon cap- 
tured the Chesapeake on the first of June, 1813, 
but on the 14th of September, 1806, the day when 
he took command of his frigate, Captain Broke had 
begun to prepare the glorious tern- i nation to this 
bloody affair." 

Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a 
man as Lawrence, a very Bayard of the seas, who 
was admired as much for his dauntless bravery as 
he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it 
must be confessed that he acted rashly. And after 
he had sailed, it was, as. Lord Howard Douglas 
has pointed out, a tactical error, however chivalric, 
to neglect the chance of luffing across the Shannon's 
stern to rake her; exactly as it was a tactical error 
of his equally chivalrous antagonist to have let him 



On the Ocean 237 

have such an opportunity. Hull would not have 
committed either error, and would, for the matter 
of that, have been an overmatch for either com- 
mander. But it must always be remembered that 
Lawrence's encounters with the English had not 
been such as to give him a high opinion of them. 
The only foe he had fought had been inferior in 
strength, it is true, but had hardly made any effec- 
tive resistance. Another sloop, of equal, if not 
superior force, had tamely submitted to blockade 
for several days, and had absolutely refused to fight. 
And there can be no doubt that the Chesapeake, 
unprepared though she was, would have been an 
overmatch for the Guerriere, Macedonian, or Java. 
Altogether it is hard to blame Lawrence for going 
out, and in every other respect his actions never 
have been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friend 
or foe, without the warmest respect. But that is 
no reason for insisting that he was ruined purely 
by an adverse fate. We will do far better tO' recol- 
lect that as much can be learned from reverses as 
from victories. Instead of flattering ourselves by 
saying the defeat was due to chance, let us try to 
find out what the real cause was, and then take 
care that it does not have an opportunity to act 
again. A little less rashness would have saved 
Lawrence's life and his frigate, while a little more 
audacity on one occasion would have made Com- 
modore Chauncy famous for ever. And whether 
a lesson is to be learned or not, a historian should 
remember that his profession is not that qI a 



238 Naval War of 1812 

panegyrist. The facts of the case unquestionably 
are that Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight 
of the enemy's harbor, proved conqueror over a 
nominally equal and in reality slightly superior 
force; and that this is the only single-ship action of 
the war in which the victor was weaker in force 
than his opponent. So much can be gathered by 
reading only the American accounts. Moreover 
accident had little or nothing to do with the gain- 
ing of the victory. The explanation is perfectly 
easy; Lawrence and Broke were probably exactly 
equal in almost everything that goes to make up 
a first-class commander, but one had trained his 
crew for seven years, and the other was new to 
the ship, to the officers, and to the men, and the 
last to each other. The Chesapeake's crew must 
have been of fine material, or they would not have 
fought so well as they did. 

So much for the American accounts. On the 
other hand, the capture of the Chesapeake was, and 
is, held by many British historians to "conclusively 
prove" a good many different things; such as, that 
if the odds were anything like equal, a British frig- 
ate could always whip an American, that in a hand- 
to-hand conflict such would invariably be the case, 
etc. ; and as this was the only single-ship action of 
the war in which the victor was the inferior in force, 
most British writers insist that it reflected more 
honor on them than all the frigate actions of 1812 
put together did on the Americans. 

These assertions can be best appreciated by ref- 



On the Ocean 239 

erence to a victory won by the French in the year 
of the Battle of the Nile. On the 14th of Decem- 
ber, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the French 24- 
gtin corvette Bayonnaise captured, by boarding, the 
English 32-gun frigate Ambuscade. According to 
James the Ambuscade threw at a broadside 262 
pounds of shot, and was manned by 190 men, 
while the Bayonnaise threw 150 pounds, and had 
on board supernumeraries and passenger soldiers 
enough to make in all 250 men. According to 
the French historian Rouvier^^ the broadside force 
was 246 pounds against 80 pounds; according to 
Troude^^ it was 270 pounds against 112. M. Leon 
Guerin, in his voluminous but exceedingly preju- 
diced and one-sided work,^^ makes the difference 
even greater. At any rate the English vessel was 
vastly the superior in force, and was captured by 
boarding, after a long and bloody conflict in which 
she lost 46, and her antagonist over 50, men. Dur- 
ing all the wars waged with the Republic and the 
Empire, no English vessel captured a French one 
as much superior to itself as the Ambuscade was 
to the Bayonnaise, precisely as in the war of 18 12 
no American vessel captured a British opponent as 
much superior to itself as the Chesapeake was to 
the Shannon. Yet no sensible man can help acknowl- 

*' "Histoire des Mar ins Frangais sous la Republique," par 
Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Paris, 1868. 

3-^ "Batailles Navales." 

'^ "Histoire Maritime de France" (par Leon Guerin, His- 
torien titulaire de la Marine, Membre de la Legion d' Hon- 
neur), vi, 142 (Paris, 1852). 



240 Naval War of 1812 

edging, in spite of these and a few other isolated 
instances, that at that time the French were inferior 
to the English, and the latter to the Americans. 

It is amusing to compare the French histories 
of the English with the English histories of the 
Americans, and to notice the similarity of the argu- 
ments they use to detract from their opponents'' 
fame. Of course I do not allude to such writers 
as Lord Howard Douglas or Admiral de la Gra- 
viere, but to men like William James and Leon 
Guerin, or even O. Troude. James is always re- 
counting how American ships ran away from British 
ones, and Guerin tells as many anecdotes of British 
ships that fled from French foes. James reproaches 
the Americans for adopting a "Parthian" mode of 
warfare, instead of "bringing to in a bold and be- 
coming manner." Precisely the same reproaches 
are used by the French writers, who assert that the 
English would not fight "fairly," but acquired an 
advantage by manoeuvring. James lays great stress 
on the American long guns; so does Lieutenant 
Rouvier on the British carronades. James always 
tells how the Americans avoided the British ships, 
when the crews of the latter demanded to be led 
aboard; Troude says the British always kept at 
long shot, while the French sailors "demanderent a 
grands cris, I'abordage." James says the Ameri- 
cans "hesitated to grapple" with their foes "unless 
they possessed a twofold superiority;" Guerin that 
the English "never dared attack" except when they 
possessed "une superiorite enorme." The British 



On the Ocean 241 

sneer at the "mighty dollar"; the French at the 
"eternal guinea." The former consider Decatur's 
name as "sunk" to the level of Porter's or Bain- 
bridge's; the latter assert that the "presumptuous 
Nelson" was inferior to any of the French admirals 
of the time preceding the Republic. Says James: 
"The Americans only fight well when they have 
the superiority of force on their side;" and Lieu- 
tenant Rouvier: "Never have the English van- 
quished us with an undoubted inferiority of force." 

On June 12, 181 3, the small cutter Surveyor, of 
six 12-pound carronades, was lying in York River, 
in the Chesapeake, under the command of Mr. Wil- 
liam S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men.^* 
At nightfall she was attacked by the boats of the 
Narcissus frigate, containing about 50 men, under 
the command of Lieutenant John Creerie.^^ None 
of the carronades could be used; but Mr. Travis 
made every preparation that he could for defence. 
The Americans waited till the British were within 
pistol shot before they opened their fire; the latter 
dashed gallantly on, however, and at once carried 
the cutter. But though brief, the struggle was 
bloody; 5 of the Americans were wounded, and of 
the British 3 were killed and 7 wounded. Lieu- 
tenant Creerie considered his opponents to have 
shown so much bravery that he returned Mr. Travis 

3« Letter of W. S. Travis, June i6, 1813. 
^^ James, vi, 334. 

Vol. IX.— II 



242 Naval War of 1812 

his sword, with a letter as compHmentary to him 
as it was creditable to the writer.^® 

As has been already mentioned, the Americans 
possessed a large force of gunboats at the begin- 
ning of the war. Some of these were fairly sea- 
worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop or schooner- 
rigged, and armed with one or two long, heavy 
guns, and sometimes with several light carronades 
to repel boarders.^'^ Gunboats of this kind, to- 
gether with the few small cutters owned by the 
government, were serviceable enough. They were 
employed all along the shores of Georgia and the 
CaroHnas, and in Long Island Sound, in protecting 
the coasting trade by convoying parties of small ves- 

36 The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows: "Your gallant 
and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more 
than double your number, on the night of the 12th instant, 
excited such admiration on the part of your opponents as I 
have seldom witnessed, and induced me to return :you the 
sword you had so nobly used, in testimony of mine. Our 
poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly, if not 
solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent surprise. 
In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous 
arrangement aboard the Surveyor, or the determined man- 
ner in which her deck was disputed inch by inch. I am, 
sir," etc. 

31 According to a letter from Captain Hugh G. Campbell 
(in the Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," 1812, vol. ii, 
Nos. 21 and 192), the crews were distributed as follows: ten 
men and a boy to a long 32, seven men and a boy to a long 
9, and five men and a boy to a carronade, exclusive of petty 
officers. Captain Campbell complains of the scarcity of men, 
and rather naively remarks that he is glad the marines have 
been withdrawn from the gunboats, as this may make the 
commanders of the latter keep a brighter lookout than 
formerly. 



On the Ocean 243 

sels from one port to another, and preventing them 
from being molested by the boats of any of the 
British frigates. They also acted as checks upon the 
latter in their descents upon the towns and planta- 
tions, occasionally capturing their boats and tend- 
ers, and forcing them to be very cautious in their 
operations. They were very useful in keeping pri- 
vateers off the coast, and capturing them when they 
came too far in. The exploits of those on the south- 
ern coast will be mentioned as they occurred. Those 
in Lx)ng Island Sound never came into collision 
with the foe, except for a couple of slight skirmishes 
at very long range; but in convoying little fleets 
of coasters, and keeping at bay the man-of-war 
boats sent to molest them, they were invaluable; 
and they also kept the Sound clear of hostile 
privateers. 

Many of the g^mboats were much smaller than 
those just mentioned, trusting mainly to their sweeps 
for motive power, and each relying for offence on 
one long pivot gun, a 12 or i8-pounder. In the 
Chesapeake there was quite a large number of these 
small galleys, with a few of the larger kind, and 
here it was thought that by acting together in flotil- 
las the gunboats might in fine weather do consider- 
able damage to the enemy's fleet by destroying 
detached vessels, instead of confining themselves to 
the more humble tasks in which their brethren else- 
where were fairly successful. At this period Den- 
mark, having lost all her large ships of war, was 
'confining herself purely to gun-brigs. These were 



244 Naval War of 1812 

stout little craft, with heavy guns, which, acting 
together, and being handled with spirit and skill, 
had on several occasions in calm weather captured 
small British sloops, and had twice so injured frig- 
ates as to make their return to Great Britain neces- 
sary; while they themselves had frequently been the 
object of successful cutting-out expeditions. Con- 
gress hoped that our gimboats would do as well as 
the Danish ; but for a variety of reasons they failed 
utterly in every serious attack that they made on 
a man-of-war, and were worse than useless for all 
but the various subordinate employments above 
mentioned. The main reason for this failure was 
in the gunboats themselves. They were utterly use- 
less except in perfectly calm weather, for in any 
wind the heavy guns caused them to careen over so 
as to make it difficult to keep them right side up, 
and impossible to fire. Even in smooth water they 
could not be fought at anchor, requiring to be kept 
in position by means of sweeps ; and they were very 
unstable, the recoil of the guns causing them to 
roll so as to make it difficult to aim with any ac- 
curacy after the first discharge, while a single shot 
hitting one put it hors de combat. This last event 
rarely happened, however, for they were not often' 
handled with any approach to temerity, and, on the 
contrary, usually made their attacks at a range 
that rendered it as impossible to inflict as to receive 
harm. It does not seem as if they were very well 
managed; but they were such ill-conditioned craft 
that the best officers might be pardoned for feeling 



On the Ocean 245 

uncomfortable in them. Their operations through- 
out the war offer a painfillly ludicrous commentary 
on Jefferson's remarkable project of having our 
navy composed exclusively of such craft. 

The first aggressive attempt made with the gun- 
boats was characteristically futile. On June 20th 
15 of them, under Captain Tarbell, attacked the 
Junon, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed 
in Hampton Roads, with the Barossa, 36, and Lau- 
restinus, 24, near her. The gunboats, while still at 
very long range, anchored, and promptly drifted 
round so that they couldn't shoot. Then they got 
under way, and beg^n gradually to draw nearer to 
the Junon. Her defence was very feeble; after 
some hasty and ill-directed volleys she endeavored 
to beat out of the way. But meanwhile, a slight 
breeze having sprung up, the Barossa, Captain Sher- 
riff, approached near enough to take a hand in 
the affair, and at once made it evident that she was 
a more dangerous foe than the Junon, though a 
lighter ship. As soon as they felt the effects of the 
breeze the gunboats became almost useless, and, 
the Barossa's fire being animated and well aimed, 
they withdrew. They had suffered nothing from 
the Junon, but during the short period she was en- 
gaged, the Barossa had crippled one boat and 
slightly damaged another; one man was killed and 
two wounded. The Barossa escaped unscathed and 
the Junon was but slightly injured. Of the com- 
batants, the Barossa was the only one that came 
off with credit, the Junon behaving, if anything, 



246 Naval War of 1812 

rather worse than the gunboats. There was no 
longer any doubt as to the amount of reliance to 
be placed on the latter.^^ 

On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, 
one 64, four frigates, two sloops, and three trans- 
ports was anchored off Craney Island. On the 
northwest side of this island was a battery of 18- 
pounders, to take charge of which Captain Cassin, 
commanding the naval forces at Norfolk, sent 
ashore one hundred sailors of the Constellation, 
under the command of Lieutenants Neale, Shu- 
brick, and Saunders, and fifty marines under Lieu- 
tenant Breckenridge.^^ On the morning of the 
226. they were attacked by a division of 15 boats, 
containing 700 men,^'^ seamen, marines, chasseurs, 
and soldiers of the I02d regiment, the whole under 
the command of Captain Pechell, of the San Do- 
mingo, 74. Captain Hanchett led the attack in the 

^* Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats, they 
acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bla- 
densburg. The British Lieutenant Gleig, himself a spectator, 
thus writes of their deeds on that occasion ("Campaign at 
Washington," p. 119): "Of the sailors, however, it would 
be injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct 
merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only did 
they serve their guns with a quickness and precision which 
astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them 
were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was 
it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw 
themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they 
quitted the field." Certainly such men could not be accused 
of lack of courage. Something else is needed to account for 
the failure of the gunboat system. 

^* Letter of Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813. 

^ James, vi, 337. 



On the Ocean 247 

Diadem's launch. The battery's guns were not fired 
till the British were close in, when they opened 
with destructive effect. While still some seventy 
yards from the guns the Diadem's launch grounded, 
and the attack was checked. Three of the boats 
were now sunk by shot, but the water was so shal- 
low that they remained above water ; and while the 
fighting was still at its height, some of the Con- 
stellation's crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall, 
waded out and took possession of them.*^ A few 
of their crew threw away their arms and came 
ashore with their captors; others escaped to the 
remaining boats, and immediately afterward the 
flotilla made off in disorder, having lost 91 men. 
The three captured barges were large, strong boats, 
one called the Centipede being fifty feet long, and 
more formidable than many of the American gun- 
vessels. The Constellation's men deserve great 
credit for their defence, but the British certainly 
did not attack with their usual obstinacy. When 
the foremost boats were sunk, the water was so 
shallow and the bottom so good that the Americans 
on shore, as just stated, at once waded out to 
them; and if in the heat of the fight Tatnall and 
his seamen could get out to the boats, the 700 
British ought to have been able to get in to the 
battery, whose 150 defenders would then have 
stood no chance.*^ 

■»! "Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall," by Charles C. 
Jones, Jr. (Savannah, 1878), p. 17. 

■*2 James comments on this repulse as "a defeat as discred- 
itable to those that caused it as honorable to those that suf- 



248 Naval War of 1812 

On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels Scorpion 
and Asp, the latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, 
got under way from out of the Yeocomico Creek,'*^ 
and at 10 a.m., discovered in chase the British brig- 
sloops Contest, Captain James Rattray, and Mo- 
hazvk. Captain Henry D. Byng.*^ The Scorpion 
beat up the Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing Asp 
had to re-enter the creek; the two brigs anchored 
off the bar and hoisted out their boats, under the 
command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry; where- 
upon the Asp cut her cable and ran up the creek 
some distance. Here she was attacked by three 
boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twenty 
men, with two light guns, beat off; but they were 
joined by two others, and the five carried the Asp, 
giving no quarter. Mr. Sigourney and 10 of his 
men were killed or wounded, while the British also 
suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (including 

fered in it." "Unlike most other nations, the Americans in 
particular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this 
nature, always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather 
than on numbers." These comments read particularly well 
when it is remembered that the assailants outnumbered the 
assailed in the proportion of 5 to i. It is monotonous work 
to have to supplement a history by a running commentary 
on James' mistakes and inventions; but it is worth while to 
prove once for all the utter unreliability of the author who 
is accepted in Great Britain as the great authority about the 
war. Still, James is no worse than his compeers. In the 
American Coggeshall's "History of Privateers," the mis- 
statements are as gross and the sneers in as poor taste — the 
British, instead of the Americans, being the objects. 

*3 Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July 15, 1813. 

*• James, vi, 343. 



On the Ocean 249 

Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving Ameri- 
cans reached the shore, raUied under Midshipman 
H. McCHntock (second in command), and when 
the British retired after setting the Asp on fire, at 
once boarded her, put out the flames, and got her 
in fighting order; but they were not again mo- 
lested. 

On July 29th, while the Junon, 38, Captain 
Sanders, and Martin, 18, Captain Senhouse, were 
in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on the out- 
side of Crow's Shoal; the frigate anchored within 
supporting distance, and while in this position the 
two ships were attacked by the American flotilla in 
those waters, consisting of eight gunboats, carry- 
ing each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier 
block-sloops,*^ commanded by Lieutenant Samuel 
Angus. The flotilla kept at such a distance that an 
hour's cannonading did no damage whatever to 
anybody; and during that time gunboat No. 121, 
Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile and a half 
away from her consorts. Seeing this the British 
made a dash at her in 7 boats, containing 140 men, 
led by Lieutenant Philip Westphal. Mr. Shead 
anchored and made an obstinate defence, but at 
the first discharge the gun's pintle gave way, and 
the next time it was fired the gun-carriage was al- 
most torn to pieces. He kept up a spirited fire of 
small arms, in reply to the boat-carronades and 
musketry of the assailants; but the latter advanced 
steadily and carried the gunboat by boarding, 7 

*» Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813. 



250 Naval War of 1812 

of her people being wounded, while 7 of the British 
were killed and 13 wounded.*^ The defence of 
No. 121 was very creditable, but otherwise the honor 
of the day was certainly with the British; whether 
because the gunboats were themselves so worthless 
or because they were not handled boldly enough, 
they did no damage, even to the grounded sloop, 
that would seem to have been at their mercy.^'^ 

On June i8th the American brig-sloop Argus, 
commanded by Lieutenant William Henry Allen, 
late first of the United States, sailed from New 
York for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for 
that country, aboard, and reached L'Orient on July 
nth, having made one prize on the way. On July 
14th she again sailed, and cruised in the chops 
of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after 
ship, and creating the greatest consternation among 
the London merchants; she then cruised along 
Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, where 
the work of destruction went on. The labor was 
very severe and harassing, the men being able to 
get very little rest.^^ On the night of August 13th, 

*^ Letter of Mr. Shead, Aug. 5, 1813. 

*' The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the gun- 
boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is 
a letter from Mr. Angus ("Masters-Commandant's Letters," 
1813, No. 3; see also No. 91), in which he says that the frig- 
ate's shot passed over them, while theirs could not even 
reach the sloop. He also incloses a copy of a paper, signed 
by the other gunboat officers, which runs: "We, the officers 
of the vessels comprising the Delaware flotilla, protest against 
the powder as being unfit for service." 

*^ Court of Inquiry into loss of Argus, 1815. 



On the Ocean 251 

a brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured 
and burnt, and unluckily many of the crew suc- 
ceeded in getting at some of the cargo. At 5 a.m. 
on the 14th a large brig-of-war was discovered 
standing down under a cloud of canvas.^*^ This 
was the British brig-sloop Pelican, Captain John 
Fordyce Maples, which, from information received 
at Cork three days previous, had been cruising 
especially after the Argus, and had at last found 
her; St. David's Head bore east five leagues (lat. 
52° 15° N. and 5° 50' W.). 

The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her 
lofty masts and long spars, could easily have es- 
caped from her heavier antagonist; but Captain 
Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could 
not get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran 
easily along on the starboard tack, while the Pelican 
came down on him with the wind (which was from 
the south) nearly aft. At 6 a.m. the Argus wore 
and fired her port guns within grape distance, the 
Pelican responded with her starboard battery, and 
the action began with great spirit on both sides.^^ 
At 6.04 a round shot carried off Captain Allen's 
leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on 
deck till he fainted from loss of blood. Soon the 
British fire carried away the main-braces, main- 
spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the Argus; 
the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in 

« Letter of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 1815. 

50 Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral Thornborough, 

Aug. 14, 1813- 



252 Naval War of 1812 

the head by a grape-shot and carried below; the 
second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no relation 
of the captain), continued to fight the ship with 
great skill. The Pelican's fire continued very- 
heavy, the Argus losing her spritsail-yard and most 
of the standing rigging on the port side of the 
foremast. At 6.14 Captain Maples bore up to pass 
astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed 
into the wind and threw the main-topsail aback, 
getting into a beautiful raking position ;^^ had the 
men at the guns done their duty as well as those 
on the quarter-deck did theirs, the issue of the fight 
would have been very different; but, as it was, in 
spite of her favorable position, the raking broad- 
side of the Argils did little damage. Two or three 
minutes afterward the Argus lost the use of her 
after-sails through having her preventer-main- 
braces and top-sail tie shot away, and fell off be- 
fore the wind, when the Pelican at 6.18 passed 
her stern, raking her heavily, and then ranged up 
on her starboard quarter. In a few minutes the 
wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every descrip- 
tion were shot away, and the Argus became ut- 
terly unmanageable. The Pelican continued raking 
her with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed her 
broadside and took a position on her starboard 
bow, when at 6.45 the brigs fell together, and the 
British "were in the act of boarding when the Argus 
struck her colors," ^^ at 6.45 a.m. The Pelican 

*• Letter of Lieutenant Watson. 
" Letter of Captain Maples. 



On the Ocean 253 

carried, besides her regular armament, two long 
6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside weight of 

metal was thus i"^ 

1x6 
1x6 

I X 12 

8 X 32 

or 280 lbs. against the Argus' : 

I X 12 

9 X 24 

or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent for light 
weight of metal, 210 lbs. The Pelican's crew con- 
sisted of but 116 men, according to the British ac- 
count, though the American reports make it much 
larger. The Argus had started from New York 
with 137 men, but having manned and sent in sev- 
eral prizes, her crew amounted, as near as can be 
ascertained, to 104. Mr. Low in his "Naval His- 
tory," published just after the event, makes it but 
99. James makes it 121 ; as he placed the crew of 
the Enterprise at 125, when it was really 102; that 
of the Hornet at 162, instead of 135; of the Pea- 
cock at 185, instead of 166; of the Nautilus at 106 
instead of 95, etc., it is safe to presume that he has 
over-estimated it by at least 20, which brings the 
number pretty near to the American accounts. 
The Pelican lost but two men killed and five wound- 
ed. Captain Maples had a narrow escape, a spent 
grape-shot striking him in the chest with some 
force, and then falling on the deck. One shot 
had passed through the boatswain's and one through 

*^ James, vi, 320. 



254 



Naval War of 1812 



the carpenter's cabin; her sides were filled with 
grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much in- 
jured ; her foremast, main-topmast, and royal masts 
were slightly wounded, and two of her carronades 
dismounted. 

The injuries of the Argtis have already been de- 
tailed ; her hull and lower masts were also tolerably 
well cut up. Of her crew, Captain Allen, two mid- 
shipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed 
or mortally wounded; her first lieutenant and 13 
seamen severely and slightly wounded; total, 10 
killed and 14 wounded. 

In reckoning the comparative force, I include the 
Englishman's six-pound stem-chaser, which could 
not be fired in broadside with the rest of the guns, 
because I include the Argus' 12-pound bow-chaser, 
which also could not be fired in broadside, as it was 
crowded into the bridle-port. James of course, 
carefully includes the latter, though leaving out the 
former. 

COMPARISON 



Tons. No. Guna. 



Weight 
Metal. 



Argus 
Felican 



298 
467 



Argus 
Pelican 



10 
II 

Comparative 
Force. 

.82 
1.00 



2tO 
280 



Men. 

104 
116 



Losa. 
7 



Comparative Loss 
Inflicted. 

.29 
1. 00 



».u 



US 



tJt 






SJ* 



AKCUS 




PSUCdM 



On the Ocean 255 

■ Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war 
this is the least creditable to the Americans. The 
odds in force, it is true, were against the Argus, 
about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but this is neither 
enough to account for the loss inflicted, being as 10 
to 3, nor for her surrendering when she had been 
so little ill used. It was not even as if her antago- 
nist had been an unusually fine vessel of her class. 
The Pelican did not do so well as either the Frolic 
previously, or the Reindeer afterward, though per- 
haps rather better than the Avon, Penguin, or Pea- 
cock. With a comparatively unmanageable antag- 
onist, in smooth water, she ought to have sunk her 
in three quarters of an hour. But the Pelican's not 
having done particularly well merely makes the con- 
duct of the Americans look worse; it is just the 
reverse of the Chesapeake's case, where, paying the 
highest credit to the British, we still thought the 
fight no discredit to us. Here we can indulge no 
such reflection. The officers did well^ but the crew 
did not. Cooper says : "The enemy was so much 
heavier that it may be doubted whether the Argus 
would have captured her antagonist under any ordi- 
nary circumstances." This I doubt; such a crew 
as the Wasp's or Hornet's probably would have 
been successful. The trouble with the guns of the 
Argus was not so much that they were too small, as 
that they did not hit ; and this seems all the more in- 
comprehensible when it is rernembered that Captain 
Allen is the very man to whom Commodore Decatur, 
in his official letter, attributed the skilful gun-prac- 



iS^ Naval War of 1812 

tice of the crew of the frigate United States. Cooper 
says that the powder was bad; and it has also been 
said that the men of the Argus were over- fatigued 
and were drunk, in which case they ought not to 
have been brought into action. Besides unskil ful- 
ness, there is another very serious count against the 
crew. Had the Pelican been some distance from 
the Argus, and in a position where she could pour 
in her fire with perfect impunity to herself, when the 
surrender took place, it would have been more justi- 
fiable. But, on the contrary, the vessels were 
touching, and the British boarded just as the colors 
were hauled down ; it was certainly very disgraceful 
that the Americans did not rally to repel them, for 
they had still four fifths of their number absolutely 
untouched. They certainly ought to have suc- 
ceeded, for boarding is a difficult and dangerous ex- 
periment ; and if they had repulsed their antagonists 
they might in turn have carried the Pelican. So that, 
in summing up the merits of this action, it is fair 
to say that both sides showed skilful seamanship and 
unskilful gimnery; that the British fought bravely 
and that the Americans did not. 

It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, 
where a weaker American sloop was taken by a 
stronger British one, with two or three others, where 
both the comparative force and the result were re- 
versed. Comparing it, therefore, with the actions 
between the Hornet and Peacock (British), the 
Wasp and Avon, and the Peacock (American) and 
Epervier, we get four actions, in one of which, the 



On the Ocean 257 

first-named, the British Avere victorious, and in the 
other three the Americans. 



Comparative 
Force. 


Comparative 
Loss Inflicted. 


Per cent 
Loss. 


Pelican {British) I.oo 
/Irgw (American) .82 


2.00 
.29 


j06 

•23 


Hornet (American) I.oo 
Peacock (British) .83 


1,00 
.07 


.02 
.81 


Wasp (American) I.oo 
Avon (British) .80 


I.OO 

.07 


.02 

•33 


Peacock (American) I.oo 
Epervier (British) .8i 


I.oo 

.08 


.01 

.20 



It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the 
superiority of the force on the side of the victor was 
each time about the same. The Argus made a much 
more effectual resistance than did either the Peacock, 
Avon, or Epervier, while the Pelican did her work in 
poorer form than either of the victorious American 
sloops ; and, on the other hand, the resistance of the 
Argus did not by any means show as much bravery 
as was shown in the defence of the Peacock or Avon, 
although rather more than in the case of the 
Epervier. 

This is the only action of the war where it is 
almost impossible to find out the cause of the inferi- 
ority of the beaten crew. In almost all other cases 
we find that one crew had been carefully drilled, and 
so proved superior to a less-trained antagonist; but 
it is incredible that the man, to whose exertions 
when first lieutenant of the States Commodore De- 
catur ascribes the skilfulness of that ship's men, 
should have neglected to train his own crew; and 
this had the reputation of being composed of a fine 



258 Naval War of 1812 

set of men. Bad powder would not account for the 
surrender of the Argus when so little damaged. It 
really seems as if the men must have been drunk or 
over-fatigued, as has been so often asserted. Of 
course drunkenness would account for the defeat, al- 
though not in the least altering its humiliating 
character. 

"Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument ; still 
it may be as well to call to mind here two engage- 
ments in which British sloops suffered much more 
discreditable defeats than the Argus did. The fig- 
ures are taken from James ; as given by the French 
historians they make even a worse showing for the 
British. 

A short time before our war the British brig 
Carnation, 18, had been captured, by boarding, by 
the French brig Palimire, 16, and the British brig 
Alacrity, 18, had been captured, also by boarding, 
by the corvette Aheille, 20. 

The following was the comparative force, etc., 
of the combatants : 

Weight Metal No. Crew Loss 

Carnation 262 217 40 

Palinure 174 100 20 

Alacrity 262 100 18 

Abeille 260 130 19 

In spite of the pride the British take in their hand- 
to-hand prowess both of these ships were captured 
by boarding. TheCarnation was captured by a much 
smaller force, instead of by a much larger one, as 
in the case of the Argus; and if the Argus gave up 
before she had suffered greatly, the Alacrity sur- 



On the Ocean 259 

rendered when she had suffered still less. French 
historians asserted that the capture of the two brigs 
proved that "French valor could conquer British 
courage"; and a similar opinion was very com- 
placently expressed by British historians after the 
defeat of the Argus. All that- the three combats 
really "proved" was, that in eight encounters be- 
tween British and American sloops the Americans 
were defeated once; and in a far greater number 
of encounters between French and British sloops the 
British were defeated twice. No one pretends that 
either navy was invincible; the question is, which 
side averaged best? 

At the opening of the war we possessed several 
small brigs; these had originally been fast, handy 
little schooners, each armed with 12 long sixes, and 
with a crew of 60 men. As such they were effective 
enough ; but when afterward changed into brigs, 
each armed with a couple of extra guns, and given 
40 additional men, they became too slow to run, 
without becoming strong enough to fight. They 
carried far too many guns and men for their size, 
and not enough to give them a chance with any 
respectable opponent; and they were almost all 
ignominiously captured. The single exception was 
the brig Enterprise. She managed to escape capture, 
owing chiefly to good luck, and once fought a vic- 
torious engagement, thanks to the fact that the 
British possessed a class of vessels even worse than 
our own. She was kept near the land and finally 
took up her station off the eastern coast, where she 



26o Naval War of 1812 

did good service in chasing away or capturing the 
various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick privateers, 
which were smaller and less formidable vessels than 
the privateers of the United States, and not calcu- 
lated for fighting. 

By crowding gims into her bridle-ports, and over- 
manning herself, the Enterprise, now under the com- 
mand of Lieutenant William Burrows, mounted 14 
eighteen-pound carronades and 2 long 9's, with 102 
men. On September 5th, while standing along shore 
near Penguin Point, a few miles to the eastward of 
Portland, Me., she discovered, at anchor inside, a 
man-of-war brig^* which proved to be H.M.S. 
Boxer, Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carronades, 
eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with but 66 
men aboard, 12 of her crew being absent.^^ The 
Boxer at once hoisted three British ensigns and 
bore up for the Enterprise, then standing in on the 
starboard tack; but when the two brigs were still 
4 miles apart it fell calm. At midday a breeze 
sprang up from the southwest, giving the American 
the weather-gage, but the latter manoeuvred for 
some time to windward to try the comparative rates 
of sailing of the vessels. At 3 p.m. Lieutenant Bur- 
rows hoisted three ensigns, shortened sail and edged 
away toward the enemy, who came gallantly on. 

5^ Letter from Lieutenant Edward R. McCall to Commo- 
dore Hull, September 5, 1813. 

" James, "Naval Occurrences," 264. The American ac- 
counts give the Boxer 104 men, on very insufficient grounds. 
Similarly, James gives the Enterprise 123 men. Each side 
will be considered authority for its own force and loss. 



On the Ocean 261 

Captain Blyth had nailed his colors to the mast, 
telling his men they should never be struck while 
he had life in his body.^^ Both crews cheered 
loudly as they neared each other, and at 3.15, the 
two brigs being on the starboard tack not half pistol- 
shot apart, they opened fire, the American using the 
port, and the English the starboard, battery. Both 
broadsides were very destructive, each of the com- 
manders falling at the very beginning of the action. 
Captain Blyth was struck by an eighteen-pound shot 
while he was standing on the quarter-deck ; it passed 
completely through his body, shattering his left arm 
and killing him on the spot. The command, there- 
upon, devolved on Lieutenant David McCreery. At 
almost the same time his equally gallant antagonist 
fell. Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his 
men, laid hold of a gun-tackle fall to help the crew 
of a carronade run out the gun ; in doing so he raised 
one leg against the bulwark, when a canister shot 
struck his thigh, glancing into his body and inflict- 
ing a fearful wound.^^ In spite of the pain he re- 
fused to be carried below, and lay on the deck, crying 
out that the colors must never be struck. Lieu- 
tenant Edward McCall now took command. At 3.30 
the Enterprise ranged ahead, rounded to on the star- 
board tack, and raked the Boxer with the starboard 
giins. At 3.35 the Boxer lost her main-topmast 
and top sail yard, but her crew still kept up the fight 
bravely with the exception of four men who deserted 

56 "Naval Chronicle," xxxii, p. 462. 
" Cooper, "Naval History," ii, p. 259. 



262 Naval War of 1812 

their quarters and were afterward court-martialed 
for cowardice. ^^ The Enterprise now set her fore- 
sail and took position on the enemy's starboard bow, 
delivering raking fires; and at 3.45 the latter sur- 
rendered, when entirely unmanageable and defence- 
less. Lieutenant Burrows would not go below until 
he had received the sword of his adversary, when 
he exclaimed, "I am satisfied, I die contented." 

Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the 
Boxer, which had been hulled repeatedly, had three 
eighteen-pound shot through her foremast, her top- 



'nmute 




gallant forecastle almost cut away, and several of 
her guns dismounted. Three men were killed and 
seventeen wounded, four mortally. The Enterprise 
had been hulled by one round and many grape ; one 
18-pound ball had gone through her foremast, and 
another through her main-mast, and she was much 
cut up aloft. Two of her men were killed and ten 
wounded, two of them (her commander and Mid- 
shipman Kervin Waters) mortally. The British 
court-martial attributed the defeat of the Boxer 
"to a superiority in the enemy's force, principally 
in the number of men, as well as to a greater degree 

58 Minutes of court-martial held aboard H.M.S. Surprise, 
January 8, 1814. 



On the Ocean 263 

of skill in the direction of her fire, and to the de- 
structive effects of the first broadside."' But the 
main element was the superiority in force, the 
difference in loss being very nearly proportional to 
it; both sides fought with equal bravery and equal 
skill. This fact was appreciated by the victors, for 
at a naval dinner given in New York shortly after- 
ward, one of the toasts offered was : "The crew of the 
Boxer; enemies by law, but by gallantry brothers." 
The two commanders were both buried at Portland, 
w4th all the honors of war. The conduct of Lieu- 
tenant Burrows needs no comment. He was an 
officer greatly beloved and respected in the service. 
Captain Blyth, on the other side, had not only shown 
himself on many occasions to be a man of distin- 
guished personal courage, but was equally noted 
for his gentleness and humanity. He had been one 
of Captain Lawrence's pall-bearers, and but a month 
previous to his death had received a public note of 
thanks from an American colonel for an act of 
great kindness and courtesy.^^ 

The Enter prise, under Lieut.-Com. Renshaw, now 
cruised off the southern coast, where she made sev- 
eral captures. One of them was a heavy British 
privateer, the Mars, of 14 long nines and 75 men, 
which struck after receiving a broadside that killed 
and wounded 4 of her crew. The Enterprise was 
chased by frigates on several occasions ; being once 
forced to throw overboard all her guns but two, and 
escaping only by a shift in the wind. Afterward, 

5« "Naval Chronicle," xxxii, 466. 



264 Naval War of 18 12 

as she was unfit to cruise, she was made a guardship 
at Charlestown ; for the same reason the Boxer was 
not purchased into the service. 

On October 4th some volunteers from the New- 
port flotilla captured, by boarding, the British priva- 
teer Dart,^^ after a short struggle, in which two of 
the assailants were wounded and several of the 
privateersmen, including the first officer, were killed. 

On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in 
command of the President, sailed again from Provi- 
dence, Rhode Island. On the 25th, in lat. 19° N. 
and long. 35° W., the President, during the night, 
fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the 
headmost fired at her, when she made off. These 
were thought to be British, but were in reality the 
two French 40-gun frigates Nymphe and Meduse, 
one month out of Brest. After this little encounter 
Rodgers headed toward the Barbadoes, and cruised 
to windward of them. 

On the whole the ocean warfare of 18 13 was de- 
cidedly in favor of the British, except during the 
first few months. The Hornefs fight with the 
Peacock was an action similar to those that took 
place in 181 2, and the cruise of Porter was unique 
in our annals, both for the audacity with which it 
was planned, and the success with which it was 
executed. Even later in the year the Argus and the 
President made bold cruises in sight of the British 
coasts, the former working great havoc among the 
merchantmen. But by that time the tide had 

*° Letter of Mr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1813. 



On the Ocean 16^ 

turned strongly in favor of our enemies. From the 
beginning of summer the blockade was kept up so 
strictly that it was with difficulty any of our vessels 
broke through it; they were either chased back or 
captured. In the three actions that occurred, the 
British showed themselves markedly superior in two, 
and in the third the combatants fought equally well, 
the result being fairly decided by the fuller crew 
and slightly heavier metal of the Enterprise. The 
gunboats, to which many had looked for harbor de- 
fence, proved nearly useless, and were beaten off 
with ease whenever they made an attack. 

The lessons taught by all this were the usual ones. 
Lawrence's victory in the Hornet showed the superi- 
ority of a properly trained crew to one that had not 
been properly trained; and his defeat in the Chesa- 
peake pointed exactly the same way, demonstrating 
in addition the folly of taking a raw levy out of port, 
and, before they have had the slightest chance of 
getting seasoned, pitting them against skilled veter- 
ans. The victory of the Enterprise showed the wis- 
dom of having the odds in men and metal in our 
favor, when our antagonist was otherwise our equal ; 
it proved, what hardly needed proving, that, when- 
ever possible, a ship should be so constructed as to 
be superior in force to the foes it would be likely to 
meet. As far as the capture of the Argus showed 
anything, it was the advantage of heavy metal and 
the absolute need that a crew should fight with pluck. 
The failure of the gimboats ought to have taught the 
lesson (though it did not) that too great economy in 

Vol. IX.— 12 



o.(i(> Naval War of 1812 

providing the means of defence may prove very ex- 
pensive in the end, and that good officers and men 
are powerless when embarked in worthless vessels. 
A similar point was emphasized by the strictness of 
the blockade, and the great inconvenience it caused ; 
namely, that we ought to have had ships powerful 
enough to break it. 

We had certainly lost ground during this year; 
fortunately we regained it during the next two. 

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN 

Name Guns Tonnage 

Peacock 20 477 

Boxer 14 181 

Highflyer 6 g6 

40 754 

AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEH 



Nane. 


Cwo. 


Cluiopeake 

Argus 

Vif<r 


SO 

ao 
10 




80 I7I1 

VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED 

Nmm. Rie. Cvns. Toniaco. Where Built. Cost. 



RattUsnaJu Brig 14 378 Medford, P*. $18,000 

Alligator SchV 4 80 

A^ Sloop 3 56 2,600 



PRIZES MADE. 




Naae of SMp^ Wo. 


«<Prix«t. 


PredtUnt 


»3 


Congress 


1 


Chesapeake 


Essex 


14 


ifomet 


% 


Argus 


2< 


Small crcfi 


1% 



79 



CHAPTER VI 

1813 

ON THE LAKES 

Ontario — Comparison of the rival squadrons — Chauncy 
takes York and Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at Sack- 
ett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake — Chauncy 
sails — Yeo's partial victory off Niagara — Indecisive ac- 
tion off the Genesee — Chauncy's partial victory off Bur- 
lington, which gives him the command of the lake — 
Erie — Perry's success in creating a fleet — His victory 
— Champlain — Loss of the Growler and Eagle — Sum- 
mary 

ONTARIO 

WINTER had almost completely stopped prep- 
arations on the American side. Bad 
weather put an end to all communication with Al- 
bany or New York, and so prevented the transit of 
stores, implements, etc. It was worse still with the 
men, for the cold and exposure so thinned them out 
that the new arrivals could at first barely keep the 
ranks filled. It was moreover, exceedingly difficult 
to get seamen to come from the coast to serve on 
the lakes, where work was hard, sickness prevailed, 
and there was no chance of prize-money. The 
British government had the great advantage of being 
able to move its sailors where it pleased, while in 
the American service at that period the men en- 
listed for particular ships, and the only way to get 

(267) 



268 Naval War of 1812 

them for the lakes at all was by inducing portions 
of crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither.^ 
However, the work went on in spite of interruptions. 
Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely 
owing to the energy and capacity of the head builder, 
Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as much as any naval 
officer in giving us an effective force on Ontario) 
the Madison was equipped, a small despatch sloop. 
The Lady of the Lake, prepared, and a large new 
ship, the General Pike, 28, begun, to mount 13 gims 
in each broadside and 2 on pivots. 

Meanwhile Sir George Prevost, the British com- 
mander in Canada, had ordered two 24-gun ships 
to be built and they were begun; but he committed 
the mistake of having one laid down in Kingston 
and the other in York, at the opposite end of the 
lake. Earle, the Canadian commodore, having proved 
himself so incompetent, was removed; and in the 
beginning of May Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo 
arrived, to act as commander-in-chief of the naval 
forces, together with four captains, eight lieutenants, 
twenty-four midshipmen, and about 450 picked sea- 

' Cooper, ii, 357. One of James' most comical misstate- 
ments is that on the lakes the American sailors were all 
"picked men." On p. 367, for example, in speaking of the 
battle of Lake Erie he says: "Commodore Perry had picked 
crews to all his vessels." As a matter of fact Perry had 
once sent in his resignation solely on account of the very 
poor quality of his crews, and had with difficulty been in- 
duced to withdraw it. Perry's crews were of hardly average 
excellence, but then the average American sailor was a very 
good specimen. 



On the Lakes 269 

men, sent out by the home government especially for 
service on the Canada lakes.^ 

The comparative force of the two fleets or squad- 
rons it is hard to estimate. I have already spoken 
of the difficulty in finding out v^hat guns were 
mounted on any given ship at a particular time, and 
it is even more perplexing with the crews. A 
schooner would make one cruise with but thirty 
hands; on the next it would appear with fifty, a 
number of militia having volunteered as marines. 
Finding the militia rather a nuisance, they would be 
sent ashore, and on her third cruise the schooner 
would substitute half a dozen frontier seamen 
in their place. It was the same with the larger 
vessels. The Madison might at one time have her 
full complement of 200 men; a month's sickness 
would ensue, and she would sail with but 150 ef- 
fectives. The Pike's crew of 300 men at one time 
would shortly afterward be less by a third in conse- 
quence of a draft of sailors being sent to the upper 
lakes. So it is almost impossible to be perfectly 
accurate; but, making a comparison of the various 
authorities from Lieutenant Emmons to James, the 
following tables of the forces may be given as very 
nearly correct. In broadside force I count every 
pivot gun, and half of those that were not on pivots. 

CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON 

Broadside 
Name Rig Tonnage Crew Metal, lbs. Armament 

P'^e ship 87s 300 360 28 lone 24's 

Madison " 593 200 364 24 short 32's 

Oneida brig 243 100 17a 16 " 24's 

' James, vi, 353. 



270 



Naval War of 18 12 



Name. 

Scvurgr, 
Con^unt, 

TamfikAm, 
fulia, 

Ontario, 

Fair A mm imt tt. 
Pert, 

Ladtf o/tfra i,«ke, 
'4 



Rig. Tonnnage.Crew. 

$ct)oDn«r ifs 50 

* ItO i9 

•• 8» 40 

" g6 4» 

8a ,s 

" 81 IS 

S3 JS 

53 30 

50 »S 

I' •' 

89 IS 

a.S7« e8o 



Broadside 

Metal; lbs. Armament. 

34 



80 

80 

S6 

6a 

44 
44 

44 

36 

84 

a4 

9 

>f3» 



" 3» 
Sskort is'a 
long ja 
" i» 

" 6'» 

: >' 
•• I* 

: »» 
" i» 

: »» 

" la 

: " 

" fa 
" 24 

: •♦ 

•4 

" g 

iia 



This is not materially different from James' ac- 
count (p. 356), which gives Chatmcy 114 guns, 
1,193 men, and 2,121 tons. The Lady of the Lake, 
however, was never intended for anything but a 
despatch boat, and the Scourge and Hamilton were 
both lost before Chauncy actually came into col- 
lision with Yeo. Deducting these, in order to com- 
pare the two foes, Chauncy had left 11 vessels of 
2,265 tons, with 865 men and 92 guns throwing a 
broadside of 1,230 pounds. 





TEO'S SQUADRON. 






NMae. 


Rig. Tonnage, Crev. 


Broaddde 

Metal; lbs. ARoameat. 


Wolft^ 


diip 6|7 tio 


39« 


4 


' t long 34 
8 "* .i'9 
4 short 68'» 


RcytU George, 


* |(a coo 


360 




3 long i8'» 

2 6hort 68'» 

16 •• fa'* 



On the Lakes 271 



Name. 




Rig. Tonnage. Crew. 


Meta 


Melville, 




Ms t79 


MO 


ato 


Moira, 




t6j 


lOO 


'S3 


Sydnty Sm 


lU, 


Ech«on«r m6 


60 


17a 


Beresford, 




aj 


r^ 


87 



Broadside 

s. Armament. 



f. 



t Ions >8'* 
It short si's 

» long 9'» 
11 (hort -34'* 

2 long i:'8 
10 short ji's 

I long t4 

« " 9 
6 short i8's 



6 (^094 770 i,S74 «» 

This differs but slightly from James, who gives 
Yeo 92 guns throwing a broadside of 1,374 pounds, 
but only 717 men. As the evidence in the court- 
martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official 
accounts (on both sides) of Macdonough's victory, 
convict him of very much underrating the force in 
men of the British on Erie and Champlain, it can 
be safely assumed that he has underestimated the 
force in men on Lake Ontario. By comparing the 
tonnage he gives to Barclay's and Downie's squad- 
rons with what it really was, we can correct his 
account of Yeo's tonnage. 

The above figures would apparently make the 
two squadrons about equal, Chauncy having 95 
men more, and throwing at a broadside 144 pounds 
shot less than his antagonist. But the figures do 
not by any means show all the truth. The Ameri- 
cans greatly excelled in the number and calibre of 
their long guns. Compared thus, they threw at 
one discharge 694 pounds of long-gun metal and 
536 pounds of carronade metal; while the British 
only threw from their long guns 180 pounds, and 
from their carronades 1,194. This unequal dis- 
tribution of metal was very much in favor of the 



272 Naval War of 1812 

Americans. Nor was this all. The Pike, with her 
15 long 24's in battery, was an overmatch for any 
one of the enemy's vessels, and bore the same rela- 
tion to them that the Confiance, at a later date, did 
to Macdonough's squadron. She should certainly 
have been a match for the Wolfe and Melville to- 
gether, and the Madison and Oneida for the Royal 
George and Sydney Smith. In fact, the three heavy 
American vessels ought to have been an overmatch 
for the four heaviest of the British squadron, al- 
though these possessed the nominal superiority. 
And in ordinary cases the eight remaining Ameri- 
can gun-vessels would certainly seem to be an over- 
match for the two British schooners, but it is just 
here that the difficulty of comparing the forces comes 
in. When the water was very smooth and the wind 
light, the long 32's and 24's of the Americans could 
play havoc with the British schooners, at a distance 
which would render the carronades of the latter 
useless. But the latter were built for war, pos- 
sessed quarters and were good cruisers, while 
Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels, with- 
out quarters, crank, and so loaded down with heavy 
metal that whenever it blew at all hard they could 
with difficulty be kept from upsetting, and ceased 
to be capable even of defending themselves. When 
Sir James Yeo captured two of them he would not 
let them cruise with his other vessels at all, but 
sent them back to act as gimboats, in which capacity 
they were serving when recaptured; this is a toler- 
able test of their value compared to their opponents. 



On the Lakes 273 

Another disadvantage that Chauncy had to contend 
with, was the difference in the speed of the various 
vessels. The Pike and Madison were fast, weatherly 
ships ; but the Oneida was a perfect slug, even going 
free and could hardly be persuaded to beat to wind- 
ward at all. In this respect Yeo was much better 
off; his six ships were regular men-of-war with 
quarters, all of them seaworthy, and fast enough 
to be able to act with uniformity, and not needing 
to pay much regard to the weather. His force 
could act as a unit; but Chauncy's could not. 
Enough wind to make a good working breeze for 
his larger vessels put all his smaller ones hors de 
combat; and in weather that suited the latter, the 
former could not move about at all. When speed 
became necessary the two ships left the brig hope- 
lessly behind, and either had to do without her, or 
else perhaps let the critical moment slip by while 
waiting for her to come up. Some of the schooners 
sailed quite as slowly; and finally it was found out 
that the only way to get all the vessels into action 
at once was to have one half the fleet tow the other 
half. It was certainly difficult to keep the com- 
mand of the lake when, if it came on to blow, the 
commodore had to put into port under penalty of 
seeing a quarter of his fleet founder before his 
eyes. These conflicting considerations render it 
hard to pass judgment; but on the whole it would 
seem as if Chauncy was the superior in force, for 
even if his schooners were not counted, his three 
square-rigged vessels were at least a match for 



274 Naval War of 1812 

the four square-rigged British vessels, and the two 
British schooners would not have counted very 
much in such a conflict. In calm weather he was 
certainly the superior. This only solves one of the 
points in which the official letters of the two com- 
manders differ : after every meeting each one in- 
sists that he was inferior in force, that the weather 
suited his antagonist, and that the latter ran away, 
and got the worst of it; all of which will be con- 
sidered further on. 

In order to settle toward which side the balance 
of success inclined, we must remember that there 
were two things the combatants were trying to 
do, viz. : 

(i) To damage the enemy directly by capturing 
or destroying his vessels. This was the only object 
we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers, but 
on the lakes it was subordinated to : 

(2) Getting the control of the lake, by which 
invaluable assistance could be rendered to the army. 
The most thorough way of accomplishing this of 
course was by destroying the enemy's squadron; 
but it could also be done by building ships too pow- 
erful for him to face or by beating him in some 
engagement which, although not destroying hiy 
fleet, would force him to go into port. If one side 
was stronger, then the weaker party by skilful 
manoeuvring might baffle the foe, and rest satisfied 
by keeping the sovereignty of the lake disputed ; for, 
as long as one squadron was not undisputed master 
it could not be of much assistance in transporting 



On the Lakes 275 

troops, attacking forts, or otherwise helping the 
miHtary. 

In 1813 the Americans gained the first point by 
being the first to begin operations. They were 
building a new ship, afterward the Pike, at Sackett's 
Harbor; the British were building two new ships, 
each about two-thirds the force of the Pike, one at 
Toronto (then called York), one at Kingston. Be- 
fore these were built the two fleets were just on 
a par; the destruction of the Pike would give the 
British the supremacy; the destruction of either of 
the British ships, provided the Pike were saved, 
would give the Americans the supremacy. Both 
sides had already committed faults. The Ameri- 
cans had left Sackett's Harbor so poorly defended 
and garrisoned that it invited attack, while the 
British had fortified Kingston very strongly, but 
had done little for York, and, moreover, ought not 
to have divided their forces by building ships in 
different places. 

Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for 
service on April 19th, and on the 25th he made sail 
with the Madison, Lieutenant-commander Elliott, 
floating his own broad pennant, Oneida, Lieutenant 
McPherson, Scourge, Mr. Osgood, Tompkins, Lieu- 
tenant Brown, Conquest, Lieutenant Pettigrew, 
Growler, Mr. Mix, Julia, Mr. Trant, Asp, Lieuten- 
ant Smith, Pert, Lieutenant Adams, American, Lieu- 
tenant Chauncy, Ontario, Mr. Stevens, Lady of the 
Lake, Mr. Hinn, and Raven, transport, having on 
board General Dearborn and 1,700 troops, to at- 



276 Naval War of 1812 

tack York, which was garrisoned by about 700 
British regulars and Canadian militia under Major- 
General Sheafe. The new 24-gun ship was almost 
completed, and the Gloucester lo-gun brig was in 
port; the guns of both vessels were used in defence 
of the port. The fleet arrived before York early 
on April 27th, and the debarkation began at about 
8 A.M. The schooners beat up to the fort under a 
heavy cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from 
their long guns; while the troops went ashore un- 
der the command of Brigadier-General Pike. The 
boats were blown to leeward by the strong east 
wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but landed 
the troops under cover of the grape thrown by the 
vessels. The schooners now beat up to within a 
quarter of a mile from the principal work, and 
opened heavily upon it, while at the same time 
General Pike and the main body of the troops on 
shore moved forward to the assault, using their 
bayonets only. The British regulars and Canadian 
militia, outnumbered three to one (including the 
American sailors) and with no very good defensive 
works, of course had to give way, having lost heav- 
ily, especially from the fire of the vessels. An ex- 
plosion immediately afterward killed or wounded 
250 of the victors, including General Pike. The 
Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed, includ- 
ing midshipmen Hatfield and Thompson, and 8 
wounded ;3 and of the army,^ 14 killed and 32 

3 Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1813. 

^ James, "Military Occurrences" (London, 1818) i, p. 151. 



On the Lakes 277 

wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killed and 180 
wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. The 
British regulars lost 130 killed and wounded, includ- 
ing 40 by the explosion;^ together with 50 Cana- 
dians and Indians, making a total of 180, besides 
290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship was burned, her 
guns taken away, and the Gloucester sailed back to 
Sackett's Harbor with the fleet. Many military and 
naval stores were destroyed, and much more shipped 
to the Harbor. The great fault that the British had 
committed was in letting the defences of so impor- 
tant a place remain so poor, and the force in it so 
small. It was impossible to resist very long when 
Pike's troops were landed, and the fleet in position. 
On the other hand, the Americans did the work in 
good style; the schooners were finely handled, fir- 
ing with great precision and completely covering the 
troops, who, in turn, were disembarked and brought 
into action very handsomely. 

After being detained in York a week by bad 
weather the squadron got out, and for the next 
fortnight was employed in conveying troops and 
stores to General Dearborn. Then it was determined 
to m.ake an attack on Fort George, where the British 
General Vincent was stationed with from 1,000^ to 
1,800'' regulars, 600 militia, and about 100 Indians. 
The American troops numbered about 4,500, prac- 
tically under the command of Colonel Scott. On 

« Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812," p. 581. The 
accounts vary somewhat. 
* James, "Military Occurrences," i. p. 151. 
' Lossing, 596. 



278 Naval War of 1812 

May 26th Commodore Chauncy carefully recon- 
noitred the place to be attacked, and in the night 
made soundings along the coast, and laid buoys 
so as to direct the small vessels, who were to do the 
fighting. At 3 A.M. on the 27th the signal was made 
to weigh, the heavy land artillery being on the 
Madison, and the other troops on the Oneida, the 
Lady of the Lake, and in batteaux, many of which 
had been captured at York. The Julia, Growler, and 
Ontario moved in and attacked a battery near the 
lighthouse, opening a cross-fire which silenced it. 
The troops were to be disembarked further along the 
lake, near a battery of one long 24, managed by 
Canadian militia. The Conquest and Tompkins 
swept in under fire to this battery, and in 10 minutes 
killed or drove off the artillerymen, who left the 
gun spiked, and then opened on the British. "The 
American ships with their heavy discharges of round 
and grape too well succeeded in thinning the British 
ranks." ^ Meanwhile the troop-boats, under Cap- 
tain Perry and Colonel Scott dashed in, completely 
covered by a heavy fire of grape directed point- 
blank at the foe by the Hamilton, Scourge, and Asp. 
"The fire from the American shipping committed 
dreadful havoc among the British, and rendered 
their efforts to oppose the landing of the enemy in- 
effectual." » Colonel Scott's troops, thus protected, 
made good their landing and met the British regu- 
lars; but the latter were so terribly cut up by the 
tremendous discharges of grape and canister from 

8 James, "Military Occurrences," i, p. 151- ' ^^- cit' 



On the Lakes 279 

the schooners, that in spite of their gallantry and 
discipline they were obliged to retreat, blowing up 
and abandoning the fort. One sailor was killed and 
two wounded;^*' seventeen soldiers were killed and 
forty-five wounded ;^^ making the total American 
loss sixty-five. Of the British regulars 52 were 
killed, 44 wounded and 262 "wounded and miss- 
ing," ^2 in addition to about forty Canadians and 
Indians hors de combat and nearly 500 militia cap- 
tured; so that in this very brilliant affair the as- 
sailants suffered hardly more than a fifth of the loss 
in killed and wounded that the assailed did; 
which must be attributed to the care with which 
Chauncy had reconnoitred the ground and prepared 
the attack, the excellent handling of the schooners, 
and the exceedingly destructive nature of their fire. 
The British batteries were very weak, and, more- 
over, badly served. Their regular troops fought ex- 
cellently, it was impossible for them to stand against 
the fire of the schooners, which should have been 
engaged by the batteries on shore; and they were 
too weak in numbers to permit the American army 
to land and then attack it when away from the 
boats. The Americans were greatly superior in 
force, and yet deserve very much credit for achiev- 
ing their object so quickly, with such slight loss 
to themselves, and at such a heavy cost to the foe. 
The effect of the victory was most important, the 

'° Letter of Commodore Chauncy, May 29, 1813. 
" Letter of General Dearborn, May 27, 1813. 
^^ Letter of Brig.-Gen. Vincent, May 28, 1813. 



aSo Naval War of 1812 

British evacuating the whole Niagara frontier, and 
leaving the river in complete possession of the Amer- 
icans for the time being. This offered the opportu- 
nity for despatching Captain Perry up above the 
falls to take out one captured brig (the Caledonia) 
and four purchased schooners, which had been lying 
in the river unable to get past the British batteries 
into Lake Erie. These five vessels were now carried 
into that lake, being tracked up against the current 
by oxen, to become a most important addition to the 
American force upon it. 

While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at 
the west end of the lake the Wolfe, 24, was launched 
and equipped at Kingston, making the British force 
on the lake superior to that of the Americans. Im- 
mediately Sir George Prevost and Sir James Lucas 
Yeo, the commanders-in-chief of the land and water 
forces in the Canadas, decided to strike a blow at 
Sackett's Harbor and destroy the General Pike, 28, 
thus securing to themselves the superiority for the 
rest of the season. Accordingly, they embarked 
on May 27th, in the Wolfe, Royal George, Moira, 
Prince Regent, Simcoe, and Seneca, with a large 
number of gunboats, barges, and batteaux; and on 
the next day saw and attacked a brigade of 19 
boats transporting troops to Sackett's Harbor, un- 
der command of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelve 
boats were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in 
them captured; but Lieutenant Aspinwall and 100 
men succeeded in reaching the Harbor, bringing 
up the total number of regulars there to 500 men, 



On the Lakes 281 

General Brown having been summoned to take the 
chief command. About 400 miHtia also came in, 
but were of no earthly service. There were, how- 
ever, 200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel Mills, 
who could be relied on. The defences were mis- 
erably inadequate, consisting of a battery of one lon^ 
gun, and a block-house. 

On the 29th Sir George Prevost and 800 regulars 
landed, being covered by the gunboats under Sir 
James Lucas Yeo. The American militia fled at 
once, but the regulars and volunteers held their 
ground in and around the block-house. "At this 
point the further energies of the [British] troops 
became unavailing. The [American] block-house 
and stockade could not be carried by assault nor re- 
duced by field-pieces, had we been provided with 
them ; the fire of the gunboats proved insufficient to 
attain that end; light and adverse winds continued, 
and our larger vessels were still far off." ^^ The 
British re-embarked precipitately. The American 
loss amounted to 23 killed and 114 wounded; that 
of the British 52 killed and 211 wounded,^^ most 
of the latter being taken prisoners. During the fight 
some of the frightened Americans set fire to the 
storehouses, the Pike and Gloucester; the former 
were consumed, but the flames were extinguished 
before they did any damage to either of the vessels. 
This attack differed especially from those on Fort 
George and York, in that the attacking force was 

" Letter of Adj. -Gen. Baynes, May 30. 1813. 
>* James, "Military Occurrences," p. i73- 



282 Naval War of 1812 

relatively much weaker; still it ought to have been 
successful. But Sir George could not compare as 
a leader with Col. Scott or Gen, Pike ; and Sir James 
did not handle the gunboats by any means as well 
as the Americans did their schooners in similar at- 
tacks. The admirers of Sir James lay the blame on 
Sir George, and vice versa; but in reality neither 
seems to have done particularly well. At any rate 
the affair was the reverse of creditable to the British. 
The British squadron returned to Kingston, and 
Chauncy, having heard that they were out, came 
down the lake and went into port about June 2d. 
So far the Americans had had all the success, and 
had controlled the lake; but now Yeo's force was 
too formidable to be encountered until the Pike was 
built, and the supremacy passed undisputed into his 
hands, while Chauncy lay in Sackett's Harbor. Of 
course with the Pike soon to be built, Yeo's uncon- 
tested superiority could be of but short duration; 
but he used his time most actively. He sailed from 
Kingston on the 3d of June, to co-operate with the 
British army at the head of the lake, and intercept 
all supplies going to tHe Americans. On the 8th 
he discovered a small camp of the latter near Forty 
Mile Creek, and attacked it with the Beresford, 
Sydney Smith, and gunboats, obliging the Ameri- 
cans to leave their camp, while their equipages, pro- 
visions, stores, and batteaux fell into the hands of 
the British, whose troops occupied the post, thus as- 
sisting in the series of engagements which ended in 
the humiliating repulse of General Wilkinson's ex- 



On the Lakes 283 

pedition into Canada. On the 13th two schooners 
and some boats bringing supplies to the Americans 
were captured, and on the i6th a depot of provisions 
at the Genesee River shared the same fate. On the 
19th a party of British soldiers were landed by the 
fleet at Great Sodas, and took off 600 barrels of 
flour. Yeo then returned to Kingston, where he 
anchored on the 27th, having done good service in 
assisting the land forces.^ ^ As a small compensa- 
tion, on the 1 8th of the same month the Lady of the 
Lake, Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy, captured off Presqu' 
Isle the British schooner Lady Murray, containing 
I ensign, 15 soldiers, and 6 sailors, together with 
stores and ammunition.^^ 

During the early part of July neither squadron 
put out in force ; although on the first of the month 
Commodore Yeo made an abortive attempt to sur- 
prise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it when it 
was discovered. Meanwhile the Americans were 
building a new schooner, the Sylph, and the for- 
midable corvette Pike was made ready to sail by 
July 2 1 St. On the same day the entire American 
squadron, or fleet, sailed up to the head of the lake, 
and reached Niagara on the 27th. Here Col. Scott 
and some of his regulars were embarked, and on the 
30th a descent was made upon York, where 1 1 trans- 
ports were destroyed, 5 cannon, a quantity of flour, 
and some ammunition carried off, and the barracks 

" Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June 29, 

1813. 

'" Letter of Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy to Com. Chauncy, 
June i8, 1813. 



284 Naval War of 1812 

burned. On the 3d of August the troops were dis- 
embarked at the Niagara, and 1 1 1 officers and men 
were sent up to join Perry on Lake Erie. As this 
left the squadron much deranged 150 militia were 
subsequently lent it by General Boyd, but they 
proved of no assistance (beyond swelling the num- 
ber of men Yeo captured in the Growler and Julia 
from 70 individuals to 80), and were again landed. 
Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from 
Kingston on Aug. 2d, and on the 7th the two fleets 
for the first time came in sight of one another, the 
Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, the British 
six miles to windward, in the W.N.W. Chauncy's 
squadron contained one corvette, one ship sloop, one 
brig sloop, and ten schooners, manned by about 965 
men, and throwing at a broadside, 1,390 lbs. of shot, 
nearly 800 of which were from long guns. Yeo's 
included two ship sloops, two brig sloops, and two 
schooners, manned by 770 men, and throwing at a 
broadside 1,374 lbs., but 180 being from long guns. 
But Yeo's vessels were all built with bulwarks, while 
ten of Chauncy's had none ; and, moreover, his ves- 
sels could all sail and manoeuvre together, while, as 
already remarked, one half of the American fleet 
spent a large part of its time towing the other half. 
The Pike would at ordinary range be a match for the 
Wolfe and Melville together; yet in actual weight 
of metal she threw less than the former ship alone. 
In calm weather the long guns of the American 
schooners gave them a great advantage; in rough 
weather they could not be used at all. Still, on the 



On the Lakes 285 

whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo was ad- 
vancing to attack a superior fleet. 

All through the day of the 7th the wind blew 
light and variable, and the two squadrons went 
through a series of manceuvres, nominally to bring 
on an action. As each side flatly contradicts the 
other it is hard to tell precisely what the manoeu- 
vres were; each captain says the other avoided him 
and that he made all sail in chase. At any rate it 
was just the weather for Chauncy to engage in. 

That night the wind came out squally ; and about 
I A.M. on the morning of the 8th a hea\7 gust struck 
the Hamilton and Scourge, forcing them to careen 
over till the heavy guns broke loose, and they foun- 
dered, but 16 men escaping, — which accident did not 
open a particularly cheerful prospect to the remain- 
der of the schooners. Qiauncy's force was, by this 
accident, reduced to a numerical equality with Yeo's, 
having perhaps a hundred more men,^' and throw- 
ing 144 lbs. less shot at a broadside. All through 
the two succeeding days the same manoeuvring went 
on; the question as to which avoided the fight is 
simply one of veracity between the two commanders, 

" This estimate as to men is a mere balancing: of proba- 
bilities. If James underestimates the British force on On- 
tario as much as he has on Erie and Champlain. Yeo had as 
many men as his opponent. Chauncy, in one of his letters 
(preserved with the other manuscript letters in the ^'aval 
Archives), says: "I enclose the muster-rolls of all my ships." 
but I have not been able to find them, and in any event the 
complements were continually changing completely. The 
point is not important, as each side certainly had plenty of 
men on this occasion. 



286 Naval War of 1812 

and of course each side, to the end of time, will be- 
lieve its own leader. But it is not of the least con- 
sequence, as neither accomplished anything. 

On the loth the same tedious evolutions were 
continued, but at 7 p.m. the two squadrons were 
tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward, the 
breeze being fresh from the S.W. Commodore 
Chauncy formed his force in two lines on the port 
tack, while Commodore Yeo approached from be- 
hind and to windward, in single column, on the 
same tack. Commodore Chauncy's weather line 
was formed of the Julia, Growler, Pert, Ash, On- 
tario, and American, in that order, and the lee line 
of the Pike, Oneida, Madison, Tompkins, and Con- 
quest. Chauncy formed his weather line of the 
smaller vessels, directing them, when the British 
should engage, to edge away and form to leeward 
of the second line, expecting that Sir James would 
follow them down. At 1 1 the weather line opened 
fire at very long range; at 11. 15 it was returned, 
and the action became general and harmless; at 
11.30 the weather line bore up and passed to lee- 
ward, except the Julia and Growler, which tacked. 
The British ships kept their luff and cut off the two 
that had tacked, while Commodore Chauncy's lee 
line "edged away two points, to lead the enemy 
down, not only to engage him to more advantage, 
but to lead him from the Jidia and Growler.'" ^^ Of 
course the enemy did not come down, and the Julia 
and Growler were not saved. Yeo kept on till he 

^^ Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy, Aug. 13, 1813. 



On the Lakes 



287 



had cut off the two schooners, fired an ineffectual 
broadside at the other ships, and tacked after the 
Growler and Julia. Then, when too late, Chauncy 




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tacked also, and stood after him. The schooners, 
meanwhile, kept clawing to windward till they were 
overtaken, and, after making a fruitless effort to run 



288 Naval War of 1812 

the g-antlet through the enemy's squadron by put- 
ting before the wind, were captured. Yeo's account 
is simple : "Came within gunshot of Pike and Madi- 
son, when they immediately bore up, fired their 
stern chase gnns, and made all sail for Niagara, 
leaving two of their schooners astern, which we 
captured." ^^ The British had acted faultlessly, and 
the honor and" profit gained by the encounter rest- 
ed entirely with them. On the contrary, neither 
Chauncy nor his subordinates showed to advantage. 
Cooper says that the line of battle was "singu- 
larly well adapted to draw the enemy down," and 
"admirable for its advantages and ingenuity." In 
the first place it is an open question whether the 
enemy needed drawing down; on this occasion he 
advanced boldly enough. The formation may have 
been ingenious, but it was the reverse of advanta- 
geous. It would have been far better to have had the 
strongest vessels to windward, and the schooners, 
with their long guns, to leeward, where they would 
not be exposed to capture by any accident happen- 
ing to them. Moreover, it does not speak well for 
the discipline of the fleet, that two commanders 
should have directly disobeyed orders. And when 
the two schooners did tack, and it was evident that 
Sir James would cut them off, it was an extraordi- 
nary proceeding for Chauncy to "edge away two 
points ... to lead the enemy from the Grozvler and 
Julia." It is certainly a novel principle, that if part 
of a force is surrounded the true way to rescue 

>9 Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, Aug. lo, 1813. 



On the Lakes 289 

it is to run away with the balance, in hopes that the 
enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, 
Sir James would have been placed between two fires, 
and it would have been impossible for him to cap- 
ture the schooners. As it was, the British com- 
mander had attacked a superior force in weather 
that had just suited it, and yet had captured two 
of its vessels without suffering any injury beyond 
a few shot holes in the sails. The action, however, 
was in no way decisive. All next day, the nth, the 
fleets were in sight of one another, the British to 
windward, but neither attempted to renew the en- 
gagement. The wind grew heavier, and the vil- 
lanous little American schooners showed such strong 
tendencies to upset, that two had to run into Ni- 
agara Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran 
down the lake to Sacketfs Harbor, which he reached 
on the 13th, provisioned his squadron for five weeks, 
and that same evening proceeded up the lake again. 
The advantage in this action had been entirely 
with the British, but it is simply nonsense to say, 
as one British historian does, that "on Lake Ontario, 
therefore, we at last secured a decisive predomi- 
nance, which we maintained until the end of the 
war." 2^ This "decisive" battle left the Americans 
just as much in command of the lake as the British ; 

s" "History of the British Navy," by Charles Duke Yonge 
(London, 1866), iii, p. 24. It is apparently not a work of any 
authority, but I quote it as showing probably the general 
feeling of British writers about the action and its results, 
which can only proceed from extreme partisanship and igno- 
rance of the subject. 

Vol. IX.— 13 



290 Naval War of 1812 

and even this very questionable "predominance" 
lasted but six weeks, after which the British squad- 
ron was blockaded in port most of the time. The 
action has a parallel in that fought on the 22d of 
July, 1805, by Sir Robert Calder's fleet of 15 sail 
of the line against the Franco-Spanish fleet of 20 
sail of the line, under M. Villeneuve.^^ The two 
fleets engaged in a fog, and the English captured 
two ships, when both sides drew off, and remained 
in sight of each other the next day without either re- 
newing the action. "A victory therefore it was that 
Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a 'decisive' 
nor a 'brilliant' victory." 22 This is exactly the criti- 
cism that should be passed on Sir James Lucas 
Yeo's action of the loth of August. 

From the 13th of August to the loth of Septem- 
ber both fleets were on the lake most of the time, 
each commodore stoutly maintaining that he was 
chasing the other; and each expressing in his let- 
ters his surprise and disgust that his opponent should 
be afraid of meeting him "though so much superior 
in force." The facts are of course difficult to get at, 
but it seems pretty evident that Yeo was determined 
to engage in heavy, and Chauncy in light, weather ; 

21 "Batailles Navales de la France," par O. Troude, iii, 352. 
It seems rather ridiculous to compare these lake actions, 
fought between small flotillas, with the gigantic contests 
which the huge fleets of Europe waged in contending for 
the supremacy of the ocean ; but the difference is one of de- 
gree and not of kind, and they serve well enough for pur- 
poses of illustration or comparison. 

"^ James' "Naval History," iv, 14. 



On the Lakes 291 

and that the party to leeward generally made off. 
The Americans had been reinforced by the Sylph, 
schooner, of 300 tons and 70 men, carrying four 
long 32's on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoreti- 
cally her armament would make her formidable ; but 
practically her guns were so crowded as to be of 
little use, and the next year she was converted into 
a brig, mounting 24-pound carronades. 

On the nth of September a partial engagement, 
at very long range, in light weather, occurred near 
the mouth of the Genesee River ; the Americans suf- 
fered no loss whatever, while the British had one 
midshipman and three seamen killed and seven 
wounded, and afterward ran into Amherst Bay. 
One of their brigs, the Melville, received a shot so 
far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns 
had to be run in on one side and out on the other. 
Chauncy describes it as a running fight of 3>4 hours, 
the enemy then escaping into Amherst Bay.^^ James 
(p. 38) says that "at sunset a breeze sprang up 
from the westward, when Sir James steered for the 
American fleet; but the American commodore 
avoided a close action, and thus the affair ended." 
This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness; 
his account is supposed to be taken from Commo- 
dore Yeo's letter ,24 which says : "At sunset a breeze 
sprang up from the westward, when I steered for 
the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy 
could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged to 

2' Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 13, 1813. 
"^^ Letter to Admiral Warren, Sept. 12, 1813. 



292 Naval War of 1812 

meet us on equal terms. This, however, he carefully 
avoided doing." In other words, Yeo did 7iot steer 
for but away from Chauncy. Both sides admit that 
Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, and it is only 
a question as to whether Chauncy followed him or 
not. Of course in such light weather Chauncy's long 
guns gave him a great advantage. He had present 
10 vessels; the Pike, Madison, Oneida, Sylph, Tomp- 
kins, Conquest, Ontario, Pert, American, and Asp, 
throwing 1,288 lbs. of shot, with a total of 98 
guns. Yeo had 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 
1,374 lbs. Nevertheless, Chauncy told but part of 
the truth in writing as he did : "I was much disap- 
pointed at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was 
so much superior in point of force, both in guns and 
men, having upward of 20 guns more than we have, 
and heaves a greater weight of shot." His inferi- 
ority in long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvan- 
tage in such a very light wind; but in his letter 
he makes a marvelous admission of how little able 
he was to make good use of even what he had. He 
says : "I found it impossible to bring them to close 
action. We remained in this mortifying situation 
five hours, having only six guns in all the squadron 
that would reach the enemy (not a carronade being 
fired)." Now according to James himself ("Naval 
Occurrences," p. 297) he had in his squadron 2 long 
24's, 13 long i8's, 2 long 12's, and 3 long 9's, and, 
in a fight of five hours, at very long range, in smooth 
water, it was a proof of culpable incompetency on 
his part that he did not think of doing what Elliott 



On the Lakes 293 

and Perry did in similar circumstances on Lake Erie 
— substitute all his long guns for some of the car- 
ronades on the engaged side. Chauncy could place 
in broadside 7 long 32's, 18 long 24's, 4 long 12's, 
8 long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long guns, throw- 
ing 752 lbs. of shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing 
333 lbs. of shot. The odds were thus more than two 
to one against the British in any case ; and their com- 
mander's lack of resource made them still greater. 
But it proved a mere skirmish, with no decisive re- 
sults. 

The two squadrons did not come in contact again 
till on the 28th, in York Bay. The Americans had 
the weather-gage, the wind being fresh from the 
east. Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake, 
while Chauncy steered directly for his centre. When 
the squadrons were still a league apart the British 
formed on the port tack, with their heavy vessels 
ahead; the Americans got on the same tack and 
edged down toward them, the Pike ahead, towing 
the Asp; the Tompkins, under Lieut. Bolton Finch, 
next; the Madison next, being much retarded by 
having a schooner in tow ; then the Sylph, with an ^ 
other schooner in tow, the Oneida, and the two other 
schooners. The British, fearing their sternmost ves- 
sels would be cut off, at 12.10 came round on the 
starboard tack, beginning with the Wolfe, Commo- 
dore Yeo, and Royal George, Captain William 
Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of the 
line. They opened with their starboard gims as 
soon as they came round. When the Pike was 



294 Naval War of 1812 

abeam of the Wolfe, which was past the centre of 
the British line, the Americans bore up in succes- 
sion for their centre. 

The Madison was far back, and so was the Sylph, 
neither having cast off their tows; so the whole 
brunt of the action fell on the Pike, Asp, and Tomp- 
kins. The latter kept up a most gallant and spirited 



fMtPJSiftS j>s^ 




I 



4SP 

PJKB 




fire till her foremast was shot away. But already 
the Pike had shot away the Wolfe's maintopmast 
and main yard, and inflicted so heavy a loss upon 
her that Commodore Yeo, not very heroically, put 
dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas he 
could on her forward spars, and she ran completely 
past all her own vessels, who of course crowded sail 



On the Lakes 295 

after her. The retreat of the commodore was most 
ably covered by the Royal George, under Captain 
Mulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British 
officer on the lake. He luffed up across the com- 
modore's stern, and delivered broadsides in a man- 
ner that won the admiration even of his foes. The 
Madison and Sylph, having" the schooners in tow, 
could not overtake the British ships, though the 
Sylph opened a distant fire; the Pike kept on after 
them, but did not cast off the Asp, and so did not 
gain; and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished;^^ 
when the enemy were running into the entirely un- 
defended port of Burlington Bay, whence escape 
would have been impossible. The Tompkins had 
lost her foremast, and the Pike her foretopgallant 
mast, with her bowsprit and mainmast wounded; 
and of her crew five men were killed or wounded, 
almost all by the guns of the Royal George. These 
were the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's fire, 
but the Pike's starboard bow-chaser burst, killing 
or wounding 22 men, besides blowing up the topgal- 
lant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun could not 
be used. Among the British ships, the Wolfe lost 
her maintopmast, mizzentopmast, and mainyard, and 
the Royal George her foretopmast; both suffered 
a heavy loss in killed and wounded, according to 
the report of the British officers captured in the 
transports a few days afterward. 

As already mentioned, the British authorities no 
longer published accounts of their defeats, so Com- 

" Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Sept. 28, 1813. 



296 Naval War of 1812 

modore Yeo's report on the action was not made 
public. Brenton merely alludes to it as follows (Vol. 
II, p. 503) : "The action of the 28th of September, 
181 3, in which Sir James Yeo in the Wolfe had his 
main and mizzentopmasts shot away, and was 
obliged to put before the wind, gave Mulcaster an 
opportunity of displaying a trait of valor and sea- 
manship which elicited the admiration of friends 
and foes, when he gallantly placed himself between 
his disabled commodore and a superior enemy." 
James speaks in the vaguest terms. He first says, 
"Commodore Chauncy, having the weather-gage, 
kept his favorite distance," which he did because 
Commodore Yeo fled so fast that he could not be 
overtaken; then James mentions the injuries the 
Wolfe received, and says that "it was these and not, 
as Mr. Clark says, 'a manoeuvre of the commodore's' 
that threw the British in confusion." In other 
words, it was the commodore's shot and not his ma- 
noeuvring that threw the British into confusion — 
a very futile distinction. Next he says that "Com- 
modore Chauncy would not venture within car- 
ronade range," whereas he zuas within carronade 
range of the Wolfe and Royal George, but the lat- 
ter did not wait for the Madison and Oneida to get 
within range with their carronades. The rest of his 
article is taken up with exposing the absurdities of 
some of the American writings, miscalled histories, 
which appeared at the close of the war. His criti- 
cisms on these are very just, but afford a funny in- 
stance of the pot calling the kettle back. This much 



On the Lakes 297 

is clear, that the British were beaten and forced to 
flee, when but part of the American force was en- 
gaged. But in good weather the American force 
was so superior that being beaten would have been 
no disgrace to Yeo, had it not been for the claims 
advanced both by himself and his friends, that on 
the whole he was victorious over Chauncy. The 
Wolfe made anything but an obstinate fight, leav- 
ing almost all the work to the gallant Mulcaster, in 
the Royal George, who shares with Lieutenant Finch 
of the Tompkins most of the glory of the day. The 
battle, if such it may be called, completely estab- 
lished Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo spending most of 
the remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston. 
So Chauncy gained a victory which established his 
control over the lakes; and, moreover, he gained it 
by fighting in succession, almost single-handed, the 
two heaviest ships of the enemy. But gaining the 
victory was only what should have been expected 
from a superior force. The question is. Did 
Chauncy use his force to the best advantage? And 
it can not be said that he did. When the enemy bore 
up it was a great mistake not to cast off the schooners 
which were being towed. They were small craft, 
not of much use in the fight, and they entirely pre- 
vented the Madison from taking any part in the con- 
test, and kept the Sylph at a great distance; and by 
keeping the Asp in tow the Pike, which sailed faster 
than any of Yeo's ships, was distanced by them. 
Had she left the Asp behind and run in to engage 
the Royal George she could have mastered, or at 



298 Naval War of 1812 

any rate disabled, her; and had the swift Madison 
cast off her tow she could also have taken an effective 
part in the engagement. If the Pike could put the 
British to flight almost single-handed, how much 
more could she not have done when assisted by the 
Madison and Oneida f The cardinal error, however, 
was made in discontinuing the chase. The British 
were in an almost open roadstead, from which they 
could not possibly escape. Commodore Chauncy 
was afraid that the wind would come up to blow a 
gale, and both fleets would be thrown ashore; and, 
moreover, he expected to be able to keep a watch 
over the enemy, and to attack him at a more suit- 
able time. But he utterly failed in this last; and 
had the American squadron cast off their tows and 
gone boldly in,they certainly ought to have been able 
to destroy or capture the entire British force before 
a gale could blow up. Chauncy would have done 
well to keep in mind the old adage, so peculiarly 
applicable to naval affairs : "L'audace ! toujours I'au- 
dace! et encore I'audace!" Whether the fault was 
his or that of his subordinates, it is certain that while 
the victory of the 28th of September definitely set- 
tled the supremacy of the lake in favor of the Amer- 
icans, yet this victory was by no means so decided 
as it should have been, taking into account his su- 
periority in force and advantage in position, and the 
somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe. 

Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted 
till the evening of the 31st. There was no longer 
any apprehension of molestation from the British, 



On the Lakes 299 

so the troop transports were sent down the lake by 
themselves, while the squadron remained to watch 
Yeo. On Oct. 2d he was chased, but escaped by his 
better saihng; and next day false information in- 
duced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded him and 
passed down the lake, and he accordingly made 
sail in the direction of his supposed flight. On the 
5th, at 3 P.M., while near the False Ducks, seven ves- 
sels were made out ahead, which proved to be Brit- 
ish gunboats, engaged in transporting troops. AH 
sail was made after them ; one was burned, another 
escaped, and five were captured, the Mary, Drum- 
mond, Lady Gore, Conflance, and Hamilton,^^—the 
two latter being the rechristened Itdia and Growler. 
Each gun-vessel had from one to three guns, and 
they had aboard in all 264 men, including seven 
naval (three royal and four provincial) and ten mili- 
tary officers. These prisoners stated that in the ac- 
tion of the 28th the Wolfe and Royal George had 
lost very heavily. 

After this Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded 
there by Chauncy for most of the time; on Nov. 
loth he came out and was at once chased back into 
port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for the rest of the 
season entirely undisturbed. Accordingly, Chauncy 
was able to convert his small schooners into trans- 
ports. On the 17th these transports were used to 
convey 1,100 men of the army of General Harrison 
from the mouth of the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, 
while Chauncy blockaded Yeo in Kingston. The 
^^ Letter of Commodore Chauncy. Oct. 8, 1813. 



300 Naval War of 1812 

duty of transporting troops and stores went on till 
the 27th, when everything had been accomplished; 
and a day or two afterward navigation closed. 

As between the Americans and British, the suc- 
cess of the season was greatly in favor of the for- 
mer. They had uncontested control over the lake 
from April 19th to June 3d, and from Sept. 28th to 
Nov. 29th, in all 107 days; while their foes only 
held it from June 3d to July 21st, or for 48 days; 
and from that date to Sept. 28th, for 69 days, the 
two sides were contending for the mastery. York 
and Fort George had been taken, while the attack 
on Sackett's Harbor was repulsed. The Americans 
lost but two schooners, both of which were recap- 
tured ; while the British had one 24-gun ship nearly 
ready for launching destroyed, and one lo-gun 
brig taken, and the loss inflicted upon each 
other in transports, gunboats, storehouses, stores, 
etc., was greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy's 
fleet, moreover, was able to co-operate with the army 
for over twice the length of time Yeo's could (107 
days to 48). 

It is more difficult to decide between the respective 
merits of the two commanders. We had shown so 
much more energy than the Anglo-Canadians :t,hat 
at the beginning of the year we had overtaken thv-m 
in the building race, and the two fleets were about 
equally formidable. The Madison and Oneida were 
not quite a match for the Royal George and Sydney 
Smith (opposing 12 32-pound and 8 24-pound car- 
ronades to 2 long i8's, i long 12, i 68-pound and 13 



On the Lakes 301 

32-pound carronades) ; and our ten-gun-schooners 
would hardly be considered very much of an over- 
match for the Melville, Moira, and Beresford. Had 
Sir James Yeo been as bold and energetic as Bar- 
clay or Mulcaster he would certainly not have per- 
mitted the Americans, when the forces were so equal, 
to hold uncontested sway over the lake, and by re- 
ducing Fort George, to cause disaster to the Brit- 
ish land forces. It would certainly have been better 
to risk a battle with equal forces than to wait till 
each fleet received an additional ship, which ren- 
dered Chauncy's squadron the superior by just about 
the superiority of the Pike to the Wolfe. Again, 
Yeo did not do particularly well in the repulse be- 
fore Sackett's Harbor; in the skirmish off Genesee 
River he showed a marked lack of resource ; and in 
the action of ihe 28th of September (popularly 
called the "Burlington Races" from the celerity of 
his retreat) he evinced an amount of caution that 
verged toward timidity, in allowing the entire brunt 
of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in the Royal 
George, a weaker ship than the Wolfe. On the other 
hand, he gave able co-operation to the army while he 
possessed control of the lake ; he made a most gallant 
and sr cessful attack on a superior force on the loth 
of Aagust; and for six weeks subsequently by skil- 
ful manoeuvring he prevented this same superior 
force from acquiring the uncontested mastery. 
It was no disgrace to be subsequently block- 
aded; but it is very ludicrous in his admirers to 
think that he came out first best. 



302 Naval War of 1812 

Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assistance 
to the army all the while that he had control of the 
water; his attacks on York and Fort George were 
managed with consummate skill and success, and on 
the 28th of September he practically defeated the 
opposing force with his own ship alone. Neverthe- 
less he can by no means be said to have done the best 
he could with the materials he had. His stronger 
fleet was kept two months in check by a weaker 
British fleet. When he first encountered the foe, 
on August loth, he ought to have inflicted such a 
check upon him as would at least have confined him 
to port and given the Americans immediate supe- 
riority on the lake; instead of which he suffered a 
mortifying, although not at all disastrous, defeat, 
which allowed the British to contest the supremacy 
with him for six weeks longer. On the 28th of Sep- 
tember, when he only gained a rather barren victory, 
it was nothing* but excessive caution that prevented 
him from utterly destroying his foe. Had Perry 
on that day commanded the American fleet there 
would have been hardly a British ship left on On- 
tario. Chauncy was an average commander; and 
the balance of success inclined to the side of the 
Americans only because they showed greater energy 
and skill in shipbuilding, the crews and commanders 
on both sides being very nearly equal. 



On the Lakes 303 

LAKE ERIE 

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed com- 
mand of Erie and the upper lakes, acting under 
Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy he at 
once began creating a naval force which should be 
able to contend successfully with the foe. As al- 
ready said, the latter in the beginning had exclusive 
control of Lake Erie; but the Americans had cap- 
tured the Caledonia, brig, and purchased three 
schooners, afterward named the Somers, Tigress, 
and Ohio, and a sloop, the Trippe. These at first 
were blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall 
of Fort George and retreat of the British forces, 
Captain Perry was enabled to get them out, tracking 
them up against the current by the most arduous 
labor. They ran up to Presque Isle (now called 
Erie), where two 20-gun brigs were being con- 
structed under the directions of the indefatigable 
captain. Three other schooners, the Ariel, Scorpion, 
and Porcupine, were also built. 

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but 
had a bar on which there was less than seven feet 
of water. Hitherto this had prevented the enemy 
from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs 
from getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay 
had been appointed commander of the British forces 
on Lake Erie ; and he was having built at Amherst- 
burg a 20-gun ship. Meanwhile he blockaded 
Perry's force, and as the brigs could not cross the 
bar with their guns in, or except in smooth water, 
they of course could not do so in his presence. He 



304 Naval War of 18 12 

kept a close blockade for some time; but on the 2d 
of Aug-ust he disappeared. Perry at once hurried 
forward everything; and on the 4th, at 2 p.m., one 
brig-, the Lawrence, was towed to that point of the 
bar where the water was deepest. Her guns were 
whipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig 
got over the bar by a hastily improvised "camel." 

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were 
hauled alongside, and the work of lifting the brig 
proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of massive 
timber had been run through the forward and after 
ports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's 
edge, the ends of the timbers were blocked up, sup- 
ported by these floating foundations. The plugs 
were now put in the scows, and the water was 
pumped out of them. By this process the brig was 
lifted quite two feet, though when she was got on 
the bar it was found that she still drew too much 
water. It became necessary, in consequence, to 
cover up everything, sink the scows anew, and block 
up the timbers afresh. This duty occupied the 
whole night." ^^ 

Just as the Lawrence had passed the bar, at 8 a.m. 
on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too late ; Cap- 
tain Barclay exchanged a few shots with the 
schooners and then drew off. The Niagara crossed 
without difficulty. There were still not enough men 
to man the vessels, but a draft arrived from On- 
tario, and many of the frontiersmen volunteered, 
while soldiers also were sent on board. The squad- 

" Cooper, ii, 389. Perry's letter of Aug. 5th is very brief. 



On the Lakes 305 

ron sailed on the i8th in pursuit of the enemy, whose 
ship was now ready. After cruising about some 
time the Ohio was sent down the lake, and the 
other ships went into Put-in-Bay. On the 9th of 
September Captain Barclay put out from Amherst- 
burg, being so short of provisions that he felt com- 
pelled to risk an action with the superior force 
opposed. On the loth of September his squadron 
was discovered from the masthead of the Lawrence 
in the northwest. Before going into details of the 
action we will examine the force of the two squad- 
rons, as the accounts vary considerably. 

The tonnage of the British ships, as already stated, 
we know exactly, they having been all carefully 
appraised and measured by the builder, Mr. Henry 
Eckford, and two sea-captains. We also know the 
dimensions of the American ships. The Lawrence 
and Niagara measured 480 tons apiece. The Cale- 
donia, brig, was about the size of the Hunter, or 
180 tons. The Tigress, Somers, and Scorpion were 
subsequently captured by the foe and were then 
said to measure, respectively, 96, 94, and 86 tons; 
in which case they were larger than similar boats 
on Lake Ontario. The Ariel was about the size of 
the Hamilton; the Porcupine and Trippe about the 
size of the Asp and Pert. As for the guns, Captain 
Barclay in his letter gives a complete account of 
those on board his squadron. He has also given a 
complete account of the American guns, which is 
most accurate, and, if anything, underestimates 
them. At least Emmons in his "History" gives the 



3o6 Naval War of 1812 

Trippe a long 32, while Barclay says she had only 
a long 24; and Lossing in his "Field-Book" says 
(but I do not know on what authority) that the 
Caledonia had 3 long 24's, while Barclay gives her 
2 long 24's and one 32-pound carronade; and that 
the Somers had two long 32's, while Barclay gives 
her one long 32 and one 24-pound carronade. I 
shall take Barclay's account, which corresponds with 
that of Emmons, the only difference being that Em- 
mons puts a 24-pounder on the Scorpion and a 32 on 
the Trippe, while Barclay reverses this. I shall also 
follow Emmons in giving the Scorpion a 32-pound 
carronade instead of a 24. 

It is more difficult to give the strength of the re- 
spective crews. James says the Americans had 580, 
all "picked men." They were just as much picked 
men as Barclay's were, and no more; that is, the 
ships had "scratch" crews. Lieutenant Emmons. , f 
gives Perry 490 men ; and Lossing says he "had - ' n^ 
upon his muster-roll 490 names." In Vol. XIV, p. 
566, of the American State Papers, is a list of the 
prize-moneys owing to each man (or to the survi- 
vors of the killed), which gives a grand total of 
532 men, including 136 on the Lawrence and 155 on 
the Niagara, 45 of whom were volunteers — frontiers- 
men. Deducting these we get 487 men, which is 
pretty near Lieutenant Emmons' 490. Possibly 
Lieutenant Emmons did not include these volun- 
teers; and it may be that some of the men whose 
names were down on the prize list had been so sick 
that they were left on shore. Thus Lieutenant Yar- 



On the Lakes 307 

nail testified before a Court of Inquiry in 181 5, that 
there were but 131 men and boys of every descrip- 
tion on board the Lawrence in the action; and the 
Niagara was said to have had but 140. Lieutenant 
Yarnall also said that "but 103 men on board the 
Lawrence were fit for duty" ; as Captain Perry in his 
letter said that 31 were unfit for duty, this would 
make a total of 134. So I shall follow the prize- 
money list; at any rate the difference in number is 
so slight as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men whose 
names the list gives, 45 were volunteers, or lands- 
men, from among the surrounding inhabitants ; 1 58 
were marines or soldiers (I do not know which, 
as the list gives marines, soldiers, and privates, and 
it is impossible to tell which of the two former heads 
include the last) ; and 329 were officers, seamen, 
cooks, pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries. Of 
the total number, there were on the day of action, 
according to Perry's report, 116 men unfit for duty, 
including 31 on board the Lawrence, 28 on board 
the Niagara, and 57 on the small vessels. 

All the later American writers put the number of 
men in Barclay's fleet precisely at "502," but I have 
not been able to find out the original authority. 
James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 289) says the Brit- 
ish had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Cana- 
dians, and 210 soldiers. But the letter of Adjutant- 
General E. Bayne, Nov. 24, 181 3, states that there 
were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's squadron, of 
whom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, and the balance 
(178) captured; and James himself on a previous 



3o8 Naval War of 1812 

page (284) states that there were 102 Canadians 
on Barclay's vessels, not counting the Detroit, and 
we know that Barclay originally joined the squad- 
ron with 19 sailors from the Ontario fleet, and that 
subsequently 50 sailors came up from the Dover. 
James gives at the end of his "Naval Occurrences" 
some extracts from the court-martial held on Cap- 
tain Barclay. Lieut. Thomas Stokes, of the Queen 
Charlotte, there testified that he had on board "be- 
tween 120 and 130 men, officers and all together," of 
whom "16 came up from the Dover three days be- 
fore." James, on p. 284, says her crew already 
consisted of no men; adding these 16 gives us 126 
(almost exactly "between 120 and 130"). Lieu- 
tenant Stokes also testified that the Detroit had more 
men on account of being a larger and heavier ves- 
sel; to give her 150 is perfectly safe, as her heavier 
guns and larger size would at least need 24 men 
more than the Queen Charlotte. James gives the 
Lady Prevost 76, Hunter 39, Little Belt, 15, and 
Cliippeway 13 men; Canadians and soldiers, a total 
of 143 ; supposing that the number of British sailors 
placed on them was proportional to the amount 
placed on board the Queen Charlotte, we could add 
21. This would make a grand total of 440 men, 
which must certainly be near the truth. This num- 
ber is corroborated otherwise: General Bayne, as 
already quoted, says that there were aboard 250 
soldiers, of whom y2 were killed or wounded. Bar- 
clay reports a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must 
therefore have been sailors or Canadians, and if the 



On the Lakes 309 

loss suffered by these bore the same proportion to 
their whole number as in the case of the soldiers, 
there ought to have been 219 sailors and Canadians, 
making in all 469 men. It can thus be said with 
certainty that there were between 440 and 490 men 
aboard, and I shall take the former number, though 
I have no doubt that this is too small. But it is 
not a point of very much importance, as the battle 
was fought largely at long range, where the number 
of men, provided there were plenty to handle the 
sails and guns, did not much matter. The following 
statement of the comparative force must therefore be 
very nearly accurate: 



Total Crew Broad- 
Name. Rig. Tons. Crevr. fit for side ; Armament. 

Duty. lbs. 

Lawrence, brig 480 .36 .05 300 j ,^ St'a^X 

/^ia^ara. " 480 .55 .27 300 .^g fe'jX 

CaUdon^a, "^ .80 sz] 80 j J ^-S^ ^f ^ 

Ariel, schooner 112 36 48 4 long 12's 

Scorpion. " 86 35 64 { J short 32 

Somers. " ,4 30' '«^ ^6 j | long^ 24 

Porcupine. " 83 25 32 i long 32 

Tigress, " 96 27 32 1 " 32 

Trippe, sloop 60 35J 24 1 " 24 

9 vessels, 1,671 532 (416) 936 lbs. 



During the action, however, the Lazvrence and 
Niagara each fought a long 12 instead of one 
of the carronades on the engaged side, making a 
broadside of 896 lbs., 288 lbs. being from long 
guns. 



3IO Naval War of 1812 

BAKCLAY'S SQUADRON. 











Broadside ; 




tfame. 


Rig. 


Ions. 


Crew. 


lbs. 


Armament 
' 1 long 18 
a " a4'a 


• 










6 " la'a 


Detroit, 


ship 


490 


•so 


u8 

189 


8 " 9'» 
I short 24 

I " '8 
1 long It 


Cuteu Charlotte, " 


400 


126 


a " 9'8 












14 short 24'* 












I long 9 
a •' 6's 
10 short la's 


Lady Prevost, 


schoooer 


ajo 


86 


7S 






















' 4 long 6's 


Hunter, 


trig 


j8o 


4S 


30 


a " 4'» 
a •• 2'8 
2 short la'a 


Chippeway, 


schooner 


70 


»S 


9 


1 long g 


Little Belt, 


sloop 


90 


■8 


18 


1 " 12 

a « 6'8 



6 vessels, im^ 440 459 lbs. 

These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 
lbs., of which 195 were from long guns. 

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun 
metal was therefore nearly as three is to two, and 
in corronade metal greater than two to one. The 
chief fault to be found in the various American ac- 
counts is that they sedulously conceal the compara- 
tive weight of metal, while carefully specifying the 
number of gims. Thus, Lossing says : "Barclay had 
35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed greatly 
the advantage in action at a distance"; which he 
certainly did not. The tonnage of the fleets is not 
so very important; the above tables are probably 
pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, impossible to 
tell exactly the number of men in the two crews. 
Barclay almost certainly had more than the 440 
men I have given him, but in all likelihood some 
of them were unfit for duty, and the number of his 



On the Lakes 311 

effectives was most probably somewhat less than 
Perry's. As the battle was fought in such smooth 
water, and part of the time at long range, this, as 
already said, does not much matter. The Niagara 
might be considered a match for the Detroit, and 
the Lawrence and Caledonia for the five other Brit- 
ish vessels; so the Americans were certainly very 
greatly superior in force. 

At daylight on Sept. loth Barclay's squadron was 
discovered in the N.W., and Perry at once got under 
way; the wind soon shifted to the N.E., giving us 
the weather-gage, the breeze being very light. Bar- 
clay lay to in a close column, heading to the S.W. 
in the following order : Chippeway, Master's Mate J. 
Campbell ; Detroit, Captain R. H. Barclay ; Hunter, 
Lieutenant G. Bignell ; Queen Charlotte, Captain R. 
Finnis ; Lady Prevost, Lieutenant Edward Buchan ; 
and Little Belt, by whom commanded is not said. 
Perry came down with the wind on his port beam, 
and made the attack in column ahead, obliquely. 
First in order came the Ariel, Lieut. John H. Packet, 
and Scorpion, Sailing-Master Stephen Champlin, 
both being on the weather bow of the Lawrence, 
Captain O. H. Perry; next came the Caledonia, 
Lieut. Daniel Turner ; Niagara, Captain Jesse D. El- 
liott; Somers, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conklin; Por- 
cupine, Acting-Master George Serrat; Tigress, 
Sailing-Master Thomas C Almy, and Trippe, Lieu- 
tenant Thomas Holdup.^^ 

'* The accounts of the two commanders tally almost ex- 
actly. Barclay's letter is a model of its kind for candor and 



312 Naval War of 1812 

As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the 
American squadron approached the enemy, Perry's 
stragghng line formed an angle of about fifteen de- 
grees with the more compact one of his foes. At 
11.45 the Detroit opened the action by a shot from 
her long 24, which fell short; at 11.50 she fired a 
second which went crashing through the Lawrence, 
and was replied to by the Scorpion's long 32. At 
11.55 the Lawrence, having shifted her port bow- 
chaser, opened with both the long 12's, and at me- 
ridian began with her carronades, but the shot from 
the latter all fell short. At the same time the action 
became general on both sides, though the rearmost 
American vessels were almost beyond the range of 
their own guns, and quite out of range of the guns 
of their antagonists. Meanwhile the Lawrence was 
already suffering considerably as she bore down on 
the enemy. It was twenty minutes before she suc- 
ceeded in getting within good carronade range, and 
during that time the action at the head of the line 
was between the long guns of the Chippeway and 
Detroit, throwing 123 pounds, and those of the 
Scorpion, Ariel, and Lawrence, throwing 104 

generosity. Letter of Captain R. H. Barclay to Sir James, 
Sept. 2, 1813; of Lieutenant Inglis to Captain Barclay, Sept. 
loth; of Captain Perry to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 
loth and Sept. 13th, and to General Harrison, Sept. nth and 
Sept. 13th. I have relied mainly on Lossing's "Field-Book 
of the War of 1812" (especially for the diagrams furnished 
him by Commodore Champlin), on Commander Ward's 
"Naval Tactics," p. 76, and on Cooper's "Naval History." 
Extracts from the court-martial on Captain Barclay are 
given in James' "Naval Occurrences," Ixxxiii. 



On the Lakes 313 

pounds. As the enemy's fire was directed almost 
exclusively at the Lawrence she suffered a great 
deal. The Caledonia, Niagara, and Somers were 
meanwhile engaging, at long range, the Hunter and 
Queen Charlotte, opposing from their long guns 
96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, 
while from a distance the three other American gun- 
vessels engaged the Prevost and Little Belt. By 
12.20 the Lazvrence had worked down to close quar- 
ters, and at 12.30 the action was going on with 
great fury between her and her antagonists, within 
canister range. The raw and inexperienced Ameri- 
can crews committed the same fault the British so 
often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their 
carronades. In consequence, that of the Scorpion 
upset down the hatchway in the middle of the action, 
and the sides of the Detroit were dotted with marks 
from shot that did not penetrate. One of the Ariel's 
long 12's also burst. Barclay fought the Detroit 
exceedingly well, her guns being most excellently 
aimed, though they actually had to be discharged by 
flashing pistols at the touchholes, so deficient was the 
ship's equipment. Meanwhile the Caledonia came 
down too, but the Niagara was wretchedly handled, 
Elliott keeping at a distance which prevented the 
use either of his carronades or of those of the Queen 
Charlotte, his antagonist; the latter, however, suf- 
fered greatly from the long guns of the opposing 
schooners, and lost her gallant commander. Captain 
Finnis, and first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who were 
killed early in the action; her next in command, 

Vol. IX.— 14 



314 Naval War of 18 12 

Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he 
could do no good, passed the Hunter and joined in 
the attack on the Lawrence, at close quarters. The 
Niagara, the most efficient and best-manned of the 
American vessels, was thus almost kept out of the 
action by her captain's misconduct. At the end of 
the line the fight went on at long range between the 
Somers, Tigress, Porcupine, and Trippe on one side, 
and Little Belt and Lady Prevost on the other ; the 
Lady Prevost making a very noble fight, although 
her 12-pound carronades rendered her almost help- 
less against the long guns of the Americans. She 
was greatly cut up, her commander. Lieutenant 
Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieu- 
tenant, Mr. Roulette, severely, wounded, and she 
began falling gradually to leeward. 

The fighting at the head of the line was fierce 
and bloody to an extraordinary degree. The Scor- 
pion, Ariel, Lawrence, and Caledonia, all of them 
handled with the most determined courage, were 
opposed to the Chippeway, Detroit, Queen Char- 
lotte, and Hunter, which were fought to the full 
as bravely. At such close quarters the two sides 
engaged on about equal terms, the Americans being 
superior in weight of metal, and inferior in number 
of men. But the Lawrence had received such dam- 
age in working down as to make the odds against 
Perry. On each side almost the whole fire was di- 
rected at the opposing large vessel or vessels ; in con- 
sequence the Queen Charlotte was almost disabled, 
and the Detroit was also frightfully shattered, es- 



On the Lakes 315 

pecially by the raking fire of the gunboats, her first 
lieutenant, Mr. Garland, being mortally wounded, 
and Captain Barclay so severely injured that he was 
obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship in the 
command of Lieutenant George Liglis. But on 
board the Lawrence matters had gone even worse, 
the combined fire of her adversaries having made 
the grimmest carnage on her decks. Of the 103 
men who were fit for duty when she began the ac- 
tion, 83, or over four-fifths, were killed or wounded. 
The vessel was shallow, and the ward-room, used as 
a cock-pit, to which the wounded were taken, was 
mostly above water, and the shot came through it 
continually, killing and wounding many men under 
the hands of the surgeon. 

The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times 
wounded, but kept to the deck through all ; the only 
other lieutenant on board. Brooks, of the marines, 
was mortally wounded. Every brace and bowline 
was shot away, and the brig almost completely dis- 
mantled ; her hull was shattered to pieces, many shot 
going completely through it, and the guns on the 
engaged side were by degrees all dismounted. Perry 
kept up the fight with splendid courage. As the 
crew fell one by one, the commodore called down 
through the skylight for one of the surgeon's as- 
sistants; and this call was repeated and obeyed till 
none was left; then he asked, "Can any of the 
wounded pull a rope?" and three or four of them 
crawled up on deck to lend a feeble hand in placing 
the last guns. Perry himself fired the last effective 



3i6 Naval War of 1812 

heavy gun, assisted only by the purser and chaplain. 
A man who did not possess his indomitable spirit 
would have then struck. Instead, however, although 
failing in the attack so far, Perry merely determined 
to win by new methods, and remodeled the line ac- 
cordingly. Mr. Turner, in the Caledonia, when or- 
dered to close, had put his helm up, run down on the 
opposing line, and engaged at very short range, 
though the brig was absolutely without quarters. 
The Niagara had thus become the next in line astern 
of the Lawrence, and the sloop Trippe, having 
passed the three schooners in front of her, was next 
ahead. The Niagara now, having a breeze, steered 
for the head of Barclay's line, passing over a quarter 
of a mile to windward of the Lawrence, on her port 
beam. She was almost uninjured, having so far 
taken very little part in the combat, and to her Perry 
shifted his flag. Leaping into a row boat, with his 
brother and four seamen, he rowed to the fresh brig, 
where he arrived at 2.30, and at once sent Elliott 
astern to hurry up the three schooners. The Trippe 
was now very near the Caledonia. The Lawrence, 
having but 14 sound men left, struck her colors, but 
could not be taken possession of before the action re- 
commenced. She drifted astern, the Caledonia pass- 
ing between her and her foes. At 2.45 the 
schooners having closed up. Perry in his fresh ves- 
sel, bore up to break Barclay's line. 

The British ships had fought themselves to a 
standstill. The Lady Prevost was crippled and 
sagged to leeward, though ahead of the others. The 



On the Lakes 317 

Detroit and Queen Charlotte were so disabled that 
they could not effectually oppose fresh antagonists. 
There could thus be but little resistance to Perry, 
as the Niagara stood down, and broke the British 
line, firing her port guns into the Chippeway, Little 
Belt, and Lady Prevost, and the starboard ones into 
the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Hunter, raking on 
both sides. Too disabled to tack, the Detroit and 
Charlotte tried to wear, the latter running up to lee- 
ward of the former ; and, both vessels having every 
brace and almost every stay shot away, they fell 
foul. The Niagara luffed athwart their bows, with- 
in half pistol-shot, keeping up a terrific discharge of 
great guns and musketry, while on the other side the 
British vessels were raked by the Caledonia and 
the schooners so closely that some of their grape 
shot, passing over the foe, rattled through Perry's 
spars. Nothing further could be done, and Bar-_ 
clay's flag was struck at 3 p.m., after three and a 
quarter hours' most gallant and desperate fighting. 
The Chippeway and Little Belt tried to escape, but 
were overtaken and brought to respectively by the 
Trippe and Scorpion, the commander of the latter, 
Mr. Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had the 
first, shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has be- 
haved in the most humane and attentive manner, not 
only to myself and officers, but to all the wounded," 
writes Captain Barclay. 

The American squadron had suffered severely, 
more than two-thirds of the loss falling upon the 
Lawrence, which was reduced to the condition of a 



3i8 Naval War of 1812 

perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being com- 
pletely beaten in. She had, as already stated, 22 
men killed, including Lieutenant of Marines Brooks 
and Midshipman Lamb; and 61 wounded, including 
Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting second 
leutenant) Forrest, Sailing-master Taylor, Purser 
Hambleton, and Midshipmen Swartout and Clax- 
ton. The Niagara lost 2 killed and 25 wounded (al- 
most a fifth of her effective), including among 
the latter the second lieutenant, Mr. Edwards, and 
Midshipman Cummings. The Caledonia had 3, 
the Somers 2, and Trippe 2, men wounded. The 
Ariel had i killed and 3 wounded; the Scorpion 2 
killed, including Midshipman Lamb. The total loss 
was 123; 2^ were killed and 96 wounded, of whom 
3 died. 

The British loss, falling most heavily on the De- 
troit and Queen Charlotte, amounted to 41 killed 
(including Capt. S. J. Garden, R.N., and Captain R. 
A. Finnis), and 94 wounded (including Captain 
Barclay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Roulette, 
and Bignall) : in all 145. The first and second in 
command on every vessel were killed or wounded, 
a suf^cient proof of the desperate nature of the 
defence. 

The victory of Lake Erie was most important, 
both in its material results and in its moral effect. 
It gave us complete command of all the upper lakes, 
prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter, 
increased our prestige with the foe and our confi- 
dence in ourselves, and ensured the conquest of up- 



On the Lakes 319 

per Canada; in all these respects its importance has 
not been overrated. But the "glory" acquired by it 
most certainly has been estimated at more than its 
worth. Most Americans, even the well educated, if 
asked which was the most glorious victory of the 
war, would point to this battle. Captain Perry's 
name is more widely known than that of any other 
commander. Every schoolboy reads about him, if 
of no other sea-captain; yet he certainly stands on 
a lower grade than either Hull or Macdonough, 
and not a bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake 
Erie our seamen displayed great courage and skill ; 
but so did their antagonists. The simple truth is, 
that, where on both sides the officers and men were 
equally brave and skilful, the side which possessed 
the superiority in force, in the proportion of three to 
two, could not well help winning. The courage 
with which the Lawrence was defended has hardly 
ever been surpassed, and may fairly be called heroic ; 
but equal praise belongs to the men on board the 
Detroit, who had to discharge the great guns by 
flashing pistols at the touchholes, and yet made such 
a terribly effective defence. Courage is only one 
of the many elements which go to make up the char- 
acter of a first-class commander; something more 
than bravery is needed before a leader can be really 
called great. 

There happened to be circumstances which ren- 
dered the bragging of our writers over the victory 
somewhat plausible. Thus they could say with an 
appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns 



320 Naval War of 1812 

to our 54, and outnumbered us. In reality, as well 
as can be ascertained from the conflicting- evidence, 
he was inferior in number; but a few men more or 

The following diagrams will serve to explain the movements. 

I 




s 



=9 



si 



if ■ ^1 



§ s 



^ 



M 



I 



^ 



> 



I 



less mattered nothing. Both sides had men enough 
to work the guns and handle the ships, especially 
as the fight was in smooth water, and largely at 



On the Lakes 321 

long range. The important fact was that though 
we had nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they 
threw half as much metal again as those of our 
antagonist. With such odds in our favor it would 



J^ cmoir^ ""^ "^"-^ SCL9 

^' auMcarrt excfart 



^ ^ J^ -^a 



^ umtMu cSLOMu ^rtvpe 



/ 






8.00 P.M. 







«tW/M \ 



V 



/ 



t 



soMeiti^ ^ftias 



have been a disgrace to have been beaten. The 
water was too smooth for our two brigs to show 
at their best ; but this very smoothness rendered our 
gunboats more formidable than any of the British 



322 Naval War of 1812 

vessels, and the British testimony is unanimous, 
that it was to them the defeat was primarily due. 
The American fleet came into action in worse form 
than the hostile squadron, the ships straggling badly, 
either owing to Perry having formed his line badly, 
or else to his having failed to train the subordinate 
commanders how to keep their places. The Niagara 
was not fought well at first, Captain Elliott keeping 
her at a distance that prevented her from doing any 
damage to the vessels opposed, which were battered 
to pieces by the gunboats without the chance of re- 
plying. It certainly seems as if the small vessels 
at the rear of the line should have been closer up, 
and in a position to render more effectual assistance ; 
the attack was made in too loose order, and, whether 
it was the fault of Perry or of his subordinates, it 
fails to reflect credit on the Americans. Cooper, as 
usual, praises all concerned; but in this instance 
not with very good judgment. He says the line- 
of-battle was highly judicious, but this may be 
doubted. The weather was peculiarly suitable for 
the gunboats, with their long, heavy guns; and yet 
the line-of-battle was so arranged as to keep them 
in the rear, and let the brunt of the assault fall on 
the Lawrence, with her short carronades. Cooper 
again praises Perry for steering for the head of 
the enemy's line, but he could hardly have done any- 
thing else. In this battle the firing seems to have 
been equally skilful on both sides, the Detroit's long 
guns being peculiarly well served; but the British 
captains manoeuvred better than their foes at first, 



On the Lakes 323 

and supported one another better, so that the dis- 
parity in damage done on each side was not equal 
to the disparity in force. The chief merit of the 
American commander and his followers was indom- 
itable courage, and determination not to be beaten. 
This is no slight merit ; but it may well be doubted 
if it would have ensured victory had Barclay's force 
been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a headlong 
attack ; his superior force, whether through his fault 
or his misfortune can hardly be said, being brought 
into action in such a manner that the head of the 
line was crushed by the inferior force opposed. 
Being literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry 
brought up its powerful twin-sister, and the already 
shattered hostile squadron was crushed by sheer 
weight. The manoeuvres which marked the close 
of the battle, and which ensured the capture of all 
the opposing ships, were unquestionably very fine. 
The British ships were fought as resolutely as 
their antagonists, not being surrendered till they 
were crippled and helpless, and almost all the offi- 
cers, and a large proportion of the men placed hoi's 
de combat. Captain Barclay handled his ships like 
a first-rate seaman. It was impossible to arrange 
them so as to be superior to his antagonist, for the 
latter's force was of such a nature that in smooth 
water his gunboats gave him a great advantage, 
while in any sea his two brigs were more than a 
match for the whole British squadron. In short, 
our victory was due to our heavy metal. As regards 
the honor of the affair, in spite of the amount of 



324 Naval War of 1812 

boasting it has g-iven rise to, I should say it was a 
battle to be looked upon as in an equally high degree 
creditable to both sides. Indeed, if it were not for 
the fact that the victory was so complete, it might 
be said that the length of the contest and the trifling 
disparity in loss reflected rather the most credit on 
the British. Captain Perry showed indomitable 
pluck and readiness to adapt himself to circum- 
stances; but his claim to fame rests much less on 
his actual victory than on the way in which he pre- 
pared the fleet that was to win it. Here his energy 
and activity deserve all praise, not only for his 
success in collecting sailors and vessels and in build- 
ing the two brigs, but above all for the manner 
in which he succeeded in getting them out on the 
lake. On that occasion he certainly out-generaled 
Barclay; indeed the latter committed an error that 
the skill and address he subsequently showed could 
not retrieve. But it will always be a source of sur- 
prise that the American public should have so glori- 
fied Perry's victory over an inferior force, and have 
paid comparatively little attention to Macdonough's 
victory, which really was won against decided odds 
in ships, men, and metal. 

There are always men who consider it unpatriotic 
to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flattering; 
but, aside from the morality of the case, we never 
can learn how to produce a certain effect unless we 
know rightly what the causes were that produced 
a similar effect in times past. Lake Erie teaches us 
the advantage of having the odds on our side; 



On the Lakes 325 

Lake Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill 
can still counteract them. It is amusing to read 
some of the pamphlets written "in reply" to Cooper's 
account of this battle, the writers apparently regard- 
ing him as a kind of traitor for hinting that the vic- 
tory was not "Nelsonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The 
arguments are stereotyped : Perry had 9 fewer guns, 
and also fewer men than the foe. This last point 
is the only one respecting which there is any doubt. 
Taking sick and well together, the Americans un- 
questionably had the greatest number in crew ; but 
a quarter of them were sick. Even deducting these 
they were still, in all probability, more numerous 
than their foes. 

But it is really not a point of much consequence, 
as both sides had enough, as stated, to serve the 
guns and handle the ships. In sea-fights, after there 
are enough hands for those purposes additional ones 
are not of so much advantage. I have in all my 
accounts summed up as accurately as possible the 
contending forces, because it is so customary with 
British writers to follow James' minute and inac- 
curate statements, that I thought it best to give 
everything exactly; but it was really scarcely nec- 
essary, and, indeed, it is impossible to compare 
forces numerically. Aside from a few exceptional 
cases, the number of men, after a certain point was 
reached, made little difference. For example, the 
Java would fight just as effectually with 377 men, 
the number James gives her, as with 426. the num- 
ber I think she really had. Again, my figures make 



326 Naval War of 1812 

the Wasp slightly superior in force to the Frolic, 
as she had 25 men the most; but in reality, as the 
battle was fought under very short sail, and decided 
purely by gunnery, the difference in number of crew 
was not of the least consequence. The Hornet had 
nine men more than the Penguin, and it would be 
absurd to say that this gave her much advantage. 
In both the latter cases, the forces were practically 
equal, although, numerically expressed, the odds 
were in favor of the Americans. The exact reverse 
is the case in the last action of the Constitution. 
Here, the Levant and Cyane had all the men they 
required, and threw a heavier broadside than their 
foe. Expressed in numbers, the odds against them 
were not great, but numbers could not express the 
fact that carronades were opposed to long guns, and 
two small ships to one big one. Again, though in 
the action on Lake Champlain numbers do show a 
slight advantage both in weight, metal, and number 
of men on the British side, they do not make the 
advantage as great as it really was, for they do not 
show that the British possessed a frigate with a 
main-deck battery of 24-pounders, which was equal 
to the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly 
as the Constitution was superior to the Cyane and 
Levant.^^ And on the same principles I think that 

'' It must always be remembered that these rules cut both 
ways. British writers are very eloquent about the disadvan- 
tage in which carronades placed the Cyane and Levant, but 
do not hint that the Essex suffered from a precisely similar 
cause, in addition to her other misfortunes; either they 



On the Lakes 327 

every fair-minded man must admit the great supe- 
riority of Perry's fleet over Barclay's, though the 
advantage was greater in carronades than in long 
guns. 

But to admit this by no means precludes us from 
taking credit for the victory. Almost all the victo- 
ries gained by the English over the Dutch in the 
17th century were due purely to great superiority 
in force. The cases have a curious analogy to this 
lake battle. Perry won with 54 guns against Bar- 
clay's 63; but the odds were largely in his favor. 
Blake won a doubtful victory on the i8th of Feb- 
ruary, 1653, with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but 
the English vessels were twice the size of the Dutch, 
and in number of men and weight of metal greatly 
their superior. The English were excellent fighters, 

should give the Constittition more credit or the Phoebe less. 
So the Confiance, throwing 480 pounds of metal at a broad- 
side, was really equal to both the Eagle and Saratoga, who 
jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384 pounds, 
from her carronades 96. Their long guns threw 168, their 
carronades 510. Now the 32-pound carronade, mounted on 
the spar-deck of a 38-gun frigate, was certainly much less 
formidable than the long 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it 
probably ranked more nearly with a long 12, in the ordinary 
chances of war (and it must be remembered that Downie 
was the attacking party and chose his own position, so far 
as Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let him). 
So that in comparing the forces, the carronades should not 
be reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns, 
and we get, as a mere approximation, 384 -|- 48 = 432, against 
168 -f 255 = 423. At any rate, British writers, as well as 
Americans, should remember that if the Constituti07t was 
greatly superior to her two foes, then the Confiance was 
certainly equal to the Eagle and Saratoga , and vice versa. 



328 Naval War of 1812 

but no better than the Dutch, and none o£ their 
admirals of that period deserves to rank with De 
Ruyter. Again, the great victory of La Hogue was 
won over a very much smaller French fleet, after 
a day's hard fighting, which resulted in the capture 
of one vessel! This victory was most exultingly 
chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry had 
fought Barclay all day and only succeeded in captur- 
ing the Little Belt. Most of Lord Nelson's suc- 
cesses were certainly won against heavy odds by 
his great genius and the daring skill of the captains 
who served under him; but the battle of the Baltic, 
as far as the fighting went, reflected as much honor 
on the defeated Danes as on the mighty sea-chief 
who conquered them. Many a much-vaunted vic- 
tory, both on sea and land, has really reflected less 
credit on the victors than the battle of Lake Erie 
did on the Americans. And it must always be re- 
membered that a victory, honorably won, if even 
over a weaker foe, does reflect credit on the nation 
by whom it is gained. It was creditable to us as a 
nation that our ships were better made and better 
armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was 
creditable to them that a few years before their ves- 
sels had stood in the same relation to the Dutch 
ships.^^ It was greatly to our credit that we had 

'^ After Lord Duncan's victory at Camperdown, James 
chronicled the fact that all the captured line-of-battle ships 
were such poor craft as not to be of as much value as so 
many French frigates. This at least showed that the Dutch 
sailors must have done well to have made such a bloody and 



On the Lakes 329 

been enterprising enough to fit out such an effective 
Httle flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry de- 
serves the highest praise.^ ^ 

Before leaving the subject it is worth while mak- 
ing a few observations on the men who composed 
the crews. James, who despised a Canadian as 
much as he hated an American, gives as one excuse 
for the defeat, the fact that most of Barclay's crew 
were Canadians, whom he considers to be "sorry 
substitutes." On each side the regular sailors, from 
the seaboard, were not numerous enough to permit 
the battle to be fought purely by them. Barclay 
took a number of soldiers of the regular army, and 
Perry a number of militia, aboard; the former had 
a few Indian sharp-shooters, the latter quite a num- 
ber of negroes. A great many men in each fleet 
were lake sailors, frontiersmen, and these were the 
especial objects of James' contempt; but it may be 
doubted if they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navi- 
gation, used to contests with Indians and whites, 
naturally forced to be good sailors, and skilful in 
the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained 
by good men and on their own waters, the very best 
possible material. Certainly the battle of Lake Erie, 
fought mainly by Canadians, was better contested 

obstinate fight as they did, with the materials they had. 
According to his own statements, the loss was about propor 
tional to the forces in action. It was another parallel to 
Perry's victory. 

^' Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant ap- 
probation, to which the answer must be that a history isnot 
a panegyric. 



330 Naval War of 1 8 12 

than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly by 
British. 

The difference between the American and British 
seamen on the Atlantic was small, but on the lakes 
what little there was disappeared. A New Eng- 
lander and an Old Englander differed little enough, 
but they differed more than a frontiersman bom 
north of the line did from one bom south of it. 
These last two resembled one another more nearly 
than either did the parent. There had been no long- 
established naval school on the lakes, and the British 
sailors that came up there were the best of their 
kind; so the combatants were really so evenly 
matched in courage, skill, and all other fighting 
qualities, as to make it impossible to award the palm 
to either for these attributes. The dogged obstinacy 
of the fighting, the skilful firing and manoeuvring, 
and the daring and coolness with which cutting-out 
expeditions were planned and executed, were as 
marked on one side as the other. The only un- 
English element in the contest was the presence 
among the Canadian English of some of the de- 
scendants of the Latin race from whom they had 
conquered the country. Otherwise the men were 
equally matched, but the Americans owed their suc- 
cess — for the balance of success was largely on their 
side — to the fact that their officers had been trained 
in the best and most practical, although the smallest, 
navy of the day. The British sailors on the lakes 
were as good as our own, but no better. None of 
their commanders compares with Macdonough. 



On the Lakes 331 

Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which 
he got his fleet ready; his victory over Barclay was 
precisely similar to the quasi-victories of Blake over 
the Dutch, which have given that admiral such 
renown. Blake's success in attacking Spanish and 
Algerian forts is his true title to fame. In his 
engagements with the Dutch fleets (as well as in 
those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is no 
greater and no less than Perry's. Each made a 
headlong attack, with furious, stubborn courage, and 
by dint of sheer weight crushed or disabled a greatly 
inferior foe. In the fight that took place on Feb. 
18, 1653, ^^ Ruyter's ship carried but 34 guns,^^ 
and yet with it he captured the Prosperous of 54; 
which vessel was stronger than any in the Dutch 
fleet. The fact that Blake's battles were generally 
so indecisive must be ascribed to the fact that his 
opponents were, though inferior in force, superior 
in skill. No decisive defeat was inflicted on the 
Dutch until Tromp's death. Perry's operations were 
on a very small, and Blake's on a very large, scale; 
but whereas Perry left no antagonists to question 
his claim to victory, Blake's successes were suffi- 
ciently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in almost 
every instance claiming that they had won, or else 
that it was a draw. Of course it is absurd to put 
Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked with a 

•^ "La Vie et Les Actions Memorables de Lt. -Admiral 
Michel De Ruyter" (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way, 
why is Tromp always called Van Tromp by English writers? 
It would be quite as correct for a Frenchman to speak of 
MacNelson. 



23^ Naval War of 1812 

fleet forty times the strength of the other's flotilla ; 
but the way in which the work was done was ver>' 
similar. And it must always be remembered that 
when Perry fought this battle he was but 27 years 
old ; and the commanders of his other vessels were 
younger still. 

CHAMPLAIN 

The commander on this lake at this time was 
Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who had super- 
seded the former commander, Lieutenant Sydney 
Smith, — whose name was a curious commentary on 
the close inter-relationship of the two contesting 
peoples. The American naval force now consisted 
of two sloops, the Groivler and Eagle, each mount- 
ing II guns, and six galleys, mounting one gun 
each. Lieutenant Smith was sent down with his 
two sloops to harass the British gunboats, which 
were stationed round the head of Sorel River, the 
outlet to Lake Champlain. On June 3d he chased 
three gunboats into the river, the wind being aft, 
up to within sight of the fort of Isle-aux-noix. A 
strong British land-force, under Major-General Tay- 
lor, now came up both banks of the narrow stream, 
and joined the three gunboats in attacking the sloops. 
The latter tried to beat up the stream, but the cur- 
rent was so strong and the wind so light that no 
headway could be made. The gunboats kept out 
of range of the sloop's guns, while keeping up a 
hot fire from their long 24's, to which no reply 
could be made; but the galling fire of the infantry 
who lined the banks was responded to by showers 



On the Lakes 333 

of grape. After three hours' conflict, at 12.30, 
a 24-pound shot from one of the galleys struck the 
Eagle under her starboard quarter, and ripped out 
a whole plank under water. She sank at once, but 
it was in such shoal water that she did not settle 
entirely, and none of the men were drowned. Soon 
afterward the Growler had her forestay and main- 
boom shot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran 
ashore and was also captured. The Growler had 
I killed and 8 wounded, the Eagle 11 wounded; 
their combined crews, including 34 volunteers, 
amounted to 112 men. The British gunboats 
suffered no loss; of the troops on shore three 
were wounded, one dangerously, by grape.^^ Lieu- 
tenant Smith had certainly made a very plucky 
fight, but it was a great mistake to get cooped up 
in a narrow channel, with wind and current dead 
against him. It was a very creditable success to 
the British, and showed the effectiveness of well- 
handled gunboats under certain circumstances. The 
possession of these two sloops gave the command 
of the lake to the British. Macdonough at once 
set about building others, but with all his energy 
the materials at hand were so deficient that he could 
not get them finished in time. On July 31st, 1,000 
British troops, under Col. J. Murray, convoyed by 
Captain Thomas Everard, with the sloops Chrihh 
and Finch (late Growler and Eagle) and three gun- 

^3 Letter from Major-General Taylor (British) to Major- 
General Stone, June 3, 1813. Lossinf? says the loss of the 
British was "probably at least one hundred" — on what au- 
thority, if any, I do not know. 



\ 



334 Naval War of 1812 

boats, landed at Plattsburg and destroyed all the 
barracks and stores both there and at Saranac. For 
some reason Colonel Murray left so precipitately 
that he overlooked a picket of 20 of his men, who 
were captured; then he made descents on two or 
three other places, and returned to the head of the 
lake by Aug. 3d. Three days afterward, on Aug. 
6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the 
President, Montgomery, and Preble, of 7 guns each, 
and also six gunboats ; which force enabled him to 
prevent any more plundering expeditions taking 
place that summer, and to convoy Hampton's troops 
when they made an abortive effort to penetrate into 
Canada by the Sorel River on Sept. 21st. 

BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1&13. 

Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks. 



Ship, 


600 


24 


Burnt on stocks. 


Gloucester, 


180 


10 


Taken at York. 


Mary, 


80 


3 


Burnt. 


Drumtnond, 


80 


3 


Captured. 


Lady Core', 


80 


3 


*t 


Schooner, 


80 


3 


<• 


Detroit, 


490 


»9 


<i 


Queen Charlotttt 


400 


»7 


<■ 


Lady Prevost, 


210 


J3 


M 


Hunter, 


180 


10 


U 


Chippeway, 


70 


I 


tt 


Rattle Belt, 


90 


_3 





12 vessels. 


2,560 


109 





AMERICAN LOSS.» 

Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks. 

Growler, 1J2 11 Capjttired. 

Eagle, no li " 



i vessels, 222 22 

s* Excluding the Growler dxA Julia, which were recaptured. 



e> 



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